Cedar Rapids Community School Dist., Linn County v. City of Cedar Rapids, 50163

Decision Date13 December 1960
Docket NumberNo. 50163,50163
Citation252 Iowa 205,106 N.W.2d 655
PartiesCEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, LINN COUNTY, Iowa, Appellee, v. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, Iowa, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

David F. McGuire, City Atty., and William R. Eads, Asst. City Atty., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

David G. Bleakley and Harold D. Vietor, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

THORNTON, Justice.

Plaintiff Cedar Rapids Community School District, Linn County, Iowa, commenced this action in equity asking for a judgment declaring plaintiff not subject to the building ordinances of defendant city, Cedar Rapids, and for injunctive relief. By proper pleading the parties put in issue the building, electrical, plumbing, and heating ordinances of defendant city. The reasonableness of the ordinances is not questioned. The trial court granted the relief prayed by plaintiff. We disagree with this result.

Plaintiff and defendant are both located in Linn County. The area of the school district includes territory within defendant city. The school district is engaged in an extensive renovating and construction program of school buildings within the city.

The school district contends it has exclusive jurisdiction in all school matters, it is an arm or agency of the state as is the city, and the city has no power to regulate the school district without express or necessarily implied authority from the legislature and such authority has not been granted. Included in the contentions of the school district are the theories the city can not regulate the state, and there is reasonable doubt the city possesses the power claimed and therefore it must be denied.

The city contends it has been granted the power by the legislature to prescribe and enforce the various building regulations as against the school district.

I. The effect of Constitution of the State of Iowa, art. IX, § 15, I.C.A., is to place the responsibility for public instruction upon the legislature. Pursuant thereto the State Board of Education, section 257.1 (all references herein are to the Code of Iowa, 1958, I.C.A., unless otherwise designated), and the office of Superintendent of Public Instruction, section 257.11, have been established. The power to locate school sites, section 297.1, and to construct and repair schoolhouses, section 297.7, is vested in the board of directors of each school corporation. There is no constitutional provision directing the manner in which the legislature shall carry out its responsibility to furnish public education.

The pertinent powers granted school districts are:

'274.1 Each school district now existing shall continue a body politic as a school corporation, unless hereafter changed as provided by law, and as such may sue and be sued, hold property, and exercise all the powers granted by law, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all school matters over the territory therein contained.'

'297.1 The board of each school corporation may fix the site for each schoolhouse, * * *' and

'297.7 Before erecting a schoolhouse, the board of directors shall consult with the county superintendent as to the most approved plan for such building, and secure his approval of the plan submitted. * * *.'

The pertinent powers granted the city are:

'368.2 Cities and towns are bodies politic and corporate, * * * and shall have the general powers and privileges granted, and such others as are incident to municipal corporations of like character, not inconsistent with the statutes of the state, for the protection of their property and inhabitants, and the preservation of peace and good order therein, * * *'

'368.9 They shall have power to adopt a building code, and they may provide for the regulation and inspection of all construction, major repairs and remodeling, and the installation of electrical, heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and plumbing fixtures, apparatus, and equipment. They shall have power to provide for the removal, repair, or dismantling of any dangerous building or structure and to assess the cost thereof against the property. * * *' and

'368.17 All cities having a population of six thousand or more shall, and other cities and towns may, by ordinance, adopt a set of plumbing regulations not inconsistent with state law or state administrative regulations, and provide for the inspection of plumbing installations. They shall have authority to examine and license plumbers, * * *.'

A school district is a quasi corporation created by the legislature and has only such powers as are bestowed upon it by statute or necessarily implied to carry out those granted. Its purpose is to carry out the governmental function of public instruction within its jurisdiction. Silver Lake Consolidated School District v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984, 990, 29 N.W.2d 214, 217, and Dean v. Armstrong, 246 Iowa 412, 415, 68 N.W.2d 51, 53.

Municipalities have only those powers granted them or which arise from fair implication and those necessary to carry out powers expressly or impliedly conferred, and such grants of power are strictly construed against the authority claimed. Gritton v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 326, 331, 73 N.W.2d 813, and City of Mason City v. Zerble, 250 Iowa 102, 108, 93 N.W.2d 94.

Both the school district and the city are agencies set up by the legislature to carry out particular governmental functions and each has the authority granted by the legislature or necessarily implied.

The school district does not contend the legislature has by its own enactments set up any regulations or standards for building, electrical work, plumbing, or heating in schoolhouses in cities.

The question before us is, to which of these agencies, the school district or the city, has the legislature granted the power to prescribe such regulations.

II. In the excellent briefs filed by counsel for both the school district and the city are authorities that require examination. The theory the city lacked power to control or prescribe regulations for the state or another agency of the state influenced the decisions in Kentucky Institution for Education of Blind v. City of Louisville, 123 Ky. 767, 97 S.W. 402, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 553; Salt Lake City v. Board of Education, 52 Utah 540, 175 P. 654; and City of Milwaukee v. McGregor, 140 Wis. 35, 121 N.W. 642, 17 Ann.Cas. 1002. The Utah court concluded the building regulations of the city could not be enforced but a city regulation requiring a phone connection of the school building with the fire department was valid.

In Board of Education of City of St. Louis v. City of St. Louis, 267 Mo. 356, 184 S.W. 975, the court took the view, as we do, the question for consideration was to which of its agencies did the legislature grant the power to provide building regulations for school buildings in St. Louis, and held the power was granted to the board of education because the board was directed by statute to appoint a commissioner of school buildings and the commissioner was charged with the responsibility for ventilating, warming, sanitary condition and proper repair of school buildings, and he was directed to prepare all specifications and drawings and superintend all construction. In addition, he was to employ as an assistant an engineer.

In Kansas City v. School District of Kansas City, 356 Mo. 364, 201 S.W.2d 930, 932, the Missouri court reached what is apparently a different result but is actually on the same grounds expressed in the St. Louis case, supra. The court said the question for decision was the same, 'Where has the State put the power involved in the instant action?' The holding of the court was the state had not itself exercised the power, nor had it granted the power as in the St. Louis case, supra, to the school district, the legislature was content the measures to be taken were in the police power of the city.

The school district also relies on Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177, 302 P.2d 574...

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