Caywood v. Farrell

• Decision Date: 24 October 1898
• Parties: CAYWOOD v. FARRELL.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

175 Ill. 480

51 N.E. 775

CAYWOOD

v.FARRELL.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1898.

Error to appellate court, Third district.

Garnishment proceedings by James Caywood, for the use of others, against Felix G. Farrell. From a judgment of the appellate (65 Ill. App. 401) reversing a judgment for plaintiffs, they bring error. Affirmed.R. W. Mills, for plaintiffs in error.

W. P. Callon, for defendant in error.

PHILLIPS, J.

James Caywood, as the nominal plaintiff, for the use of certain judgment creditors, garnished defendant in error. On trial in the circuit court, judgment was entered against defendant for $1,028.23, which judgment was reversed by the appellate court, with the following finding of facts: ‘The court finds that it does not appear from the evidence that the said Felix G. Farrell was indebted in any sum to said James Caywood when the writs of garnishment were issued, nor at any time afterwards before the rendition of the judgment in garnishment proceedings.’ The error assigned on the prosecution of this writ of error is that the appellate court did not make ‘a sufficient special finding of facts.’ It is urged such order states a mere conclusion from the facts, which is said not to be in compliance with section 87 of the practice act, which provides that if the final determination of the cause, as the result, wholly or in part, of the finding of the facts ‘concerning the matter in controversy,’ is different from the finding of the court below, the appellate court shall recite in its final order or judgment ‘the facts as found,’ and such judgment shall be final and conclusive as to all matters of fact in controversy in such cause. This section has been construed to mean: (1) ‘That the facts recited should include the facts concerning any material issue submitted to the trial court.’ Insurance Co. v. Scammon, 123 Ill. 601, 14 N. E. 666;Morris v. Wibaux, 159 Ill. 627, 43 N. E. 837. (2) That such facts should be recited and set forth as in decrees in chancery. Tibballs v. Libby, 97 Ill. 552;Neer v. Railroad Co., 138 Ill. 29, 27 N. E. 705. (3) The facts to be so recited are to be ultimate, and not evidentiary, facts; that is, they may be ‘conclusions of fact,’ ‘or, in other words, inferences drawn from the subordinate or evidentiary facts.’ ‘Ultimate facts * * * are, when considered with reference to the facts or evidence by which they are established or proved, but the logical results of the proofs, or, in other words, mere conclusions of fact’ (Brown v. City of Aurora, 109 Ill. 165); as, in an action for negligence, a finding that the plaintiff did not use ordinary care to avoid the injury, or that the defendant was not guilty of willful or wanton injury (Rogers v. Railroad Co., 117 Ill. 115, 6 N. E. 889); or, in an action for fraud, a finding that the evidence does not show fraud (Hayes v. Insurance Co., 125 Ill. 626, 18 N. E. 322). See, also, Siddall v. Jansen, 143 Ill. 537, 32 N. E. 384. It is clear that the appellate court, on finding the facts differently from the lower court, is only required to recite in its order or judgment of reversal the ultimate facts in issue as made by the pleadings, or the conclusion of such ultimate fact or facts from the evidentiary facts. Such recital of ultimate facts must include or cover all the material issues made by the pleadings vital to determine a right of recovery. In an action for negligence, for fraud, or for money claimed to be due, these are, respectively, the ultimate facts in such cases, and a finding of such facts by the appellate court is sufficient under the statute, conclusive on this court, and not subject to revision. Railroad Co. v. Pennell, 110 Ill. 435;Williams v. Forbes, 114 Ill. 167, 28 N. E. 463. The finding of the appellate court, as set out in this record, was of an ultimate fact, and sufficient, under the statute, if it covered or included all the ultimate facts ‘concerning the matter...