CBS Broad. Inc. v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.

Decision Date21 February 2019
Docket NumberB292277
PartiesCBS BROADCASTING INC., et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; TOP KICK PRODUCTIONS, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION(NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT)

IT IS ORDERED that the opinion filed on February 21, 2019 and not certified for publication, be modified as follows:

On page 10, insert as the last paragraph to read as follows:

"Petitioners shall recover their costs on appeal."

/s/_________

ZELON, Acting P. J.,

/s/_________

SEGAL, J.,

/s/_________

FEUER, J.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC692372)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Petition for writ of mandate, David Sotelo, Judge. Petition for writ of mandate granted.

Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP and John M. Gatti, Benjamin G. Shatz, Emil Petrossian, and Lauren J. Fried for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Baute Crocheteire & Hartley, LLP, Mark D. Baute, Scott J. Street, and Artyom Baghdishyan for Real Parties in Interest.

____________________

Plaintiff and real party in interest Top Kick Productions Inc., filed a motion to disqualify counsel for petitioners and defendants CBS Broadcasting Inc. and CBS Corporation. Before the trial court heard the disqualification motion, CBS filed a petition to compel arbitration and a motion to stay the litigation pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. CBS challenges the trial court's denial of its stay request; we agree that the trial court erred.

FACTUAL BACKROUND

Top Kick Productions, Inc. (Top Kick) is a production company owned by actor Chuck Norris. The company produced the hit television show Walker, Texas Ranger (Walker), which starred Norris. In 1993, Top Kick entered into a distribution agreement with CBS Broadcasting Inc. and CBS Corporation (CBS) under which CBS agreed to pay Top Kick 20 percent of profits earned from the exploitation of Walker. Under the agreement, CBS was required to issue quarterly statements and Top Kick was entitled to audit CBS's books.

Top Kick initiated its first audit between 1995 and 1997 and its second audit in 2011. The parties resolved both disputes with settlement agreements containing arbitration clauses. The 1999 agreement provides: "CBSP and Artist/Top Kick agree that with respect to any subsequent audit disputes, the parties will submit such matters to arbitration in accordance with procedures to be negotiated in good faith." The July 2011 agreement states that "any disputes arising under this Settlement Agreement(including, without limitation disputes regarding its enforcement or interpretation) shall be subject to binding arbitration under the auspices of JAMS in Los Angeles, California." In April 2016, Top Kick initiated a third audit, which led to the current litigation.

Top Kick filed its first amended complaint for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and accounting against CBS and Sony Pictures Television, Inc on April 8.1 The complaint alleges, in relevant part, that CBS breached the parties' 23 percent profit agreement by failing to report and pay collected monies to Top Kick. The parties extended litigation deadlines to accommodate two rounds of mediation. Both were unsuccessful.

On June 20, after the mediation proceedings, Top Kick filed a motion to disqualify attorney John M. Gatti and the law firm Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP from representing CBS. Top Kick argued that, while working at his prior law firm, Gatti represented Top Kick in a dispute with CBS related to Walker and was privy to confidential information.

On August 8, with the disqualification motion pending, and while the parties continued settlement discussions, CBS filed a petition to compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.2 On August 10, CBS filed an ex parte motion to stay all proceedings pending a ruling on the petition to compel arbitration. On the same day, Top Kick filed a competing ex parte application asking the trial court to hear its disqualification motion before the petition to compel.

The trial court granted Top Kick's request to hear the disqualification motion first and denied CBS's request for a stay under section 1281.4. CBS brought this petition for a writ of mandate challenging the ruling. We granted a temporary stay and issued an order to show cause to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a stay filed under section 1281.4.

DISCUSSION
A. The Standard of Review

Reviewing courts apply the abuse of discretion standard in determining whether the court erred in denying a motion to stay. (Cardiff Equities, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1548, citing Henry v. Alcove Investment, Inc. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 94, 101 [controversy ordered to arbitration pursuant to section 1281.2 and stay imposed].) Where the trial court exercises discretion the law does not provide, it abuses its discretion. (Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 782). "The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the 'legal principles governing the subject of [the] action. ...' Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an 'abuse' of discretion." [Citations.]'" (MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048, citing Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 148-149.)

B. The 1281.4 Stay is Mandatory

The "rules of statutory construction require us to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law. [Citation.] We first examine the words themselves because thestatutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context." (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715.)

Section 1281.4 states, in pertinent part, that: "If an application has been made to a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, for an order to arbitrate a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State and such application is undetermined, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until the application for an order to arbitrate is determined and, if arbitration of such controversy is ordered, until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies." (Code Civ. Pro. § 1281.4.)

The use of the word shall in the statute imposes a mandatory duty. "It requires that the trial court stay an action pending before it while an application to arbitrate the subject matter of the action is pending in a court of competent jurisdiction." (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 188, 192 [holding that the trial court acted in excess of its authority by denying the motion for a stay pending a petition to compel arbitration.]) (See Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443 [the word "shall" is ordinarily construed as mandatory, while "may" is ordinarily construed as permissive].)

'"The purpose of the statutory stay is to protect the jurisdiction of the arbitrator by preserving the status quo untilarbitration is resolved." [Citation.] 'In the absence of a stay, the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court disrupts the arbitration proceedings and can render them ineffective.' [Citation.]'" (Heritage Provider Network, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1152.)

Section 1281.4 requires the trial court to impose a stay when litigants meet two requirements. First, the party seeking to enforce a contractual arbitration clause must file a section 1281.2 petition to compel arbitration. (Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1795-1796.) Second, the party seeking resolution via contractual arbitration must file a motion to stay. (§§ 1281.4, 1292.8, Brock v. Kaiser, supra, at pp. 1795-1796.) CBS met both requirements.

C. Top Kick Failed to Demonstrate a Stay was Improper

Top Kick, in arguing that the trial court correctly decided that the motion to disqualify CBS's counsel must be heard before CBS's petition to compel arbitration, fails to address either the mandatory language of section 1281.4, or the purpose of the statutory stay.3

To begin with, Top Kick contends that the disqualification motion must be heard first because it was filed first. This argument is made without citation to legal authority and must be rejected as meritless. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 ['"Every brief should contain a legal argument with citationto authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration."'])

Top Kick next maintains that CBS stipulated to have the disqualification motion heard on a certain date and did not inform Top Kick that it intended to file a petition to compel arbitration before that date. Neither the chronological order of the motions, nor complaints of nondisclosure in the parties' stipulations, presents an exception to the statutory mandate.

Top Kick also argues that CBS filed "a belated arbitration motion to prevent the court from...

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