Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. European X-Ray Distributors of America, Inc.

Decision Date24 January 1984
Docket NumberNo. 82-2643,X-RAY,82-2643
Citation444 So.2d 1068
Parties38 UCC Rep.Serv. 40 CEDARS OF LEBANON HOSPITAL CORP., Appellant, v. EUROPEANDISTRIBUTORS OF AMERICA, INC., and Saab-Scania, A.B., Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Smathers & Thompson and John W. Keller, III, Miami, for appellant.

Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson and Sally R. Doerner and Joan S. Buckley, Miami, for appellees.

Before HENDRY, NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Corporation appeals from the dismissal with prejudice of that portion of the fourth amended and supplemental complaint alleging a cause of action for breach of warranty and/or strict liability against Saab-Scania. For reasons more fully developed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellant purchased two remote x-ray systems for use in its hospital. Appellee is a Swedish corporation which designed and manufactured the image systems and cut-film cameras for the x-ray equipment. The total remote x-ray system was assembled, and then distributed by European X-Ray Distributors of America, Inc. ("EXDA"). EXDA in turn sent the assembled x-ray system to Southeastern X-Ray Corp. ("SXC"). Appellant actually purchased the two systems from SXC. The total purchase price was $514,190.50.

Appellant alleges in its complaint 1 that the various components, when assembled, are internally incompatible because they are designed for different electrical currents with different cycles. As a result, the system is subject to constant and continuous breakdowns. The x-ray tubes and generators overheat when used for rapid exposures. As for the components manufactured by appellee, specifically the cut-film cameras, appellant alleges that these cannot be made to work at all. The image produced by the t.v. imaging system is of poor quality. The serial film changer, which is supposed to allow automatic rapid film changing, jams. In short, appellant alleges that the equipment is totally unfit for the intended purpose of taking diagnostic x-rays.

Appellee responds by stating that even if all of the above is true, there can be no cause of action for breach of express or implied warranties because there is no privity between the parties. The purchase contract was between appellant and SXC. Appellee also argues that there can be no cause of action for strict liability because no person suffered injuries as a result of the defective equipment, nor was there damage to any property other than to the x-ray systems themselves.

The relevant analysis must focus briefly on the history of strict liability and implied warranties, the culmination of which is reflected in the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla.1976), and in the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, Chapters 671-680, Florida Statutes (1981).

The theory that there must be contractual privity before an action can lie for injuries suffered as a result of dangerous and defective products placed on the market has been the bane of judicial existence since the doctrine was first enunciated in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Meeson & Welsby 109, 152 Eng.Rep. 402 (1842). This requirement, which had the effect of reducing the number of people able to file suit when they were injured, was perceived immediately as being harsh and unjust. Courts began to devise ways to circumvent the doctrine while still recognizing its validity. Cf. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am.Dec. 455 (1852) (belladonna, a poison, mislabeled by manufacturer, who in turn sold it to a druggist, who in turn sold it to a customer; customer allowed to recover from manufacturer); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (J. Cardozo writing decision that when nature of product is such that it is reasonably certain to place persons in peril when negligently made, liability attaches irrespective of contract); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises between manufacturer and ultimate purchaser when manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes it to the public). All jurisdictions eventually adopted exceptions to the privity requirement if the product was a food or drug, a dangerous instrumentality, or inherently defective.

Florida followed this universal trend of receding from the requirement of privity when injuries were caused by defective products. Cf. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920) (dangerous instrumentality); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944) (tainted food); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514 (Fla.1953) (mislabeled grain); Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So.2d 299 (Fla.1956) (inherent defect). By 1965, the development in the law of implied warranty reached a point where this court could state that "we conclude that privity no longer obtains in an implied warranty suit by a consumer against a manufacturer." Bernstein v. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 177 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), aff'd, 181 So.2d 641 (Fla.1966). With that statement, it appeared that the doctrine of privity was dead in Florida, at least with regard to suits to recover for personal injuries caused by defective products. When the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted in Florida, Chapter 65-254, Laws of Florida, the debate began again, focusing on whether the Code, with its emphasis on dealings between "buyers" and "sellers", intended to impose once more the absolute stricture of privity. Without a clear statement from the Florida Legislature, however, that by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code it intended to abrogate all of the common law exceptions to the doctrine of privity, cf. Arias v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 426 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), courts have refused to state that the pre-Code cases are no longer valid. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 177 (Fla.1970), cited with approval in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla.1976). Finally, strict liability in tort was adopted by this state in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., supra. The Florida Supreme Court adopted the language of section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts in West and held that strict liability would be imposed when a manufacturer places a product on the market, knowing it is to be used without inspection for defects, which product proves to have a defect which causes an injury to a human being. Strict liability may be imposed for damages to property also when a defective product causes the damage. Cf. Adobe Building Centers, Inc. v. Reynolds, 403 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dismissed, 411 So.2d 380 (Fla.1981). Strict liability eliminates privity as a doctrinal barrier to filing suit against a manufacturer of a defective product. 2 The language in West and subsequent cases, however, convinces us that strict liability should be reserved for those cases where there are personal injuries or damage to other property only. We therefore affirm the trial court's granting the motion to dismiss as to the count alleging a cause of action in strict liability.

At the same time as the courts were attempting to circumvent the strict confines of the privity requirement in personal injury cases, another line of cases developed which also abrogated the necessity for privity in a contractual relationship. In A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So.2d 397 (Fla.1973), the Florida Supreme Court held that a third party general contractor, who may foreseeably be injured or [who] sustained an economic loss proximately caused by the negligent performance of a contractual duty by an architect, has a cause of action [in negligence] against the alleged negligent architect, notwithstanding the absence of privity. Id. at 402. See also Naranja Lakes Condominium No. One, Inc. v. Rizzo, 422 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So.2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 417 So.2d 328 (Fla.1982); Highlands County School Board v. K.D. Hedin Construction, Inc., 382 So.2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Parliament Towers Condominium v. Parliament House Realty, Inc., 377 So.2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development Concepts Corp., 373 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Luciani v. High, 372 So.2d 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Probert, Negligence & Economic Damage: The California-Florida Nexus, 33 U.Fla.L.R. 485 (1981). These cases involve only the negligent performance of a contract for professional services. These cases are interesting as another example of the complete abrogation of the privity requirement in a contractual context.

A third line of cases allowed an ultimate purchaser to sue a manufacturer for damages for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when there was only economic loss and no privity. Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So.2d 440 (Fla.1967); Chrysler Corp. v. Miller, 310 So.2d 356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So.2d 452 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 267 So.2d 833 (Fla.1972). The courts in both Miller and Rehurek based their decisions on the language of sections 672.315 and 672.316, Florida Statutes; that is to say, on the language of the Uniform Commercial Code. In so doing, the court in Rehurek stated:

When a purchaser answers the inducements made in the tremendous advertising campaigns carried on by the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
40 cases
  • Vermont Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Vermont
    • 4 Junio 1993
    ...law); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. J.B. Plastics, Inc., 505 So.2d 1223 (Ala.1987); Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. European X-Ray Distribs. of America, Inc., 444 So.2d 1068 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984); Board of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 428, 137 Ill.Dec. 635, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989); ......
  • In re Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. Mktg. & Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • 21 Diciembre 2017
    ...Co., 663 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (Cohn, J.); [288 F.Supp.3d 1274] Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. European X-Ray Distributors of America, Inc., 444 So.2d 1068, 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ; Fischetti v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 918 So.2d 974, 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. ......
  • Starr v. VSL Pharm., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 28 Diciembre 2020
    ...LLC , No. 2:18-CV-93-FTM-29CM, 2018 WL 2331979, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2018) (citing Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. European X-Ray Distrib. of Am., Inc. , 444 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ). In Cedars , however, the court expressly relied on "direct representations" consisting......
  • Masonite Corp. Hardboard Siding Prods. Litigation
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
    • 16 Septiembre 1998
    ...has been effectively overruled by Kramer, 520 So.2d 37, and its progeny. Plaintiff's reliance on Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. European X-Ray Distribs., 444 So.2d 1068 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) is similarly misplaced. There the court surveyed conflicting jurisprudential developments but con......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • The magic of privity in express product warranty claims: a plaintiff's perspective.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 79 No. 11, December 2005
    • 1 Diciembre 2005
    ...its definition. After much sifting, she comes upon Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Corp. v. European X-Ray Distributors of American, Inc., 444 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), a case discussing the "outer limits" of privity. The case involved a claim by a hospital against the manufacturer of x-ra......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT