Caviness v. Massanari, 00-3089WA

• Decision Date: 27 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-3089WA,00-3089WA
• Citation: 250 F.3d 603
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2001) ETTA J. CAVINESS, APPELLANT, v. LARRY G. MASSANARI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, <A HREF="#fr1-1" name="fn1-1">1 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, APPELLEE. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 603

250 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2001)

ETTA J. CAVINESS, APPELLANT, v. LARRY G. MASSANARI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, ¹ SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, APPELLEE.

No. 00-3089WA

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: March 27, 2001

Filed: May 9, 2001

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas.

Before Richard S. Arnold, Fagg, and Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judges.

Richard S. Arnold, Circuit Judge.

Etta J. Caviness claims that she is entitled to disability insurance benefits. The Commissioner, acting through an administrative law judge (ALJ), found that benefits should be denied. On review, the District Court granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment and upheld this decision. We hold that the ALJ committed two errors of law and therefore reverse for further proceedings.

Ms. Caviness alleged disability since March 1989 from a bad back, nervousness, depression, and other problems. Her insured status expired in December 1994. After a hearing, the ALJ found that Ms. Caviness had established only mild impairments, which did not significantly limit her ability to function at any level or compromise her residual functional capacity at any time before the expiration of her insured status. Accordingly, the ALJ held that the claimant had not established a severe impairment and concluded the sequential evaluation process at step two. This was error. Ms. Caviness did have the burden of showing a severe impairment that significantly limited her physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities, but the burden of a claimant at this stage of the analysis is not great. The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on her ability to work. See Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996). The ALJ's opinion nowhere acknowledges this standard.

We have reviewed the record, but we cannot say the evidence was so clearly against the claimant that this error of law was harmless. Possibly the ALJ, if he had applied the correct legal standard and had properly evaluated the claimant's credibility (a point to which we shall return), could have validly found that the impairment was only minimal. A finding the other way, however, could also have been supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. It is for the administrative fact-finder, in the first instance, to make this kind of choice, guided by the proper legal standard. Courts should not make this determination in the first instance, unless the case is clear beyond substantial doubt, which this case is not.

We have mentioned the claimant's credibility. In addition to medical records of low back pain, a hiatal hernia, and ulcers, the claimant offered extensive subjective testimony. She testified that, before her insured status expired, she had suffered from chest...