Ceeder v. Kowach

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: KILEY
• Citation: Ceeder v. Kowach, 17 Ill.App.2d 202, 149 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. 1958)
• Decision Date: 15 April 1958
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 47064
• Parties: Albert CEEDER, Appellant, v. John KOWACH, Appellee.

Page 766

149 N.E.2d 766

17 Ill.App.2d 202

Albert CEEDER, Appellant, v. John KOWACH, Appellee.

Gen. No. 47064.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

April 15, 1958.

Frank J. Mackey, Jr., Chicago, for appellant.

Berchem, Schwantes & Thuma, Chicago, Donald N. Berchem, Chicago, of counsel, for appellee.

KILEY, Presiding Justice.

This is a personal injury action with verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff has appealed.

On January 26, 1954, about 3:15 P.M., plaintiff and defendant were driving their automobiles in a northeasterly direction on Ogden Avenue in Chicago. Both cars were in the same lane with defendant ten or fifteen feet to the rear. About one hundred feet west of the Kostner Avenue intersection, both cars were held up momentarily by traffic. When they started again defendant stayed about the same distance to the rear at a speed of ten to fifteen miles per hour. At the Kostner Avenue intersection plaintiff stopped his car for a red light and defendant's car skidded on the wet pavement and the collision resulted.

Plaintiff contends that the trial court should have directed a verdict in his favor. There is no claim of plaintiff's contributory negligence but defendant contends the question of his negligence was for the jury. We think defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law since it is our opinion that he should have foreseen that plaintiff would probably have to stop for a red light; that traffic on adjoining lanes would prevent turning out of the way of plaintiff's car; that he would have to apply his brakes; that his car would probably skid on the wet pavement if the brakes were applied too suddenly; and that if he were going too fast or was not far enough behind he would collide with plaintiff's car. The fact that his car skidded into plaintiff's car, even though the pavement was wet, leaves room for no other inference, we think, except that under the circumstances defendant 'was driving too fast or following * * * too closely.' Kronenberger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 324 Ill.App. 519, 58 N.E.2d 334. What other drivers at the time and place were doing is of no consequence. They may have been negligent also (Kronenberger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 324 Ill.App. 519, 58 N.E.2d 334) but more fortunate in avoiding consequences.

It is on the element of damages that we must disagree with plaintiff on this contention. There was some evidence of personal injuries and property damage introduced in his case, and, therefore, this question was properly submitted to the jury. There was, however, conflicting medical evidence and an...