Ceara v. Deacon

• Decision Date: 25 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–CV–6023 KMK.,13–CV–6023 KMK.
• Citation: 68 F.Supp.3d 402
• Parties: Rafael CEARA, Plaintiff, v. DOCCS Officer Joseph DEACON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

68 F.Supp.3d 402

Rafael CEARA, Plaintiff

v.DOCCS Officer Joseph DEACON, Defendant.

No. 13–CV–6023 KMK.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed Nov. 25, 2014.

Rafael Ceara, Ossining, NY, pro se.

John E. Knudsen, Esq., Frederick Hongyee Wen, Esq., New York State Department of Law Litigation, New York, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff Rafael Ceara (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) Officer Joseph Deacon (“Defendant” or “Deacon”), alleging that Defendant subjected Plaintiff to excessive force when he pushed Plaintiff down several stairs, and then threatened Plaintiff to deter him from filing a grievance about the incident, in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (See Am. Compl. (“Am. Compl.”) (Dkt. No. 7).) Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See Notice of Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) (Dkt. No. 17).) This Motion asserts only that Plaintiff's Action is time-barred. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is denied.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion. On September 5, 2010 at approximately 11:21 a.m., Defendant “malicious[ly] and sadistic[ally] used excessive force to push [Plaintiff, then an inmate at Downstate Correctional Facility in New York,] down several concrete stairs.” (Am. Compl. 2.) Other inmates witnessed the incident. (Id. at 3.) As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff's knee was lacerated

and he continues to suffer pain in his knee and back. (Id. )

Defendant and “other officers and sergeants” threatened Plaintiff to deter him from writing a grievance about the incident. (Id. ) Plaintiff nonetheless filed a grievance about the incident and wrote to the superintendent and the state police, who “had the Inspector General investigate the matter ... [and] interview several other prisoner[ ] witnesses and [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 5.) After Plaintiff received an unfavorable response to his grievance, Plaintiff did not appeal the decision because he was not afforded an opportunity to do so. (Id. at 4.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the original Complaint on August 22, 2013. (See Compl. (“Compl.”) (Dkt. No. 2).) The original Complaint named “Correctional Officer John Doe which [sic ] worked at Downstate Corr[ectional] [F]ac[ility] on Sep [tember] 5, 2010 on [sic ] the 7[ ] a[.]m[.] [to] 3[ ] p[.]m[.] shift in D–Block, Complex 1” as the defendant. (Compl. 1.) Directly below the information provided about the Defendant, Plaintiff stated that he “wrote to [the] Inspector General for [the] full names and have had [sic ] no respon[s]e.” (Id. ) In parenthesis, Plaintiff noted “C[.]O. Deagan, [h]e has old [sic ] brother by same name.” (Id. ) As “Defendant No. 1,” Plaintiff listed “John Doe (C[.]O. Deagan younger brother).” (Id. )

The Court issued an Order of Service pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.1997), dated September 4, 2013, directing the New York State Attorney General (the “Attorney General”) to ascertain the identity and address of the John Doe Defendant that Plaintiff named in the original Complaint within 60 days.¹ (See Order of Service (“Order of Service”) (Dkt. No. 5).) The Order of Service provided that “Plaintiff must file an amended complaint naming the John Doe Defendant” within thirty days of receiving information about the defendant from the Attorney General. (Id. at 2.) In response, the Attorney General notified the Court and Plaintiff by letter dated October 25, 2013 that “Officer John Haag and Officer Joseph Deacon were on duty during the [relevant] shift....” (See Dkt. No. 6.) Plaintiff then filed the Amended Complaint on November 22, 2013, substituting “Joseph Deacon, D.O.C.C.S., Officer” for “Correctional Officer John Doe.” (Am. Compl. 1.)

Pursuant to a scheduling order entered after a pre-motion conference on June 16, 2014, (see Dkt. No. 15), Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, (see Mot.), and a memorandum of law in support of the Motion, (see Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 18)); Plaintiff submitted a memorandum of law in opposition to the Motion, a grievance dated September 9, 2010, and a letter dated September 6, 2010, (see Mem. of Law in Supp. of Plaintiff from Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.'s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 19)); and Defendant filed a reply, (seeReply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Reply”) (Dkt. No. 20)).

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his [or her] entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court has emphasized that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and that “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. But if a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show [n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) )).

In considering Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court is required to consider as true the factual allegations contained in the Complaint. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (“We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” (italics and internal quotation marks omitted)); Gonzalez v. Caballero, 572 F.Supp.2d 463, 466 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (same). Generally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint, however, it is appropriate to consider “materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” Alsaifullah v. Furco, No. 12–CV–2907, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), including “documents that a pro se litigant attaches to his opposition papers,” Agu v. Rhea, No. 09–CV–4732, 2010 WL 5186839, at *4 n. 6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010) ; see also Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n. 1 (2d Cir.2013) (noting that a court may consider “factual allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the motion”); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, No. 10–CV–891, 2013 WL 4779639, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013) (“Although the Court is typically confined to the allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint, when analyzing the sufficiency of a pro se pleading, a court may consider factual allegations contained in a pro se litigant's opposition papers and other court filings.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Although “[t]he lapse of a limitations period is an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead and prove[,]” a statute of limitations defense may be “raise[d] ... in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the defense appears on the face of the complaint.” Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vasconcellos v. City of New York, No. 12–CV–8445, 2014 WL 4961441, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2014) (same); Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 14 F.Supp.3d 191, 210 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (“[B]ecause the defendants bear the burden of establishing the expiration of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, a pre-answer motion to dismiss on this ground may be granted only if it is clear on the face of the complaint that the statute of limitations has run.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Wang v. Palmisano, 51 F.Supp.3d 521, 536-38, No. 13–CV–2186, 2014 WL 5011099, at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (refusing to dismiss several employment claims under state and federal law as untimely pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because of two uncertainties on the face of the complaint as to when the claims accrued).

B. Analysis

As noted, Defendant's sole basis for seeking dismissal of the Action is that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is time barred. Because § 1983 does not provide for a specific statute of limitations, courts apply the statute of limitations for personal injury actions under state law. See Hogan v. Fischer, ...