Cavalcante v. Lockheed Electronics Co.

• Decision Date: 20 October 1964
• Docket Number: No. 867,867
• Citation: 204 A.2d 621,85 N.J.Super. 320
• Parties: Angela Ann CAVALCANTE, Petitioner Respondent, v. LOCKHEED ELECTRONICS COMPANY a corporation, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey County Court

Page 320

85 N.J.Super. 320

204 A.2d 621

Angela Ann CAVALCANTE, Petitioner Respondent, v. LOCKHEED ELECTRONICS COMPANY a corporation, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 867.

Union County Court Law Division, New Jersey.

Oct. 20, 1964.

Thomas E. O'Gorman, Newark, for petitioner-respondent.

John C. Demos, Newark, for respondent-appellant (Schreiber, Lancaster & Demos, Newark, attorneys, Gerald W. Conway, Newark, on the brief).

HOPKINS, J.C.C.

Lockheed Electronics Company (Lockheed) appeals from an award of the statutory compensation benefits to Angela Cavalcante for the death of her husband Richard, pursuant to R.S. 34:15--7, N.J.S.A. The essential facts are not disputed but the legal issue involved creates what appears to be a case of novel impression in this State.

Decedent was employed as an electronics technician by Lockheed, with his regular place of employment being the Lockheed plant in Plainfield, New Jersey. Prior to April 1962 Lockheed had contracted for certain work, the nature of which is unimportant, at the United States Naval Base in New London, Connecticut. In April 1962 Cavalcante, along with four other Lockheed employees, volunteered to go to New London in order to expedite and clean up this particular project. The job in New London was only a temporary one, expected to last only a week. It was described in the testimony as a 'crash program' and 'clean up' job. In addition to their normal salary, the men were given an advance allowance to pay for their lodging, meals, laundry and telephone calls. Three men, including the decedent, drove their own cars and received mileage and toll expenses. Decedent was in charge of this work team.

The men left Plainfield on Monday, April 23, 1962, and arrived in New London at about 4:30 that afternoon. After checking into a motel the men changed clothing and went over to the naval base to work, eating on the way. They worked that night from 6 P.M. until approximately 2 A.M. Tuesday morning. On Tuesday they worked from about 9 or 9:30 A.M. until 1:30 A.M. on Wednesday, except for time off for food. On Wednesday, April 25, 1962, they worked from about 9 or 9:30 A.M. until 6 P.M. They all had dinner in a nearby restaurant and then all returned to their motel at about 8:30 P.M. After showering and making telephone calls to their wives, they all decided to 'go out and see what New London was like,' arriving in town at about 10 P.M.

When they arrived in New London they went to an establishment called the Seven Brothers Restaurant. This is 'a bar and a restaurant and dance hall.' They were 'drinking beer, listening to the music and talking over our work and what had to be done, what was left to be done and what we had accomplished so far.' It was also established below that they were dancing and drinking scotch and sodas, decedent included. At 11:30 P.M. the decedent had a hamburger and coffee. When the Seven Brothers closed at midnight, the five men left and stood outside on the sidewalk, smoking and continuing their conversation, until about 12:30 A.M. on Thursday, April 26, 1962. Then they got into the decedent's car in which they had come to town, and started on the fatal journey toward their motel. The car went off the road when the decedent failed to negotiate a hidden curve in the road. As a result of this accident, Cavalcante died. The Division of Workmen's Compensation found that this accident arose out of and in the course of decedent's employment and made the award to the petitioner-wife which is the subject of this appeal.

In its appeal Lockheed argues strenuously that decedent's accident and death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, that there was no causal connection between the conditions of the work and the resulting injury, and that the injury did not have its origin in a risk connected with the employment, nor did it flow from that source as a natural consequence. It contends that Cavalcante's death did not occur as a result of an accident while driving to or from the naval base at Lockheed's expense. Cf. Filson v. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 82 N.J.Super. 185, 197 A.2d 196 (App.Div.1964). Nor did it occur while he was returning to his motel after having dinner at a restaurant while away from home on his employer's business. Cf. Robinson v. Federal Telephone and Radio Corp., 44 N.J.Super. 294, 130 A.2d 386 (App.Div.1957). It contends that the outermost limits of coverage for the traveling employee were established in Robinson, where the Appellate Division said:

"* * * Where service to an employer imposes the need for travel there must be reasonably included within the scope of the employment the performance of such acts as are reasonably necessary to serve the basic subsistence needs of the employee." (at p. 299, 130 A.2d at p. 388.)

Lockheed argues that the acts of the decedent and his associates in the present case were not reasonably necessary to serve their basic subsistence needs, and that in fact the decedent had finished his work for the day, had had his evening meal, and from that time on his time was his own, just as if he had finished a long overtime session at the Plainfield plant at home. It contends that the evening trip from its start to its unfortunate finish was clearly an abandonment of and departure from the employment on a purely personal matter, having no connection whatever with the duties of his employment, his meals, his travel or his living conditions.

It is basic that an accident arises 'in the course of' employment when it occurs (a) within the period of employment, (b) at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and (c) while he is fulfilling the duties of the employment, or doing something incidental to it. It arises 'out of' the employment when the risk of such an occurrence is reasonably incident to the employment. Such a risk is one that grows out of or is connected with what a workman has to do in fulfilling his contract of service. Belyus v. Wilkinson, Gaddis & Co., 115 N.J.L. 43, 47, 178 A. 181 (Sup.Ct.1935), affirmed per curiam, 116 N.J.L. 92, 182 A. 873 (E. & A. 1936). It immediately becomes evident that the standard always is reasonableness. Furthermore, the courts take the position that:

'An employee does not have to be actually engaged in work for the employer at the time of an accident. Van Note v. Combs, 24 N.J.Super. 529, 533, 95 A.2d 12 (App.Div.1953). If the injury arises out of a risk which is reasonably incidental to the conditions and circumstances of the employment, the requirements for recovery are satisfied.' Buerkle v. United Parcel Service, 26 N.J.Super. 404, 407, 98 A.2d 327, 329 (App.Div.1953).

See also Rice v. Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 65 N.J.Super. 579, 168 A.2d 201 (App.Div.1961), and Dooley v. Smith's Transfer Co., 26 N.J.Misc. 129, 133, 57 A.2d 554 (Dept. Labor, 1948).

Where an employee is traveling on a business trip away from his home, 'reasonableness' within the meaning of the Belyus and Buerkle cases, cited above, is given a very liberal construction. In Robinson v. Federal Telephone & Radio, supra, the court quoted with approval from Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1945), when it said:

"* * * The eating of meals, while a pleasure indulged in by a traveling salesman and all mankind, is as necessary to the continuance of his duties as the breath of life; and where his duties take him away from his home, his acts of ministration to himself should not--and we believe do not--take him outside the scope of his employment, so long as he performs these acts in a normal and prudent manner. Such activities, the performance of which are necessary to his health and comfort, while in a sense personal to himself are nevertheless incidents of his employment * * *." (at 44 N.J.Super. at p. 300, 130 A.2d at p. 389)

In Hancock v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 21 A.D.2d 703, 249 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (App.Div.1964), the court said, '(t)he test to be applied is whether the activity is Reasonable activity at that place * * *.' (Emphasis supplied)

It therefore becomes necessary to examine what acts, which 'are reasonably necessary to serve the basic subsistence needs of the employee,' and are to be 'reasonably included within the scope of the employment,' come within the meaning of the Robinson case.

In determining this question it is proper and necessary and within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act to look at the 'nature of the employment environment, (and) the characteristics of human nature.' 1 Larson Workmen's Compensation Law, sec. 20.00, p. 295 (1952). It must be kept in mind that 'work-connected activity goes beyond the direct services performed for the employer and includes at least some ministration to the personal comfort and human wants of the employee.' Ibid., sec. 20.10, p. 295. In Secor v. Penn Service Garage, 35 N.J.Super. 59, 113 A.id 177 (App.Div.1955), affirmed 19 N.J. 315, 320, 117 A.2d 12 (1955), the Supreme Court recognized that 'normal human tendencies' must be given weight. In Davis v. Newsweek Magazine, 305 N.Y. 20, 110 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1953), the Court of Appeals recognized that while an employee is on a business trip, 'the employee is not expected to wait immobile' during periods of layover. Further, the Appellate Division, in quoting from the trial opinion in Robinson v. Federal Telephone & Radio Corporation, supra, 44 N.J.Super., at p. 299, 130 A.2d at p. 388 sa...