Caverly-Gould Co. v. Vill. of Springfield

• Decision Date: 07 May 1910
• Citation: 83 Vt. 396,76 A. 39
• Parties: CAVERLY-GOULD CO. v. VILLAGE OF SPRINGFIELD et al.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

76 A. 39

83 Vt. 396

CAVERLY-GOULD CO.

v. VILLAGE OF SPRINGFIELD et al.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Windsor.

May 7, 1910.

Appeal in Chancery, Windsor County; Alfred A. Hall, Chancellor.

Bill by the Caverly-Gould Company against the Village of Springfield and another. Decree for orator pro forma on bill and answer, and defendants appeal. Affirmed and remanded.

The pleadings show that defendant Fairbanks is collector of taxes of the village of Springfield; that the orator is a corporation organized under the laws of this state on June 1, 1898; that at a special meeting duly held on March 26, 1898, the town of Springfield voted "to exempt from taxation for a period of ten years all manufacturing establishments investing a capital of over five thousand dollars which may be established and put in operation during the next twelve months"; that, "relying upon and intending to accept and meet the provisions and conditions of said vote," and before the expiration of the 12 months therein limited, the orator put in operation in the village of Springfield, in the town of Springfield, a manufacturing establishment, consisting of land, buildings, shafting, machinery, and power, at a cost of $50,000, whereof $20,000 was for machinery; that the orator operated this plant as a factory for about four years, and since that time it has been operated as such by the orator's tenants, and is still owned by the orator; that on June 18, 1903, the trustees of the village of Springfield "assessed against and upon said real estate of the orator a village tax of $50, and a village highway tax of $20," which taxes, with the proper warrant for their collection, have regularly come into the hands of defendant Fairbanks as such collector, who has regularly advertised said real estate of the orator for sale in satisfaction of said taxes and costs. The bill prays for an injunction restraining defendants from further proceedings in the collection of said taxes. A temporary injunction issued.

Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and MUNSON, WATSON, HASELTON, and POWERS, JJ.

Fred H. Spaulding and Charles Batchelder, for appellants.

Blanchard & Tuppcr and Stickney, Sargent & Skeels, for appellees.

ROWELL, C. J. Section 365 of the Vermont Statutes, under which this case arose, reads as follows: "Manufacturing establishments (except for manufacturing pulp, rough sawed lumber or charcoal), quarries, mines, and such machinery, tramways, appliances and buildings as are necessary for prosecuting the business, machinery put into unoccupied buildings, and all capital and personal property used in such business, if the amount invested exceeds one thousand dollars may be exempt from taxation not exceeding ten years from the commencement of business if the town so votes. Such real and personal estate shall be appraised and set in the grand list and the termination of the exemption noted against it." The defendants say that exemptions of this class are binding contracts when regularly granted and accepted, whether the statute so provides or not. And we think this is so, if they are supported by a consideration, which is as essential here as in contracts between private parties. 1 Cooley on Taxation (3d Ed.) 114; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430, 437, 19 L. Ed. 495; Grand Lodge, etc., v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143, 17 Sup. Ct. 523, 41 L. Ed. 951. But they claim that the exemption in question was not regularly granted, as the vote was a blanket vote, put out to any one who concluded to take advantage of it, and that the statute did not authorize such a vote, and therefore it is void. They rely on Cox Needle Co. v. Gilford, 62 N. H. 503, in support of the claim. But that case is not in point. There the statute was that towns night vote to exempt from taxation any establishments therein, "or proposed to be erected or put in operation therein," etc., and that the vote should be a contract binding for the term specified therein. The vote was to exempt "all capital of $5,000 or upwards that might thereafter be invested in the town for manufacturing purposes." The court said the vote was too general to be good; that if the statute was construed to authorize exemption by a sweeping vote of all establishments that might thereafter be erected, no force would be given to the word "proposed," which pointed to such particular and specific establishments as were at the time of the vote proposed by some person or persons to be erected and put in operation; that if the Legislature intended to confer such sweeping authority, it would have expressed its purpose by omitting the word "proposed," or by substituting therefor the words, "which thereafter may," making the statute read, "towns may by vote exempt from taxation * * * any establishment therein, or which may thereafter be erected or put in operation therein."

It may be noticed in this connection that when our statute was first passed in 1867 (Laws 1867, No. 60), it was like the New Hampshire statute in respect of establishments that it might be proposed to locate in the town, and in giving the assent of the town the force of a contract. But in 1869 (Laws 1869, No. 26), those provisions were eliminated, and have never been restored. So there is nothing in our statute restricting towns as the New Hampshire statute does, but its language is general, and the vote may be as general as the statute, and with good reason, for a general vote might call in investors that the town would not otherwise learn about. Such a vote is like an offer of reward to the public at large for certain information, which becomes obligatory as soon as one, with a view to the reward, renders the specified service, if the offer was not previously withdrawn. And in the New Hampshire case the court virtually said that the vote would have been good had the statute been general. We hold, therefore, that the vote here was authorized by the statute, and that the town was bound by it when the orator acted upon it, as it did, with a view to the exemption. And the town evidently so understood it, for the property was appraised and set in the grand list, and the termination of the exemption noted against it as the statute required. But it is said that tills construction ought not to be put upon the statute because a general vote might call in an undesirable business. But the answer is that the town can protect itself against that by its vote.

But the defendants say that though the vote is valid, yet, when the orator ceased...