Cavallaro v. Umass Mem'l Health Care, Inc.

Decision Date28 January 2013
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 09–40152–FDS.
Citation971 F.Supp.2d 139
PartiesPatricia CAVALLARO, on behalf of herself and all other employees similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UMASS MEMORIAL HEALTH CARE, INC., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jody L. Newman, William A. Haddad, Boston, MA, Justin M. Cordello, Michael J. Lingle, Patrick J. Solomon, Jessica L. Witenko, Peter J. Glennon, Thomas & Solomon, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff.

Angelo Spinola, Gregory C. Keating, Lisa A. Schreter, Anne M. Mellen, Bradley E. Strawn, Littler Mendelson, PC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

SAYLOR, District Judge.

This is an employment dispute about compensation for extra time worked. Plaintiff Patricia Cavallaro, on behalf of herself and all other employees similarly situated, brought suit against various relatedhospitals and health-care providers and two healthcare executives. She contends that defendants employ a variety of policies to deny employees compensation for time worked during meal breaks and before and after shifts. The complaint seeks relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.

Pending before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss all claims against all defendants except UMass Memorial Medical Center, Inc. and to dismiss or strike collective action allegations.1

I. BackgroundA. Factual Background

Unless otherwise indicated, all facts are stated as set forth in the complaint.

Plaintiff Patricia Cavallaro worked at UMass Memorial Medical Center in Worcester, Massachusetts, as an hourly employee from August 2002 until December 2008. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 101). During that time, she was employed as a registered nurse in the Cardiac Telemetry Unit. (Compl. ¶ 101). She received her paychecks from UMass Memorial Medical Center. ( Id.).

Cavallaro purports to represent a class of some 13,000 similarly situated individuals who were not paid by defendants for all the hours they worked. (Compl. ¶¶ 5–6). According to the complaint, this class includes the following hourly employees:

secretaries, housekeepers, custodians, clerks, porters, registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, transport nurses, nurse aides, administrative assistants, anesthetists, clinicians, medical coders, medical underwriters, nurse case managers, nurse interns, nurse practitioners, nurse aides, practice supervisors, professional staff nurses, quality coordinators, resource pool nurses, respiratory therapists, senior research associates, operating room coordinators, surgical specialists, admissions officers, student nurse techs, trainers, transcriptionists, occupational therapists, occupational therapy assistants, physical therapists, physical therapy assistants, radiation therapists, staff therapists, angiotechnologists, x-ray technicians, CAT scan technicians, mammographers, MRI technologists, sleep technologists, surgical technologists, radiographers, phlebotomists, respiratory technicians, respiratory care specialists, respiratory care practitioners, clinical coordinators, medical assistants, home care nurses, home health aides, clinical case managers, midwives and other health care workers.

(Compl. ¶ 131).

The complaint alleges that Cavallaro worked time in addition to her scheduled shifts for which she did not receive compensation. For example, Cavallaro performed her regular duties during her meal breaks, without compensation. (Compl. ¶ 101). These duties included charting, responding to codes, answering questions from nurses or physicians, and attending in-service trainings. ( Id.). She also worked for approximately 15–30 minutes before each shift, and approximately 30–45 minutes after each shift, without compensation. ( Id.). Her tasks during that time included reading and creating charts and reports, as well as preparing and distributing medication. ( Id.).

Defendants UMass Memorial Health Care, Inc.; UMass Memorial Hospitals, Inc.; UMass Memorial Medical Center, Inc.; HealthAlliance Hospitals, Inc.; Marlborough Hospital; Clinton Hospital Association; and Wing Memorial Hospital Association are hospitals and health-care providers. According to Cavallaro, they are related organizations with common membership, governing bodies, trustees, officers, and benefit plans. (Compl. ¶ 10).

The complaint alleges a number of ways in which defendants operate as a cohesive system. The hospitals represent themselves in publications as an integrated health care system. (Compl. ¶ 20). They have centralized financial, payroll, and health records systems (Compl. ¶ 24); use a centralized website for job postings (Compl. ¶ 25); and maintain system-wide employee-benefit plans and human-resources policies (Compl. ¶ 28). In addition, the complaint alleges that a single Board of Trustees oversees the entire system. (Compl. ¶ 30).

According to the complaint, UMass Memorial Health Care, Inc. (UMMHC) is the “parent” company of all other corporate defendants. (Compl. ¶ 27). UMMHC's Form 990 form indicates that the company owns hospital facilities including UMass Memorial Medical Center, Inc.; HealthAlliance Hospital; Marlborough Hospital; Clinton Hospital Association; and Wing Memorial Hospital Corporation. (Compl. ¶ 32).

Defendants John O'Brien and Patricia Webb are executive officers employed by one or more of the defendants. According to the complaint, O'Brien is the President and CEO of “UMass,” a term it defines as describing all corporate defendants collectively. (Compl. ¶ 40). It further alleges that O'Brien has operational control over an integrated health-care system, including all defendants, and makes decisions that concern the policies (including human-resources policies) that the different hospitals adopt and implement. (Compl. ¶¶ 41, 44). It alleges that he has authority to oversee employment decisions, including hiring and firing, and to make decisions concerning employees' schedules, standard benefit levels, and maintenance of payroll-record systems. (Compl. ¶¶ 52, 56, 64–66).

According to the complaint, defendant Patricia Webb was an executive officer who was employed by one or more of the defendants until 2010. It alleges that Webb was the Senior Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer of “UMass,” again defined as describing all corporate defendants collectively. (Compl. ¶ 74). It further alleges that she was responsible for and authorized to direct all aspects of human-resources functions for all defendants. (Compl. ¶ 75). It alleges that she counseled defendants on employment decisions, including hiring and firing; helped set employees' schedules, hours, and standard benefit levels; was actively involved in drafting human-resources policies and overseeing compliance with those policies and with federal law; and had the authority to hire and fire employees. (Compl. ¶¶ 80, 81, 83, 86, 94).

The complaint alleges that defendants violated various statutory duties by failing to compensate Cavallaro and those similarly situated for all time worked. It alleges two unlawful practices: (1) automatically deducting time from each employee's paycheck for meal breaks, even if the employee did not actually receive such a break, and (2) failing to compensate employees for work completed before and after their shifts.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff (along with a second named plaintiff, Monique Herman) filed the originalcomplaint on September 3, 2009, alleging causes of action under ERISA, RICO, and the FLSA. In July 2010, the Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the RICO claim. Plaintiffs' second amended complaint was filed in January 2011. In June 2011, the Court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to allege an actual employment relationship with any of the named defendants. Cavallaro v. UMass Mem. Health Care, Inc., 2011 WL 2295023, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61003 (D.Mass. June 8, 2011). Plaintiffs appealed; the First Circuit reversed and remanded the case to allow for “one last amendment.” Cavallaro v. UMass Mem. Healthcare, Inc., 678 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2012).

On July 7, 2012, plaintiff Cavallaro filed a third amended complaint, focused solely on defendants' alleged FLSA violations.2 The complaint includes collective-action allegations. Defendants have moved to dismiss claims against all defendants except UMass Memorial Medical Center on the grounds that the complaint fails to plead employer status, standing, or any claims on behalf of the putative class members.

II. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must assume the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1999)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). That is, [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Dismissal is appropriate if plaintiff's well-pleaded facts do not “possess enough heft to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharms., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir.2008) (quotations and original alterations omitted).

A motion to strike collective action allegations is also analyzed under the 12(b)(6) standard. See ...

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