Cave v. Warden, Lieber Corr. Inst.

• Decision Date: 29 October 2019
• Docket Number: C/A No. 0:18-3573-CMC-PJG
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Albert James Cave, Jr., Petitioner, v. Warden, Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondent.

Albert James Cave, Jr., Petitioner, v. Warden, Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondent.

C/A No. 0:18-3573-CMC-PJG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

October 29, 2019

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Albert James Cave, Jr., a self-represented state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 18.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's motion. (ECF No. 20.) Petitioner filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 27.) Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the court finds that Respondent's motion should be granted and the Petition denied.

BACKGROUND

In October 2011, Petitioner was indicted in the Aiken County Court of General Sessions for first-degree burglary. (App. at 178-79, ECF No. 17-3 at 179-80.) Petitioner was originally represented by David Hayes, Esquire, and later represented by Brian Katonak, Esquire. (Id. at 42-44, ECF No. 17-3 at 43-45.) On September 10, 2012, Petitioner pled guilty as charged pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford¹ and was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment, to run concurrently with another twenty-five year sentence previously imposed by the court. (Id. at 3-14, ECF No. 17-3 at 4-15.) Plea counsel filed a notice of appeal on Petitioner's behalf, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for Petitioner's failure to provide sufficient reasoning for appealing his guilty plea as required by South Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 203. (ECF No. 17-1 at 4, 26.)

In 2014, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") in the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas. (App. at 16, ECF No. 17-3 at 17.) A hearing was held on the application on September 23, 2016 in which Petitioner was represented by Lance S. Boozer, Esquire.² (Id. at 36, ECF No. 17-3 at 37.) The PCR court denied the application. (Id. at 162-177, ECF No. 17-3 at 163-178.)

Petitioner appealed the denial of his PCR application by filing a Johnson³ petition for a writ of certiorari and pro se response in the South Carolina Supreme Court. (ECF No. 17-5.) The matterwas transferred to the South Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to South Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 243(l). The Court of Appeals denied the petition. (ECF No. 17-6.)

FEDERAL HABEAS ISSUES

The Petition for a writ of habeas corpus raises the following issues, as construed by the court:

Ground One: Petitioner claims his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily because he faced a life sentence if he went to trial after the plea court incorrectly denied his motion to suppress the State's fingerprint evidence.

Ground Two: Petitioner claims plea counsel was ineffective for failing to provide the South Carolina Court of Appeals with sufficient reasons to appeal his guilty plea pursuant to South Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 203.

Ground Three: Petitioner claims plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and find any evidence that would have aided in his defense against the charge.

Ground Four: Petitioner claims the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by wrongfully arresting him based on fingerprint evidence from a prior arrest that should have been destroyed, and by prosecuting him despite a court order recusing that solicitor's office from certain cases involving Petitioner.

Ground Five: Petitioner claims the State violated Brady⁴ by failing to disclose to the defense any chain of custody "receipts," "evidence analysis report[s]," or "lab reports."

(Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 5-12.)

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248.

The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g.,Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Habeas Corpus Standard of Review

In accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), claims adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding cannot be a basis for federal habeas corpus relief unless the decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as decided by the Supreme Court of the United States," or the decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). When reviewing a state court's application of federal law, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000); see also White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014) (describing an "unreasonable application" as "objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong" and that "even clear error will not suffice") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011); Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2005); McHone v. Polk, 392 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 2004). Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)); see also White, 572 U.S. at 419-20 (stating that " '[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement' ") (alteration in original) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103). Under the AEDPA, a state court's decision "must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation" when the case is being considered on direct review. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. Moreover, review of a state court decision under the AEDPA standard does not require an opinion from the state court explaining its reasoning. See id. at 98 (finding that "[t]here is no text in [§ 2254] requiring a statement of reasons" by the state court). If no explanation accompanies the state court's decision, a federal habeas petitioner must show that there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. Id. Pursuant to § 2254(d), a federal habeas court must (1) determine what arguments or theories supported or could have supported the state court's decision; and then (2) ask whether it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding of a prior decision of the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 102. "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Id. Section 2254(d) codifies the view that habeas corpus is a " 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. at 102-03 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).

C. Exhaustion Requirements

A habeas corpus petitioner may obtain relief in federal court only after he has exhausted his state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)....