Ceant v. Aventura Limousine & Transp. Serv., Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 June 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 12–20159–Civ.
• Citation: 874 F.Supp.2d 1373
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Parties: Rodney G. CEANT, Plaintiff, v. AVENTURA LIMOUSINE & TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, INC. et al., Defendants.

874 F.Supp.2d 1373

Rodney G. CEANT, Plaintiff,

v.AVENTURA LIMOUSINE & TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, INC. et al., Defendants.

Case No. 12–20159–Civ.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

June 27, 2012.

Brian Lerner, Ward, Kim, Vaughn & Lerner, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Stacey Schulman, Richard Bernard Celler, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Plantation, FL, for Plaintiff.

Chris Kleppin, Kristopher W. Zinchiak, Glasser, Boreth & Kleppin, PA, Plantation, FL, Jason Scott Coupal, Aventura Limousine & Transportation Service, Inc., Aventura, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

ROBERT N. SCOLA, JR., District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 15], filed by Defendants Aventura Limousine & Transportation Service, Inc. (“Aventura Limousine”), Scott Tinkler, Neil Goodman, and Ron Sorci (collectively, “Defendants”). The Court finds the Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice because the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged individual and enterprise coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The Motion is therefore granted in part.

Statement of Facts¹

This dispute arises from Plaintiff Rodney Ceant's employment with Defendant Aventura Limousine. The individual Defendants, Scott Tinkler, Neil Goodman, and Ron Sorci, are alleged to be joint employers based on their ownership of Aventura Limousine, their control of the company's finances and operations, their authority to hire and fire its employees, and their authority to determine employee work schedules. According to the Complaint, Ceant worked as an hourly-plus-commission paid driver for Aventura Limousine, beginning in April 2010. At various times during his employment, Ceant allegedly worked more than forty hours per week, but was not paid for such work at the required rate of time and one-half his regular pay. Specifically, Ceant complains that his employers failed to properly “account for all hours worked by [him] and others” and failed to “include [his] commissions, gratuities, and other nondiscretionary income” in calculating his regular rate of pay. Compl. ¶ 20. Ceant alleges that these derelictions run afoul of the FLSA and were committed willfully by his employers. The Complaint is brought as a collection action under the FLSA on behalf of other similarly situated employees who were likewise not properly compensated for overtime. In his demand for relief, Ceant asks to be awarded the overtime compensation he is due, liquidated damages in an equal amount, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and prejudgment interest. Ceant also includes a prayer for a declaration, under the Federal Declaratory Relief Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, “that the acts and practices complained of herein are in violation of the maximum hour provisions of the FLSA.” Compl. at 6.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that the Complaint is devoid of essential supporting facts and offers nothing but legal conclusions.² According to Defendants, the allegations do not satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.

In this regard, Defendants first argue that Ceant has not sufficiently alleged the existence of either individual or enterprise coverage under the FLSA, particularly as to whether the interstate commerce element is satisfied by the work conduct of Ceant or his employers. They also take issue with the allegation, “on information and belief,” that Aventura Limousine meets the gross revenues requirement for enterprise coverage of $500,000 annually. Second, Defendants argue that Ceant has not adequately set forth his damages, including the hours for which he was allegedly not properly paid and the manner and method of his damages calculations. Third, Defendants contend that dismissal as to Tinkler, Goodman, and Scorci is required because Ceant has not alleged sufficient facts to hold them liable as joint employers under the FLSA. Fourth, Defendants argue that the request for declaratory relief should be stricken because Ceant has an adequate remedy at law under the FLSA and has no present right to a declaration from the Court. Finally, in reply, Defendants argue that Ceant has not properly alleged he was an “employee,” versus an “independent contractor,” of Aventura Limousine, a determination governed by the “economic realities” of the employment relationship.

Legal Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all of the Complaint's allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.2008). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a pleading need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The plaintiff must therefore articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive dismissal. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Yet, where the allegations “possess enough heft” to suggest a plausible entitlement to relief, the case may proceed. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “[T]he standard ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the required element.” Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). “And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Legal Analysis

The Court finds that the allegations are, in most respects, sufficient to withstand dismissal. Yet, because Ceant has not adequately alleged individual or enterprise coverage under the FLSA, the Complaint must be dismissed with leave to amend.

I. FLSA Individual & Enterprise Coverage

The FLSA requires an employer to pay its employee “an overtime wage of one and one–half times his regular rate for all hours he works in excess of forty hours per week.” See Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir.2011); see also29 U.S.C. § 207(a). “If a covered employee is not paid the statutory wage, the FLSA creates for that employee a private cause of action against his employer for the recovery of unpaid overtime wages and back pay.” Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1298;see also29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “In order to be eligible for FLSA overtime, however, an employee must first demonstrate that he is ‘covered’ by the FLSA.” Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1298. This requires a showing that the jurisdictional prerequisite of “interstate commerce” exists in a given case, a showing that may be made one of two ways. Id. First, an employee may claim “individual coverage” if he regularly and directly participates in the actual movement of things or persons in interstate commerce. Id. Second, an employee may assert “enterprise coverage” if his employer: (1) has employees engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce, or employees who handle, sell, or otherwise work on goods or materials that have been moved in, or produced for, interstate commerce by any person; and (2) has gross volume sales or business of at least $500,000 annually. Id.

Here, Ceant attempts to assert both individual and enterprise coverage by alleging that his employers are “an ‘enterprise engaged in commerce’ within the meaning of [the] FLSA”; that they are “an enterprise engaged in the ‘production of goods for commerce’ within the meaning of the FLSA”; that “upon information and belief,” his employers had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000 during the relevant time periods; that Ceant was both “engaged in commerce” and “engaged in the ‘production of goods for commerce’ and subject to the individual coverage of the FLSA.” Compl. ¶¶ 10–14. These are the only allegations relating to whether Ceant is “covered” by the FLSA.

Defendants argue that these allegations do not satisfy Twombly and Iqbal and are not sufficient to plead individual or enterprise coverage under the FLSA. Ceant has not alleged facts showing either type of coverage; his allegations are mere conclusions, they say. This is particularly true, Defendants argue, as to Ceant's allegation on “information and belief” that Aventura Limousine has gross revenues exceeding $500,000 annually. Ceant responds that his allegations are sufficient to withstand dismissal, as pleading coverage under the FLSA is not onerous.

While Ceant is correct in principle, the Court finds that he has not properly pled either individual or enterprise coverage here. The primary problem...