Ceaser v. Ault
| Decision Date | 02 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C99-2023-MWB.,C99-2023-MWB. |
| Citation | 169 F.Supp.2d 981 |
| Parties | Rodney Lee CEASER, Petitioner, v. John AULT, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Shellie Lyn Knipfer of the State Appellate Defender, Des Moines, Iowa, for petitioner.
Robert P. Ewald, Assistant Attorney General, Des Moines, Iowa, for respondent.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION REGARDING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 984
A. Factual And Procedural Background ..................................... 984
B. Issue Presented And Objections To Report And Recommendation ........... 986
C. Standard Of Review .................................................... 987
II. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS ................................................ 988
A. Effect Of Equal Protection Challenge On Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel Claim ........................................................ 988
B. Level Of Scrutiny In Constitutional Challenge ......................... 988
C. Role Of Federal Habeas Court .......................................... 989
D. Petitioner's Claim .................................................... 991
1. Governmental interest .............................................. 991
2. Nexus requirement: Governmental interest and disparate
treatment ......................................................... 997
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM .................................. 1000
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY ............................................. 1000
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................... 1000
In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the court is asked to review the Iowa Supreme Court's finding that an Iowa sentencing statute is constitutional. Petitioner Rodney Lee Ceaser ("Ceaser") has petitioned the court for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his confinement resulting from his August 22, 1997, state court conviction of second-degree robbery is unlawful and in violation of his constitutional rights.1 The parties do not dispute the underlying facts that support Ceaser's conviction, which are admittedly relatively benign. The Iowa Supreme Court succinctly described the facts:2
In May 1997, employees of Ray's SuperValu stopped Ceaser for shoplifting $30 worth of steak. Jason Robinson, the store manager, observed Ceaser put a quantity of meat down the front of his pants. Robinson confronted Ceaser and asked Ceaser to step to the back room with him, stating to Ceaser that he thought Ceaser had some stolen goods. Ceaser denied taking anything and quickly strode toward the exit. Another employee, Matt Bullerman, grabbed Ceaser and wrestled him to the floor. Ceaser struggled against the restraint by "throwing punches." During this tussle, the stolen meat came out of Ceaser's pants, coming to rest on the floor, and Robinson's glasses were knocked off.
Once Robinson and Bullerman had Ceaser under control, they proceeded to a back storeroom. On the way there and twice in the storeroom, Ceaser tried to escape. During the last attempt he successfully bolted from the storeroom, but Bullerman caught him in one of the aisles. Another struggle occurred in which Bullerman sustained a minor eye injury. Soon thereafter, the police arrived and Ceaser gave up his resistance. State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 193 (Iowa 1998).
Upon the return of a guilty verdict, Ceaser was sentenced on September 25, 1997. Furthermore, because second degree robbery is included within section 902.12 of the Iowa Code, the sentencing judge's discretion was limited to imposing the statutory maximum for second degree robbery, which is ten years. Iowa Code §§ 902.12 (); 902.9(4) (10 years maximum sentence for second degree robbery). Ceaser will not be eligible for parole or work release until he has served at least eighty-five percent of his ten year sentence pursuant to section 903A.2. See IOWA CODE § 903A.2 ().
In the way of further explanation of Ceaser's constitutional challenge, section 902.12, known as Iowa's "85% rule," requires that defendants convicted of certain enumerated forcible felonies serve "one hundred percent of the maximum term of the person's sentence and shall not be released on parole or work release ... [e]xcept as otherwise provided in section 903A.2." Id. § 902.12. Because section 903A.2 places a fifteen percent cap on the accumulation of earned time for good behavior with respect to inmates convicted of offenses listed in 902.12, the effect of sections 902.12 and 903A.2 together is that Ceaser serve a minimum of eighty-five percent of the maximum sentence statutorily prescribed for second degree robbery —meaning Ceaser must serve a minimum of eight and one-half years of his ten year sentence.
Ceaser filed a direct appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court in which he challenged, inter alia, the constitutionality of section 902.12.3 Specifically, Ceaser argued on appeal that Iowa's 85% rule deprived him of equal protection under both the Iowa and federal constitutions by arbitrarily classifying offenders to which the statute applies. Further, because his trial counsel failed to raise the constitutional challenge and, consequently, failed to preserve the issue for appeal, Ceaser argued that his counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 Before reaching the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, however, the Iowa Supreme Court first addressed Ceaser's challenge to the constitutionality of section 902.12. Moreover, in light of the court's ultimate determination that section 902.12 passed constitutional muster, it did not reach the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, because the court noted that trial counsel could not be held incompetent for failing to pursue a meritless issue. See Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d at 192.
Ceaser presents a single issue for this court's review in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus:
Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to challenge the application of Iowa Code § 902 .12, the 85 percent rule, to his sentence for second degree robbery.
Supporting facts: Defendant's conviction is based upon his theft of $30.58 worth of steak and the physical contact that followed when a store employee tackled defendant as he attempted to leave the store. A person convicted of second degree robbery must serve 85% of the sentence. Second degree robbery is the only class "C" forcible felony subject to the 85% rule even though there are other more serious and life threatening class "C" forcible felonies that are not subject to the 85% rule. Second degree robbery does not involve the infliction or attempted infliction of serious injury or the use of a dangerous weapon. Whereas other class "C" forcible felonies do involve serious injury, the intentional infliction of serious injury, or use of a dangerous weapon (e.g., willful injury felony child endangerment, and forcible felony terrorism).
Pet., at ¶ 12(# 1).
Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss filed a Report and Recommendation on April 3, 2001, recommending that relief be denied on Ceaser's claim. Judge Zoss concluded, inter alia, that the Iowa Supreme Court's determination that section 902.12 is constitutional was not "contrary to clearly established federal law" and, accordingly, Ceaser's trial counsel's failure to raise the issue could not have prejudiced the results of Ceaser's sentencing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (). On April 16, 2001, Ceaser, through counsel, filed two objections to Judge Zoss's Report and Recommendation (# 11). In his objections, Ceaser agrees that the appropriate standard to apply in challenging the constitutionality of section 902.12 is rational basis. Nevertheless, Ceaser equates Judge Zoss's conclusion that a habeas court is forbidden from "`judg[ing] the wisdom, fairness, or logic' of the Iowa statute" with the court's failure to apply the rational basis analysis at all. RR at 14. Therefore, the petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation on the ground that the court failed to question whether the legislative classification at issue has a rational relationship to some legitimate purpose. Pet.'s Objections at 3-4.
Ceaser's other objection to the Report and Recommendation pertains to the court's recommendation that a certificate of appealability be denied. Specifically, Ceaser argues that the court violated Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) by not setting forth "why a certificate of appealability should not issue." He asserts:
Substantial claims [of constitutional deprivation] cannot be brushed under the carpet with a simple conclusory statement that they are not substantial. The only way to guarantee that petitioners with valid claims will be heard in the circuits is by clarifying the standard of "substantial showing" and by requiring a court dismissing appealability to demonstrate its analysis in reaching the conclusion.
Pet.'s Objections at 5. In other words, the petitioner argues that the court's recommendation that a certificate of appealability be denied must be supported by findings or an analysis concerning the petitioner's failure to make a substantial showing that he was deprived of a constitutional right.
The standard of review to be applied by the district court to a Report and Recommendation of a magistrate judge is established by stat...
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