CCFI Cos. v. Spicher
| Docket Number | 3:24-cv-220 |
| Decision Date | 11 December 2024 |
| Parties | CCFI COMPANIES, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WENDY SPICHER, in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
ENTRY AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO STAY DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL DEADLINES (DOC. NO. 25)
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue or, Alternatively, to Stay Discovery and Pretrial Deadlines (“Motion”) (Doc. No. 25). Defendant Wendy Spicher, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities (“Defendant”) seeks an order transferring this action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (Id. at PageID 367.) Plaintiffs TitleMax of Ohio and CCFI Companies (“CCFI”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion and argue that this matter should remain in the Southern District of Ohio. (Doc. No. 30.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion.
TitleMax of Ohio was a credit service organization which facilitated consumer installment loans “secured by the borrower's motor vehicle title.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID 2.) TitleMax of Ohio facilitated these loans in brick-and-mortar stores located solely in Ohio. (Id. at PageID 5.) TitleMax of Ohio ceased operation on April 17, 2017, and sold off its portfolio, though it is still authorized to conduct business in Ohio. (Id.) CCFI is a holding company that employs individuals for its affiliates' benefit. (Id. at PageID 3.) As of July 2023, CCFI has been affiliated with TitleMax of Ohio. (Id.)
Defendant is the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities, which is responsible for administering Pennsylvania's relevant usury laws. (Id. at PageID 6-7.) Two such pieces of legislation include the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law, 41 Pa. Cons Stat. §§ 101-605 (“LIPL”), and the Consumer Discount Company Act, 7 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 6201-6221 (“CDCA”). (Id. at PageID 13.) The LIPL and CDCA respectively cap the maximum interest rate that can be charged on certain loans of $50,000 and $25,000 or less. (Id.)
In August of 2017 Defendant issued investigative subpoenas seeking information relating to TitleMax's lending practices with Pennsylvania residents. (Doc. No. 25-1 at PageID 373.) After a protracted five-year legal battle, which concluded at the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, TitleMax produced documents in response to the subpoena. (Id. at PageID 374.) On June 24, 2024, Defendant initiated a civil enforcement proceeding by issuing an Order to Show Cause against TitleMax seeking sanctions and penalties. (Id.) Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in response.
Defendant filed the present Motion on November 5, 2024 (Doc. No. 25), and Plaintiffs filed their response on November 26, 2024 (Doc. No. 30). Defendant filed her reply brief on December 10, 2024 (Doc. No. 36). This Motion is now ripe for review and decision.
Defendant seeks to have this matter moved the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or 28 U.S.C. § 1406 or, in the alternative, for a stay of discovery pending a decision on her Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 20). As this Motion can be decided pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the Court need not analyze 28 U.S.C. § 1406 or the request for a stay.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) allows a transfer of venue along the following lines: “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” Before determining whether the interests of justice justify a transfer, the Court must first determine whether the proposed alternative venue is a district where the action might have been brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). At present, the Parties do not dispute that this action could have been brought in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
If an action could have been brought in the alternative venue, then the Court must determine whether a transfer would “prevent wastes of time, energy and money, as well as whether a transfer would protect the litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Zimmer Enters. v. Atlandia Imps., Inc., 478 F.Supp.2d 983, 990 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)). Factors the Court may consider include:
(1) convenience of the witnesses; (2) availability of judicial process to compel the attendance of unwilling or uncooperative witnesses; (3) location of the relevant documents or records, and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (4) residence and convenience of the parties; (5) relative financial means and resources of the parties; (6) locus of the operative facts and events that gave rise to the dispute or lawsuit; (7) each judicial forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the deference and weight accorded to the plaintiff's choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency, fairness, and the interests of justice based on the totality of the circumstances.
Coshocton Grain Co. v. Caldwell-Baker Co., No. 2:14-cv-2182, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161684, at *4, 2014 WL 6473504 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2014) (quoting Mardini v. Presidio Developers, LLC, No. 3:08-cv-291, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3326, at *17-8, 2011 WL 111245 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 2011)). Most applicable here, the Court considers Plaintiffs' choice of forum, the location of evidence, convenience of potential witnesses, and the interests of justice, in turn.
Typically, “‘unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.'” Reese v. CNH Am. LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Helmer v. Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., No. 1:20-CV-105, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161335, at *13, 2020 WL 5250435 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2020) (). However, where “‘the cause of action has little connection with the chosen forum, the plaintiff's choice of forum is to be given less weight than such choice would be given otherwise.'” DRFP, LLC v. Republica Bolivariana De Venez, 945 F.Supp.2d 890, 902-03 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (quoting Armco, Inc. v. Reliance Nat. Ins. Co., No. C -1-96-1149, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7880, 1997 WL 311474, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 1997)).
This matter presents several unique issues with regard to Plaintiffs' choice of forum. First, the actions leading to this lawsuit-the loaning of money to individuals who returned to Pennsylvania-involve a scenario where an act took place in Ohio, but the result of that act inevitably had consequences Pennsylvania. Second, TitleMax of Ohio has ceased operations in the State altogether. Third, Plaintiffs identify five TitleMax stores located in the Southern District of Ohio and vaguely allege, “[s]ome of these stores made loans” that form the basis of this matter. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID 5-6.)
While the Plaintiffs' choice of forum could still be afforded deference because CCFI has one of its principal places of business in Ohio, this factor weighs minimally in Plaintiffs' favor. CCFI's Ohio location is based in Dublin, Ohio, which would fall within the purview of the Columbus seat of Court for the Southern District of Ohio. This further adds to the already tangled web Plaintiffs have sought to weave in an effort to bring this case in this seat of Court. In reality, the net result of Plaintiffs' practices is that individuals returned to Pennsylvania where they were subject to their agreements with Plaintiffs. Thus, they were affected in Pennsylvania, not Ohio. Moreover, while TitleMax is permitted to conduct business in Ohio, it has ceased operations here, meaning the State's ongoing interests are affected little by this matter. For good measure, TitleMax of Ohio fails to make clear the depth of the connections this matter has to Ohio. It simply says some of its stores made loans that Pennsylvania now seeks to regulate.
The Court is not blind to Plaintiffs' broader concern that Pennsylvania allegedly seeks to enforce its laws beyond its own borders via an unconstitutional mechanism. However, as evidenced by Plaintiffs' simultaneous filing of identical lawsuits in several other states, there is nothing about their claims unique to Ohio per se. Instead, all of their claims are focused on Defendant's purported intrusion beyond the bounds of Pennsylvania into Plaintiffs' activities in other states. Thus, the acts of Defendant in Pennsylvania are far more the catalyst for this lawsuit than any action elsewhere.
To be perfectly clear, the fact that Plaintiffs have-in one corporate form or another-filed identical lawsuits in multiple states smacks of forum shopping. In all practicality, the fact that Plaintiffs have filed multiple lawsuits in multiple forums appears to be an effort to get as many bites at the apple as possible outside of Pennsylvania having already received an unfavorable ruling from the Third Circuit in 2022. See TitleMax of Del., Inc. v. Weissmann, 24 F.4th 230 (3rd Cir. 2022). “[W]here a plaintiff...
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