Cavender v. Hewitt

• Decision Date: 18 March 1922
• Citation: 239 S.W. 767,145 Tenn. 471
• Parties: CAVENDER v. HEWITT ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

239 S.W. 767

145 Tenn. 471

CAVENDER v. HEWITT ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 18, 1922

Appeal from Chancery Court, Davidson County; John T. Lellyett Judge.

Bill by P. W. Cavender against A. R. Hewitt and others.Decree of dismissal, and complainant appeals.Affirmed.

G. S Moore and John H. De Witt, both of Nashville, for appellant.

M. B Adams, J. W. Moore, J. G. Lackey, and W. C. Cherry, all of Nashville, for appellees.

L. D. SMITH, J.

The complainant was a policeman in the employment of the city of Nashville, receiving a salary from the city for his services as such.At the time he filed the bill in this cause several judgments had been rendered against him before justices of the peace in favor of the several defendants.These judgment creditors undertook by the process of garnishment to reach the complainant's wages or salary due him for his services as policeman from the city of Nashville.This bill was filed to enjoin complainant's creditors, who were made defendants to the bill, from further attempting to reach his wages, and the city of Nashville from paying same.

The right of the complainant to maintain his suit depends upon the constitutionality of chapter 29 of the Public Acts of 1921, the purport of which act, as expressed in its title, is to authorize and make lawful the garnishment of all officers and employees of the several counties and muncipalities of the state of Tennessee.Confessedly, if this act of the Legislature is valid, the complainant is not entitled to maintain the bill.The chancellor was of the opinion, and decreed, that the act was constitutional and valid, and therefore dismissed the bill.

The act is attacked as being vicious class legislation, and (1) violative of article 1, § 8, of the Constitution, ordaining that no man shall be deprived of his property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land; (2) also of article 11, § 8, prohibiting the Legislature from passing any law or granting to any individual or individuals rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions other than such as may be by the same law extended to any member of the community who may be able to bring himself within the provision of such laws; and (3) also of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, which prohibits any state from depriving any person of his property without due process of law.

It is argued that it is the settled policy in this state to hold immune all municipal and other government agencies, and that there is an implied restraint in our Constitution against such legislation.

It is quite true that this court has universally held that the wages of an employee in the services of a muncipal corporation cannot be reached by the process of garnishment upon the theory and for the reason that a muncipal corporation is but an arm of the government, and the duties to be performed by the officers of the municipality are incompatible with such proceedings.As was said by Judge Cooper in Parsons v. McGavock, 2 Tenn. Ch. 581:

"It is an imperium in imperio, and can no more be embarrassed in the exercise of the governmental powers with which it is invested for the public good than can the power creating it.The same reasons of public policy which forbid the embarrassment of the machinery of the state government, by interrupting the proper functions of its officers by process of garnishment or attachment for the collection of debts between private persons, will protect the subordinate governments from a like interruption."

There is nothing in our Constitution from which it can be inferred that a policy different from that stated should never be adopted by the Legislature.That being so, the legislative department of the state government has exclusive and ample power to determine the state's policy.When the Legislature, acting within its constitutional powers, has spoken upon a particular subject, its utterance is the public policy of the state upon that subject, and the courts are without power to read into the Constitution a restraint of the Legislature with respect thereto.The prohibition must be expressed or necessarily implied from that which is expressed.We fail to find any such restraint in our Constitution.

"It is generally recognized that the public policy of a state is to be found in its Constitution and statutes, and only in the absence of any declaration in these instruments may it be determined from judicial decisions.In order to ascertain the public policy of a state in respect to any matter, the acts of the legislative department should be looked to, because a legislative act, if constitutional, declares in terms the policy of the state, and is final so far as the courts are concerned.All questions of policy are for the determination of the Legislature, and not for the courts, and there is no public policy which prohibits the Legislature from doing anything which the Constitution does not prohibit.Hence the courts are not at liberty to declare a law void as in violation of public policy.In accordance with these general principles, it has been said that, if a state Constitution authorizes a grant, through legislative action, of an exclusive privilege, it must be deemed to be in accord with the policy of the state.Where courts intrude into their decrees their opinion on questions of public policy, they in effect constitute the judicial tribunals as lawmaking bodies in usurpation of the powers of the Legislature."6 R. C. L. § 108, pp. 108, 109.

The argument is further based upon the thought that the act in question is class legislation, because it subjects county and municipal officers and employees to the burden of having their wages and salaries attached by process of garnishment, whereas the state officers and employees are exempt from this burden.Such a classification, it is contended, is unnatural, unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.The constitutional provision invoked does not prohibit the Legislature from making class distinctions in the enactment of laws.It simply prohibits the granting to any individual or individuals rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions other than such as may be by the same law extended to any member of the community who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law.

The rule of interpretation of statutes as they relate to this provision of the Constitution is that the Legislature has a wide range of discretion in distinguishing, selecting, and classifying objects of legislation because of the function of the legislation and the purposes to which it is addressed.It suffices, if it is practical, and is not review-able unless palpably arbitrary.See cases cited in...