Cavazzini v. MRS Assocs.

• Decision Date: 06 December 2021
• Docket Number: 21-CV-5087 (ARR) (ST)
• Citation: 574 F.Supp.3d 134
• Parties: Daniel CAVAZZINI, Plaintiff, v. MRS ASSOCIATES and Crown Asset Management, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

574 F.Supp.3d 134

Daniel CAVAZZINI, Plaintiff,

v.MRS ASSOCIATES and Crown Asset Management, Defendants.

21-CV-5087 (ARR) (ST)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed December 6, 2021

David M. Barshay, Barshay, Rizzo & Lopez, PLLC, Melville, NY, for Plaintiff.

Arthur Sanders, Barron & Newburger, P.C., New City, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, Daniel Cavazzini, originally brought this action in the District Court, Sixth Division, Suffolk County, against defendants MRS Associates ("MRS") and Crown Asset Management ("Crown"). Plaintiff brings causes of action under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") alleging that defendant Crown violated his privacy by communicating his personal and/or confidential information to MRS in order to collect a debt plaintiff purportedly owed to Crown, in violation of FDCPA §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f, and that defendants engaged in false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in order to collect the debt, in violation of FDCPA §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10) and New York General Business Law ("NYGBL") § 349.

Defendants removed the action to this court, asserting that this court has original jurisdiction over plaintiff's FDCPA claims and supplemental jurisdiction over the NYGBL claim. Now before the court is plaintiff's motion to remand the action to state court. For the reasons set forth below, I find that plaintiff does not have Article III standing and remand the case to the District Court, Sixth Division, Suffolk County.

BACKGROUND

The FDCPA "create[d] a private right of action for debtors who have been harmed by abusive debt collection practices." Benzemann v. Citibank, N.A. , 806 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Section 1692c of the FDCPA limits the individuals and entities with which a debt collector¹ may share information in order to collect a debt.² See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) ("[A] debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.").³ Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using "false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in connection with the collection of any debt." Id. § 1692e. Specifically, a debt collector may not falsely represent "the character, amount, or legal status of any debt," id. § 1692e(2)(A), or use "any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt," id. § 1692e(10). Section 1692f similarly provides that debt collectors "may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt." Id. § 1692f. In a similar vein, NYGBL § 349 created a private right of action against any "person, firm[, or] corporation" that engages in "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce in the furnishing of any service." NYGBL § 349(a), (b).

On August 17, 2020, plaintiff received a "dunning" letter from MRS, a mailing vendor, on behalf of Crown, a debt collector.⁴ See Not. of Rem., Ex. A ("Compl.") ¶¶ 13–46, 79, 84–85 & Ex. 1, ECF No. 1. The letter sought payment of a debt of $7,936.72 on behalf of Crown, as the debt—originally owed to Synchrony Bank ("Synchrony")—was now owned by Crown. Id. ¶¶ 48, 84–85 & Ex. 1. Plaintiff asserts that Crown hired MRS to attempt to collect plaintiff's alleged debt and, in doing so, unlawfully "conveyed information regarding the alleged [d]ebt to MRS." Id. ¶¶ 79–80. Plaintiff also claims that he did not owe, and has never owed, money to Crown and that he has never done business with Crown, nor has Crown extended credit to him. Id. ¶¶ 50–57. Plaintiff further alleges that he was never told Crown had taken over his debt and, on information and belief, that Crown possesses no "competent" proof that the debt was transferred to it. Id. ¶¶ 58–75.

Plaintiff claims he was "misled by [d]efendants’ conduct," and as a result he "wasted time, was caused to be confused and unsure as to [his] rights," and risked incurring fees and other damages by seeking counsel. Id. ¶¶ 95, 101. Plaintiff further asserts that he now fears defendants will "continue to use abusive, deceptive, unfair and unlawful means in [their] attempts to collect" his debt, "will ultimately cause [him] unwarranted economic harm" and harm to his credit rating, and will sue him for a debt he does not owe. Id. ¶¶ 97–100.

Plaintiff brings three causes of action under the provisions enumerated above. Plaintiff first alleges Crown violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f by communicating with MRS about plaintiff's debt and disclosing to MRS plaintiff's personal and/or confidential information (his name, address, and debt amount)—communications to which plaintiff did not consent. Compl. ¶¶ 106–29. Plaintiff further alleges defendants violated several subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and NYGBL § 349 by representing to plaintiff that he owed a certain amount of money to Crown, a representation plaintiff alleges was false because he neither owed that specific amount nor owed Crown a debt. Id. ¶¶ 130–56.

Plaintiff filed suit in New York state court on August 13, 2021, Not. of Rem. 1 & Compl., ECF No. 1, and served the Complaint on defendants on or about September 1, 2021. Barshay Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 5. On September 13, 2021, defendants filed a Notice of Removal with this court, alleging that removal was proper because this court has original jurisdiction over claims arising out of federal statutes. Not. Rem. 2–3.

On September 15, 2021, plaintiff moved to remand this action to state court. ECF Nos. 4–6. Plaintiff argues that remand is necessary because defendants’ Notice of Removal is "completely silent" as to whether plaintiff has standing, and—under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 210 L.Ed.2d 568 (2021), which recently addressed Article III standing in consumer law cases—defendants have failed to carry their burden of showing federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Remand 5–6 ("Pl.’s Mem."), ECF No. 6. In opposition, defendants argue that they have demonstrated subject matter jurisdiction because "Plaintiff's complaint is based upon the violation of a Federal Statute" and the complaint "alleges Article III standing and a concrete injury despite the fact that it was filed in State Court." Mem. of Law in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Remand 5–6 ("Defs.’ Mem."), ECF No. 7.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A defendant can remove a civil action from state to federal court if the latter has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A federal court has original jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

An essential element of a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction is standing. To have standing, plaintiff must prove that: (1) he has suffered a "concrete and particularized injury"; (2) the injury "is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct"; and (3) the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U.S. 693, 704, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). Plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he asserts. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006).

In a case removed from state court, "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ; see also Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund , 500 U.S. 72, 89, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 114 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991) ("[T]he literal words of § 1447(c) ... give no discretion to dismiss rather than remand an action." (citation omitted)). A district court considering a motion to remand must "construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability." Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky , 704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). "In determining whether jurisdiction is proper, we look only to the jurisdictional facts alleged in the Notices of Removal." In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prod. Liab. Litig. , 488 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir. 2007).⁵ Defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc. , 368 F.3d 86, 100 (2d Cir. 2004).

II. Plaintiff Does Not Have Standing to Proceed in Federal Court

Because I do not have jurisdiction over cases brought without proper standing, I must decide whether plaintiff has standing before this case can proceed. See All. for Env't Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co. , 436 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Article III standing must be decided before the merits."). To have standing in federal court, plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia , that he suffered "an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent." TransUnion , 141 S. Ct. at 2203. As the Supreme Court recently explicated in TransUnion , simply citing a statutory violation does not satisfy this requirement. Id. at 2205. Plaintiff must have suffered real adverse effects beyond the "procedural violation" of the statute. Id. at 2213 (citation omitted); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 340, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) ("When we have used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’ " (citation omitted)). Pleading a risk of future harm is insufficient unless plaintiff either claims that there is a "sufficient likelihood" that this harm will materialize or that he was "independently harmed by [his] exposure to the risk itself" (e.g. , suffered an emotional injury from knowledge of the...