Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission v. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist., in Linn County

• Decision Date: 16 October 1974
• Docket Number: No. 56066,56066
• Citation: 222 N.W.2d 391
• Parties: 14 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 101, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9738 CEDAR RAPIDS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant, v. CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, IN the COUNTY OF LINN, State of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 391

222 N.W.2d 391

14 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 101, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9738

CEDAR RAPIDS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellant, v. CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, IN the COUNTY OF LINN, State of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 56066.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 16, 1974.

David F. McGuire, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

James R. Snyder and John R. Carpenter of Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ.

MASON, Justice.

This appeal by the Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission, hereafter referred to as the Commission, arises out of a controversy involving alleged sex discrimination against two school teachers employed by the Cedar Rapids Community School District, hereafter referred to as the School District. The Commission had commenced an action in the Linn District Court against the School District to enforce certain orders made by the Commission following a hearing on complaints against the School District.

Following hearing the district court dismissed the matter on the grounds the Commission acted as a court, judicial review of the Commission's ruling had not been provided and the Commission's orders against the School District were not enforceable since the Commission had exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction.

The Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission was established by Cedar Rapids City Ordinance No. 54--70 which amended ordinance No. 104--69, ch. 69, of the Municipal Code. Chapter 69 establishes the Commission, enumerates its powers, defines and sets out unfair practices in public accommodations and services, unfair employment and housing practices and provides the procedure for redress of aggrievances. The person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory act or practice may file a complaint with the Commission; an investigation is then conducted by the Commission to determine if there is probable cause for the complaint. If probable cause is found conciliation is attempted; if conciliation fails a public hearing may be brought. At the hearing the party or parties charged have the right to file written answer to the complaint, to call witnesses on their behalf and cross-examine other witnesses. The city attorney or representative, or an agent of the Commission conducts the case on behalf of the Commission. Evidence is taken under oath, strict rules of evidence applicable in courts of law or equity do not apply and complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the complaint.

Finally, section 69.15 provides in part:

'REMEDY. If upon consideration of the evidence taken at a public hearing, the Commission shall be of the opinion that any person charged in the complaint has engaged in or is engaged in, the unfair or discriminatory act or practice complained of, then the Commission shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from the unfair or discriminatory act or practice, and to take such affirmative action as is required to remedy the unfair or discriminatory act or practice complained of, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, * * *.'

Section 69.16 provides:

'SUIT. The Commission may, within 2 years after the entry of any order under this ordinance, direct the City Attorney or his representative to bring a suit in the District Court of this county, or in any other court which may have jurisdiction over the party charged, for an injunction or other appropriate court order of judgment, to compel obedience to its order.'

April 1972 Mrs. Joan Parr and Mrs. Judy McCarthy filed complaints with the Commission alleging sex discrimination in employment by their employer, the School District. The alleged discrimination involved forced maternity leave for pregnant teachers.

After investigation the Commission found probable cause for the complaints and provided for conciliation. When conciliation failed a public hearing was held and testimony taken. The Commission found the School District did discriminate in the area of sex and employment against the two complainants. They issued the following 'directives':

'The Commission directs in the case of Mrs. Judy McCarthy, that she shall receive compensation for time lost as a result of the forced maternity leave.

'The Commission directs in the case of Mrs. Joan Parr:

'(1) that Mrs. Parr shall receive a maternity leave,

'(2) that Mrs. Parr shall be offered a contract at the conclusion of her maternity leave, and

'(3) that Mrs. Parr shall receive compensation for time lost as a result of forced resignation.'

The School District was also 'directed' to pay all costs incurred by the Commission resulting from the public hearing.

After the School District failed to comply with the directives, the Commission filed a petition October 16 asking that the district court order the School District to comply.

The School District, in resistance to the petition, filed a motion to dismiss alleging: (1) The Commission acted as a tribunal or court in this controversy but because it was not established by the legislature it was an unconstitutional body. For that reason and because it acted beyond the scope of its authorized powers the Commission's orders or directives were null and void. (2) The Commission was an administrative agency and could not constitutionally be given judicial powers. (3) The School District was denied due process because the enabling ordinance establishing the Commission did not provide for judicial review. (4) The legislature has not empowered a municipality to enact ordinances establishing commissions of this type and therefore any orders or directives issued by such an illegal body are null and void.

After dismissal of its petition the Commission thereafter filed application for leave to file amended complaint. In denying the application the trial court stated:

'The original petition was dismissed because the City of Cedar Rapids established a tribunal by the provisions of Chapter 69, which it had no authority to do.

'No amendment to the petition in this case can change the provisions of Chapter 69, enacted prior to the bringing of this suit.'

The Commission contends the trial court erred, (1) in dismissing its petition and (2) in denying the Commission's application to amend its petition.

The appeal presents the following issues for review: (1) Is the Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission a court or merely an administrative agency?; (2) Is the Cedar Rapids City Council prohibited by section 1, Article V of the Iowa Constitution from establishing by ordinance a body which is designated the Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission and which acts as a court or tribunal?; (3) Is failure to provide for judicial review of the Commission's ruling a denial of due process?; and (4) Did the trial court err in denying the Commission's application for leave to file amendment to the petition after the court's ruling dismissing the petition?

I. The threshold issue of this appeal is whether the Commission is a 'court' in the constitutional sense, or an administrative agency vested with quasi-judicial powers.

The trial court found that the City had established a tribunal or court. In particularly noting section 69.15 of the City ordinance the court stated:

'By enactment of City Ordinance No. 54--70, amending Ordinance No. 104--69, the City Council has established a tribunal or court. The Council has given to the said tribunal or court the judicial power to require persons to cease and desist from unfair or discriminatory acts, to take affirmative action to remedy the unfair or discriminatory act including the power to require the hiring or reinstatement, or upgrading of employees, and the power to render judgment for back pay.'

The trial court in its ruling sustaining the School District's motion to dismiss also expressed the view that, 'It is important to note that the Commission's Petition in this Court and the ordinance (sections 69.16 and 69.17) provides that action in District Court is only to enforce an order issued and based upon an adjudication already made by the Commission acting in the judicial role. It does not provide for an appeal procedure. The ordinance does not provide for the Court to make an adjudication based on the record made before the Commission * * * or based on the proceedings before the Commission plus such other pleadings and evidence as the District Court may require * * * or for a hearing anew or de novo * * *.'

The Commission argues it is an administrative agency and not a court because it does not have all the powers and trappings of a court such as a disinterested judge, two adverse parties, specific procedures, rules of evidence, set time and place for meeting, power to subpoena, issue process, compel compliance with its ruling and orders and cite parties for contempt. The School District argues a 'functional approach' should be taken in determining whether the Commission acted as a court and that in this case the facts show the Commission did so act.

This court in In Re Community Sch. Dist. of Malvern, 250 Iowa 1240, 1246, 98 N.W.2d 737, 741, stated this definition of 'quasi-judicial':

"Designating an act or proceeding of or before an administrative tribunal or official of the general nature of a judicial act or proceeding but not within the judicial power as defined under constitutions." (Definition taken from Webster's New International Dictionary).

In a footnote the Minnesota supreme court in In Re Getsug, 290 Minn. 110, 186 N.W.2d 686, 690, cited this definition of 'judicial act' from Webster's New International Dictionary (Second Ed.) (1947), p. 1344: "An act invoking the exercise of judicial power, that is, the power to hear and determine controversies or to determine a question of right or obligation."

The court in In Re City of...