Cedillo v. Standard Oil Company of Texas

• Decision Date: 11 September 1961
• Docket Number: No. 18293.,18293.
• Citation: 291 F.2d 246
• Parties: Manuel CEDILLO, Alberto Sanchez et al., Appellants, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF TEXAS, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

291 F.2d 246 (1961)

Manuel CEDILLO, Alberto Sanchez et al., Appellants, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF TEXAS, Appellee.

No. 18293.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 26, 1961.

Rehearing Denied September 11, 1961.

Ernest Guinn, El Paso, Tex., Guinn, Guinn & Truex, El Paso, Tex., of counsel, for appellants.

J. F. Hulse, W. A. Thurmond, Scott, Hulse, Marshall & Feuille, El Paso, Tex., for appellee.

Before CAMERON and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and HANNAY, District Judge.

CAMERON, Circuit Judge.

We are called upon here to determine whether the appellants were in fact the employees of Standard Oil Company of Texas, appellee, and, as such employees, were covered by the provisions of the collective bargaining contract existing between Standard Oil and The International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 552, the certified bargaining agent for Standard's employees. The lower court found they were not. We agree.

The appellants, Manuel Cedillo, Alberto Sanchez and thirty-six others, had worked as laborers for various periods of time in the maintenance division at the El Paso County, Texas plant of Standard Oil. At all times relevant hereto Standard had a bargaining contract with I.U.O.E. which covered, among other things, such wages and benefits to which Standard's employees would be entitled. The appellants were not members of the I.U.O.E., belonging, instead, to the Hod Carriers' Union.

Standard Oil also had a contract with Vowell Construction Company, which provided that Vowell would furnish to Standard the necessary labor and equipment required by Standard to maintain the plant. At the end of each month Vowell would bill Standard, at predetermined rates, for the amount of labor and equipment used during the month. This contract expired by its own terms January 4, 1957 and was not renewed when Vowell was underbid for the work to be done during 1957.

Eight of the appellants were laid off in November, 1956, when Standard informed Vowell that less men would be needed to handle the work. The employment of the remaining appellants was terminated by Vowell upon expiration of the contract on January 4, 1957.

Thereafter appellants, through the Hod Carriers' Union, filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board against Standard Oil, alleging, among other things, that Standard had caused Vowell to terminate their employment. These charges were investigated, but the Regional Director found the evidence would not support the issuance of a complaint. This action was appealed to, and upheld by, the General Counsel.

The gravamen of the complaint filed below¹ is that appellants were in fact the employees of Standard Oil and, as such employees, were entitled to the same benefits and protection of the bargaining contract as were the other employees of Standard. Prayer was for damages equivalent to the sum of back wages lost by appellants as the result of Standard's paying them wages less than that called for by the contract, plus such wages as were owing them since date of their alleged wrongful discharge. All relief was denied appellants when the lower court found that they had been employees of Vowell Construction and not of Standard Oil.

Appellants, in their brief, make repeated references to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., and alleged violations thereof by Standard in dealing with these appellants, but such arguments are inappropriate here since the "Plaintiffs' Original Amended Petition," upon which this case was tried, made no mention of the Act and in no way brought the action within its scope.

Stripping this case down to its fundamentals, we have presented nothing but a challenge of the findings of fact of the trial court. It is well settled that, in order for a reviewing court to set aside findings of fact by a trial court sitting without a jury, it must be clearly demonstrated that such findings are without adequate evidentiary support in the record, or were induced by an erroneous view of the law,² and the burden of showing that the findings are "clearly erroneous" is on the one attacking them.³ A thorough study of the entire record in this case convinces us that this burden has not been successfully discharged by appellants.

On the contrary, the evidence presented to the trial judge fully supports the findings made. It was shown for instance, by testimony and exhibits, much of which was undisputed: that Vowell Construction handled all necessary personal information of the appellants, including the social security numbers; that appellants were carried on Vowell's payroll, and it was Vowell who did the actual paying of appellants; that all pay records were kept by Vowell, including the 1948-1956 records here involved; that Vowell made all income tax deductions from appellants' pay and deducted and paid the required social security tax; that workmen's...