Cedar Creek Tp. v. Board of Sup'rs of Wexford County

• Decision Date: 01 December 1903
• Citation: 97 N.W. 409,135 Mich. 124
• Parties: CEDAR CREEK TP. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF WEXFORD COUNTY.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

97 N.W. 409

135 Mich. 124

CEDAR CREEK TP. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF WEXFORD COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 1, 1903

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Wexford County; Clyde C. Chittenden, Judge.

Mandamus on the relation of the township of Cedar Creek against the board of supervisors of Wexford county. Writ denied, and relator brings certiorari. Reversed.

I. C Wheeler (Pratt & Davis, of counsel), for relator.

Fred C Wetmore (D. E. McIntyre, of counsel), for respondent.

HOOKER, C.J.

In the year 1900 sundry expenses were incurred by the health officer of the township of Cedar Creek, Wexford county. It does not appear that this was expressly authorized by the board of health, but the items were allowed by the said board of the township, and were then presented to the board of supervisors, and they were rejected and disallowed. The claimants--i. e., the persons who furnished the services and other items--then presented them a second time to the board of health of the township for allowance and payment, and they were allowed and paid by the township. Thereafter the township presented an itemized statement of the claims to the board of supervisors for payment, and they were again disallowed. Relator filed the petition in this proceeding alleging the foregoing facts, and that the distinction between the township and county poor had been abolished in Wexford county, and that Cedar Creek township had no poor fund; also alleging that the State Board of Health classes typhoid fever as a communicable disease, dangerous to the public health. The items presented were for expenses alleged to have been incurred in the care and treatment of typhoid fever cases within the township. An answer was filed, denying that the State Board of Health had authority to determine what diseases were communicable and dangerous to the public health, under the statute applicable to the case, and upon the hearing which followed the respondent offered no evidence except medical testimony as to the character of typhoid fever. The learned circuit judge who heard the cause dismissed the petition for the following reasons: (1) Typhoid fever is not a communicable disease dangerous to the public health, within the meaning of the health law. (2) That one Cochrane, to whom some of the items were furnished, was of sufficient ability to pay for them. (3) That the health officer was careless and negligent in the discharge of his duties, and so far exceeded his authority that the county should not be held liable for the charges, which were unreasonable. (4) That, regarding the bills for merchandise and drugs, there was not sufficient proof that those supplies were necessary for the comfort and well-being of the patients: that the evidence shows a reckless and profligate expenditure of the public funds; and that there is not only no proof that the goods were procured for the sole benefit of the sick, but that the proof and bills show that a large portion of the items were food and clothing procured for other persons. These items were excluded by the circuit judge. (5) A charge in favor of Dr. Corlett was disallowed upon the ground that he had 'hired himself, fixed his own compensation, and audited his own account.' These bills were rejected. (6) The board of health kept no itemized account of all expenditures as required by law, and therefore the accounts were never properly presented to the board of supervisors. (7) The items for physician's and nurse's services were disallowed upon the ground that they were rendered in typhoid fever cases, and were not within the provision of the law.

The questions in the case are: (1) Were the items properly disallowed upon the ground that they were rendered in typhoid cases? (2) Was the judge in error in holding that the ability of Cochrane to pay authorized the disallowance of items furnished to himself and family? (3) Is the alleged negligence of the health officer a sufficient ground of disallowance? (4) Was it proper to inquire into the uses to which articles purchased were put? (5) Was the disallowance of Dr. Corlett's claim proper? (6) Was the failure of the health board to keep an account of items a sufficient ground for dismissing the petition? (7) Should an item of $7 in Dr Morgan's bill be deducted and disallowed?

The statute under which these proceedings were taken is chapter 108 of the Compiled Laws, and especially section 4424, which was as follows at the time of the transactions in controversy, viz.: '(4424) Sec. 15. When any person coming from abroad or residing in any township within this state, shall be infected, or shall lately before have been infected with the smallpox, or other sickness dangerous to the public health, the board of health of the township where such person may be, shall make effectual provision in the manner in which they shall judge best for the safety of the inhabitants by removing such sick or infected person to a separate house, if it can be done without danger to his health, and by providing nurses and other assistance and necessaries, which shall be at the charge of the person himself his parents or other persons who may be liable for his support, if able; otherwise as a charge of the county to which he belongs: provided, that the health board shall keep and render an itemized and separate statement of expenses incurred in so caring for each person.' The health board has large discretionary powers, made necessary by the fact that it is an emergency board. When it has reason to fear danger from diseases which are generally recognized as communicable and dangerous to the public health, a court may be justified in taking judicial notice that the disease is within the statute, which in plain terms includes all diseases where there is danger to the public health from a threatened spread of the disease. There may be other diseases which the courts can judicially know not to be within the statute, but there are still others where it cannot be a matter of judicial notice. In the case of People v. Shurly (Mich.) 91 N.W. 139, which was a review of a conviction of a physician for failing to report a case of consumption, section 4453 making it his duty to report all patients...