Caussade v. Rodríguez

Decision Date23 September 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL NO.: 13-1761 (MEL)
PartiesVÍCTOR VELÁZQUEZ CAUSSADE, et al. Plaintiffs, v. RAMÓN ORTA RODRÍGUEZ, et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
OPINION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND

Víctor Velázquez Caussade ("Velázquez") and José Pérez Olivares ("Pérez") were employees of the Commonwealth Department of Sports and Recreation in Mayagüez. Defendant Benjamín Cruz Lugo ("Cruz") was the Regional Director and Ramón Orta Rodríguez ("Orta") was the Secretary of the Department. On October 10, 2013, Velázquez, Sylvia M. Meléndez Santiago ("Meléndez"), Pérez, and Maraliz González ("González") filed an amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the "Commonwealth"), Orta, and Cruz, in their official and personal capacities, alleging violations of their rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, under §§ 1, 4, 6, and 7 of Article II of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 136-38, 146. ECF No. 5. On March 18, 2014, the court dismissed Mélendez's and González's First Amendment claims (ECF No. 37) and all remaining claims by the two on August 7, 2015 (ECF No. 154). On March 25, 2014 the court dismissed all Fifth Amendment claims in this case (ECF No. 39). On July 31, 2015, all Fourteenth Amendment claims were dismissed. ECF No. 127.

On August 8, 2015, a federal jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but declined to find liability against Orta. Specifically, the jury found that both Velázquez and Pérez had experienced a change in their employment making their work situation unreasonably inferior to the norm for their positions. The jury further found that Cruz knew the political affiliations of both Velázquez and Pérez, that those affiliations were a substantial and motivating factor in the adverse employment action against both, and that his acts or omissions caused the politically motivated deprivation of the duties of both. ECF No. 167, at 1, 8. The jury found that no amount of money was required to compensate each employee for their damages caused by the deprivation of duties. Id. at 3, 10. The jury additionally found that Cruz's conduct was malicious or in reckless disregard of both Velázquez and Pérez's First Amendment rights, and accordingly awarded each two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) in punitive damages. Id. at 3, 5. Currently pending before the court are the motion for judgment as a matter of law (ECF No. 188) and motion to set aside verdict (ECF No. 172) both filed by Cruz and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (collectively "defendants").

II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 provides, in pertinent part:

If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.

Fed R. Civ. P. 50(a). Review of a Rule 50 motion is strongly weighted toward preservation of the jury verdict, and the "court is without authority to set aside a jury verdict and direct entry of a contrary verdict unless the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict adverse to that party." Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, 19 F.3d 755, 759-60 (1st Cir. 1994); see N. Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2005). "When ruling upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial judge may not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence, or attempt to resolve conflicting testimony, because credibility questions are within the exclusive province of the jury. The judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and grant that party every reasonable inference that the jury might have found in its favor." Acevedo García v. Vera Monroig, 213 F.Supp.2d 42, 47 (D.P.R.2002) (internal citations omitted). Defendants argued their Rule 50 motion originally at trial. ECF No. 162. The court held it in abeyance at that time and revisits it here.

B. Political Discrimination

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution embodies the right to be free from political discrimination. Barry v. Moran, 661 F.3d 696, 699 (1st Cir. 2011). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that that right prohibits government officials from "taking adverse action against public employees on the basis of political affiliation, unless political loyalty is an appropriate requirement of the employment." Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). A prima facie case of political discrimination based on the First Amendment consists of four elements: "(1) that the plaintiff and defendant have opposing political affiliations, (2) that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's affiliation, (3) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (4) that politicalaffiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action." Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Vélez, 630 F.3d 228, 239 (1st Cir. 2010). "Once made, the defendant may then rebut that showing with what is commonly referred to as the Mt. Healthy defense: by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the governmental agency would have taken the same action," regardless of plaintiff's political affiliation. Reyes-Pérez v. State Ins. Fund Corp., 755 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Díaz-Bigio v. Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2011)).

The only aspect of this analysis challenged by defendants is whether plaintiffs suffered adverse employment action. Where an employee suing under § 1983 claims that a diminution in his or her duties occurred, the court must "determine whether the new work conditions would place substantial pressure on even one of thick skin to conform to the prevailing political view. This level of burden is reached . . . when the employer's challenged actions result in a work situation 'unreasonably inferior' to the norm for the position." Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1219 (1st Cir. 1989).1 To meet this standard, plaintiff must establish a change in conditions by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1220 (noting that proof of an employer's political motivation need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence). In order to determine whether such a reduction in duties has occurred, "the factfinder should canvass the specific ways in which the plaintiff's job has changed" in order to reach a determination as to "whether the 'new' job is unreasonably inferior to the one she previouslyhad." Id. at 1219-20; see also Ortiz García v. Toledo Fernández, 405 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that in reduction of responsibilities cases the factfinder must determine if "the position she occupies now materially differs from the position as it existed previously."). "[T]he factfinder's responsibility, in brief, is to determine whether the employee has retained duties, perquisites and a working environment appropriate for his or her rank and title." Agosto-de-Feliciano, 889 F.2d at 1220.

C. Velázquez

In cases in which an employee held a trust position for a limited duration and also retained a career position, the removal of the duties associated with that trust position after a change in administration does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Ortiz García v. Toledo Fernández, 405 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2005). ("While Ortiz held the Agronomist IV position before being promoted to a trust position, she has not presented evidence comparing her duties to her duties when she previously held the [Agronomist IV] position. Thus, a factfinder would have no way to know whether the position she occupies now materially differs from the position as it existed previously."); and Agosto-de-Feliciano, 889 F.2d 1209 ("An employee who previously had predominantly exciting and responsible work and who was left with only a few routine and technical assignments could be found to meet [the 'unreasonably inferior'] standard so long as his prior duties reflected the usual nature of his position rather than his prior high status as a member of the then-prevailing party.").

At the times relevant to the alleged political discrimination, Velázquez served as Regional Deputy Director for the Commonwealth Sports and Recreation Department. The position of regional deputy director is a career position. ECF No. 183, at 5:4-5. In the past Velázquez has twice served as Regional Director, which is a trust position. Id., at 6:22-24. Forthe four years preceding the 2012 election, Velázquez served as the de facto or interim Regional Director. ECF No. 181, at 20:4-25. On February 1, 2013, after the election of a new administration, Cruz was appointed Regional Director. ECF No. 183, at 10:6-10, 51:9-13.

Velázquez testified that he held the position of Regional Deputy Director under Regional Director David Vázquez in 2001. ECF No. 183, at 8:10-13. When asked whether he had "any problems as to performing the responsibilities and functions of deputy director" under Vázquez, he responded "I - we work real well." Id., at 8:14-17. In 2004, Velázquez also held the position of Deputy Director under Regional Director Nelson Vélez. Id., at 8:18-25. Velázquez testified that during that time "there was no problem at all." Id., at 9:1.

Under Regional Director Cruz, however, Velázquez testified that, with a few exceptions detailed below, most days he would do "nothing." ECF No. 181, at 12:24. "For seven hours - seven and a half hours per day," Velázquez...

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