Cech v. State, 14216

Decision Date12 December 1979
Docket NumberNo. 14216,14216
Citation36 St.Rep. 2185,184 Mont. 522,604 P.2d 97
PartiesRichard CECH, as Administrator of the Estate of Kelly Cech, Deceased, and Arlene Cech, Deceased, and as Guardian of the Estate of Bruce Cech and Kerry Cech, minor children, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. The STATE of Montana, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Corette, Smith & Dean, Butte, Dolphy O. Pohlman argued, Butte, for defendant and appellant.

Berger, Anderson, Sinclair & Murphy, Billings, Richard W. Anderson argued, Billings, for plaintiffs and respondents.

HARRISON, Justice.

Plaintiff Richard Cech, as personal representative of the estates of his wife, Arlene Cech, and his child, Kelly Cech, and as guardian of the estates of his children Bruce and Kerry Cech, sued the State of Montana under provisions of the Montana Tort Claims Act for damages resulting from an automobile accident on Interstate 90, approximately eleven miles east of Whitehall, Montana. The jury trial began November 14, 1977, in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Park County. The jury returned four separate verdicts for plaintiff as follows:

                For the estate of Arlene Cech   $15,000
                                    (deceased)
                For the estate of Kelly Cech    $35,000
                                    (deceased)
                For the guardian of Bruce Cech  $25,000
                                 (minor child)
                For the guardian of Kerry Cech  $25,000
                                 (minor child)
                

From the entry of judgment on the verdicts, the State appeals. The original opinion in this case was issued August 1, 1979. A petition for rehearing was filed August 14, 1979, and this Court ordered a rehearing on August 22, 1979. The case was set on the September calendar, rebriefed and reargued to the Court.

The State raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the District Court erred by denying the State's motions for directed verdict made at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief and at the close of all the evidence?

2. Whether the District Court erred in admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures?

3. Whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff?

The single-vehicle accident subject of this action occurred on the afternoon of November 29, 1974, on Interstate 90, on a portion of that road known as Cottonwood Hill. Richard Cech was driving the family car, a 1967 Rambler, west on the freeway. His passengers were his wife, Arlene, and three of their seven children. The weather on the day of the accident was described by Cech as "sunshiny," "cool," "clear and fairly nice." He testified that the road was "fairly dry" and "in good shape" from Livingston, the town from which they were traveling, to Bozeman. From Bozeman westward the conditions were different; the left lane was snow-packed, but the right lane, in which he was driving, was "dry" according to Cech. He testified that near the hill on which the accident occurred both lanes had started to clear up and there was less snow on the road.

Cech further testified that he was driving around 55 miles per hour and had maintained that speed almost all the way. His car did not have snow tires. He stated that he did not recall seeing the roadside sign warning of ice on the next three miles of highway, within which space the accident occurred. The automobile, at an estimated speed of 55 to 60 miles per hour, passed from a dry section of the highway onto an icy section on a shaded curve. The automobile went into a skid, and Cech lost control.

Cech stated that he did not brake while on the highway or once the car left the pavement. However, once the car was on the "field or pasture" as he described it (the State calls it the "recovery area"), he testified that he must have been braking because "the car was coming to a slower motion." The car did not stop within this recovery area but went over the edge into a ravine.

Cech's wife was killed in the accident. One son, Kelly, died in a Great Falls hospital about a week later. Cech and the other two boys sustained relatively minor injuries from which they recovered.

At the time of the accident, guardrails protected this particular curve except for a portion of the curve approximately 600 feet in length. Through this gap of guardrail, the Cech automobile traveled into the recovery area. Evidence showed that the automobile skidded 84 feet 2 inches on the oil mat of the highway, 378 feet 1 inch on the recovery area, and then over the edge of the recovery area into the ravine where presumably the injuries occurred.

This section of the interstate was designed during the mid-1960's by the State Highway Department. The construction contract was let in 1968, and the four-lane interstate was opened to the traveling public in the fall of 1970.

The State contended throughout the trial that the design of the highway and guardrails, or lack of guardrails, was proper. It contended there was a "recovery area" at the place of the gap in the guardrail; that this recovery area was safer than a guardrail; and, that the presence of a guardrail where the gap existed would not have prevented the accident.

Plaintiff's contention was, and his evidence tended to prove, that after this portion of the interstate had been completed, the State noticed that this particular section of the roadway was dangerous when icy; that ice always accumulated during the winter months; that the lack of guardrail permitted vehicles to stray out upon the grassy slope designated as the "recovery area;" and that vehicles going out upon the recovery area would be unable to stop on the slope and would go into the deep ravine. Further, plaintiff contended that while a guardrail would not have prevented the Accident, it would have prevented the Injuries received.

The State also contended that as an economic choice in the original design of the highway, and later in maintaining it, the cost of guardrails as compared to the cost of providing a recovery area was a factor in its decision.

A look at the testimony will demonstrate the kind of evidence that was adduced by the State in support of its theory. David S. Johnson was called by the State. He is a professional engineer for the Department of Highways. At the time of trial he was supervisor of engineering specialities for the Department.

Johnson testified:

"Q. Now with regard to the second page of Defendant's Exhibit I, would you look at that page of the document and tell me if you in your review of the design of this highway, and possibily (sic) others, for the State of Montana, would follow the information provided on that document? A. Yes, we would use this.

"Q. Generally what does that information relate to? A. It relates to the providing of clear recovery areas wherever you can on a highway.

"Q. Does it make a distinction in that document with regard to the median as opposed to the shoulder of the road recovery areas? A. Well, I don't see a reference to median in here, just offhand.

"Q. So it would be safe to say that that applies to recovery areas along the shoulders of interstate highways? A. Yes, I think so.

"Q. As a designer, and based upon your education and your experience in that field, is there a preference that you follow with regard to shoulder of the road areas, a preference that you take of recovery area over guardrail? A. Well, It's always better to have a clear space where a vehicle can recover as opposed to having a guardrail, which is something that a vehicle can run into.

"Q. Do you consider, as a designer, that guardrail is a hazard? A. Oh, definitely.

"Q. In your design of interstate highways would you prefer to have a recovery area built or a guardrail built? A. Well, as a designer, and as a driver, I would rather have the recovery area.

"Q. All right. On this area of Cottonwood Hill is there in the design of the interstate highway a design of recovery area? A. Yes, there is." (Emphasis added.)

Ronald J. Hensen, a consulting engineer from Boulder, Colorado, also testified for the State:

"Q. Do you have a term that you use in describing such an area on the shoulder of the road? A. Where they have been dressed down, such as in this particular area, they are referred to as a secondary recovery area.

"Q. Is the use of a secondary recovery area an accepted practice in protecting a vehicle as it leaves the traveled way? A. Yes, it is.

"Q. And is that method, the use of a recovery area, a primary or secondary safety feature with regard to protection on the shoulders? A. Well, it's the primary objective in roadway design to provide a recovery area wherever possible, such that a vehicle which inadvertently leaves the road has an opportunity to get itself back under control without impacting either another vehicle or a fixed object.

"Q. Is guardrail used for the protection at the shoulders of the road when a vehicle leaves the traveled way? A. Guardrail is used in design as a secondary solution where the physical space cannot be provided. That is, where the topography is such that to provide additional space out there would be prohibitive in terms of total cost.

"Q. Now, are you suggesting that there are economic considerations for the use of recovery areas, as opposed to guardrail? A. Well, there are economic considerations in the design of roadways. And the basic economics of this, there has to be some trade off between how many miles of roadway can be improved versus how safe they can be made. The ultimate end of it is on one end you merely provide space for a vehicle to move, and on the opposite end you make it crash proof such that no matter what a driver would do he would be protected from himself." (Emphasis added.)

The foregoing evidence demonstrates the posture of the State that recovery areas were safer than...

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