Ceeder v. H.M. Loud & Sons Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 28 July 1891
• Citation: 86 Mich. 541,49 N.W. 575
• Parties: CEEDER v. H. M. LOUD & SONS' LUMBER CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

49 N.W. 575

86 Mich. 541

CEEDER v. H. M. LOUD & SONS' LUMBER CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 28, 1891

Error to circuit court, Bay county; GEORGE P. COBB, Judge.

Action by John Ceeder against the H. M. Loud & Sons' Lumber Company for the value of labor. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Hanchett, Stark & Hanchett, for appellant.

C E. Pierce, for appellee.

MCGRATH J.

Ceeder sues for wages, claiming a hiring for the season of 1889, at $3.50 per day, and setting up a discharge without cause before the expiration of his time. One Aiken says that, in the spring of 1889, H. M. Loud, who was the president of the company, instructed him to go to Bay City, and employ two sawyers for the season, at $3.25 per day each; that he went to Bay City, was unable to get his men at less than $3.50 per day, and sent word to Loud by one Chase, and wired Peterson who was superintendent of the mill, to meet Chase; that he received the reply telegram that same evening and employed plaintiff and another for that season, at $3.50 per day. He was not allowed to give the contents of the telegram, but, after stating the employment, he was asked, "Did you have any instructions from Mr. Loud to make such an arrangement?" and replied, "Yes; I did." Ceeder testifies to his employment by Aiken for defendant at $3.50 per day for the season; that "he [Aiken] came over with the telegram from H. M. Loud & Sons' Lumber Co. He read it over at the house." That was Tuesday. "I left Bay City on the 7th of May, and arrived at Oscoda that night, about 6 o'clock. Upon my arrival I saw Mr. Loud, and gave him a letter that Mr. Aiken had given me. He says, 'All right, you are the two sawyers,' and says I, 'Yes.' Then Mr. Loud said, 'Look around town, and I will see Mr. Peterson to-morrow, and give you work."' That he went to work on the 10th of May, and worked until July 6th, when he was discharged without cause; that in June plaintiff and Paul Lemme, who was hired with plaintiff, were in the office of the company, and Loud was present, but witness was not sure that Loud heard the conversation; that Lemme asked Peterson if he was going to pay $3.50 per day for the season, and Peterson said, "Yes, that is the understanding;" that plaintiff could not get work till the 29th of July, when he obtained employment at $2 per day for the balance of the season. He was paid at the rate of $3.50 per day, up to and including the 5th day of July, and it is admitted that, if entitled to a verdict at all, he was entitled to $222.50, the amount found to be due by the jury.

The defendant raised two questions of fact upon the trial: First, that Aiken was not instructed to employ plaintiff for the season; and, second, that plaintiff was discharged for cause. Both of these questions have been settled by the verdict. The only question raised here is that defendant is a corporation; that this is not a case of...