Ceeed v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com.
| Citation | 43 Cal.App.3d 306,118 Cal.Rptr. 315 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 19 November 1974 |
| Parties | CEEED, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 13691. |
This appeal involves the constitutionality of the Coastal Conservation Act of 1972 (Pub.Resources Code, § 27000, et seq.). 1 Plaintiffs 2 brought a declaratory relief action alleging that the Act is on its face Preliminarily, we shall review the salient features of the statute under review.
subject to numerous constitutional infirmities. The court below upheld the constitutionality of the Act against each and all of the attacks and entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment.
Proposed as an initiative measure known as 'Proposition 20,' the Act was approved by the voters at the general election of November 2, 1972. It declares the California coastal zone to be a 'delicately balanced ecosystem' whose preservation and protection for present and succeeding generations are of paramount concern to the state and nation. (§ 27001.) The coastal zone is defined as the area of the state seaward to the outer limits of the state's jurisdiction and landward to the nearest coastal mountain range except that in Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego counties, the landward limit is the nearest coastal mountain range or five miles from the mean high tide line, whichever distance is the shorter. (§ 27100.)
The Act creates the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission (Commission) and six regional commissions (§§ 27200--27201) to undertake studies to determine the ecological planning principles and assumptions needed to ensure conservation and protection of coastal zone resources and, based upon such studies and in full consultation with all affected public and private interests, to develop and adopt a California Coastal Zone Conservation Plan (Coastal Zone Plan). (§§ 27001, subd. (b), 27300--27304.) Each regional commission, in cooperation with local agencies and after public hearings in each county within its region, is directed to prepare and submit its recommendations to the Commission no later than April 1, 1975. No later than December 1, 1975, the Commission must adopt and submit a Coastal Zone Plan to the Legislature for its adoption and implementation. (§ 27320.)
To ensure that developments pending formulation and adoption of a Coastal Zone Plan will be consistent with the objectives of the Act, any person seeking to develop property within an area designated as the permit area must obtain a permit from the appropriate regional commission. (§ 27400.) Subject to certain exceptions, the permit area extends seaward to the outer limit of the coastal zone and landward for a distance of 1,000 yards from the mean high tide line. (§ 27104.) Before a permit may issue, the regional commission must find that the development will not have a substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect and will be consistent with the policy and objectives of the Act. (§ 27402.) The burden of proof on all issues is upon the applicant. (§ 27402.) Any applicant or aggrieved person may appeal a decision of the regional commission to the Commission (§ 27423), and may obtain judicial review of the acts or decisions of the regional commission or the Commission (§ 27424).
The Act, including the interim permit requirement, expires by its own terms on the 91st day after the final adjournment of the 1976 regular session of the Legislature.
The constitutional issues raised by these proceedings do not arise out of a particular factual context in the actual execution of the Act. They are presented as pure questions of law. Plaintiffs contend the Act is unconstitutional on its face for one or more of the following reasons: (1) Enactment of the measure by the initiative process violated due process rights of affected property owners; (2) the Act constitutes an invalid state intrusion into municipal affairs of chartered cities; (3) the Act constitutes an unlawful taking of private property for public purposes without just compensation; (4) the Act unlawfully delegates legislative power to the Commission; (5) the Act fails to assure procedural due process to permit applicants; and (6) the Act infringes upon the fundamental right to travel. From the discussion which follows, we have concluded that each and all of the attacks must fail and the judgment below should be affirmed.
Plaintiffs' first and perhaps main contention is that enactment of the measure by the initiative process rendered it void Ab initio because that process denied affected property owners an opportunity to be heard before the measure became law.
Plaintiffs urge that opportunity to be heard before passage of a regulation substantially affecting land use is mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They cite cases holding that general law cities may not enact zoning ordinances through the initiative process because compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of the State Zoning Law is essential to due process. 3 Though they do not contend that the state is subject to the State Zoning Law, plaintiffs argue that the cited cases stand for the proposition that the minimum procedural standards therein prescribed are mandated by the due process clause. It necessarily follows, so the argument goes, that the state cannot enact zoning regulations by a process which fails to afford affected property owners procedural safeguards such as are afforded by the State Zoning Law. On the foregoing assumptions, plaintiffs contend that passage of the Act under review by the initiative process violated due process rights of affected property owners. 4 We are unpersuaded.
Unlike the ordinances invalidated in the cases cited by plaintiffs, the Coastal Initiative is not a zoning measure. It 'does not zone any property but merely requires the Commission to formulate a coastal zone plan for submission to the Legislature.' (State of California v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 237, 255, 115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 508, 524 P.2d 1281, 1292.) And, unlike the zoning regulations involved in the cited cases, the Coastal Initiative does not restrict land use permanently or for an indefinite period. The only land use restriction imposed by the Act and of which plaintiffs complain is the control over development in the permit area pending formulation of the Coastal Zone Plan. That restriction is simply 'an interim measure to assure that developments in the coastal zone are consistent with the objectives of the Act so that priceless coastal resources are not irreversibly committed to uses which would be inconsistent with the plan ultimately developed.' (State of California v. Superior Court, Supra, at p. 253, 115 Cal.Rptr. at p. 508, 524 P.2d at p. 1292.) The permit system is not even a moratorium against all interim developments.
(San Diego Coast Regional Comm. v. See The Sea, Limited, 9 Cal.3d 888, 892, 109 Cal.Rptr. 377, 513 P.2d 129; Miller, The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act: Cases and Controversies, 1973--74 (Stan. Environmental Law Society, June 1974) pp. 8--9.) It imposes only such minimal controls as are necessary to enable the Commission to perform its function. Adoption of a regulation imposing such interim development controls, whether at the local or state level, without affording affected property owners an opportunity to be heard, does not offend due process.
Local interim ordinances prohibiting acts which may conflict with the objectives of a contemplated zoning plan have been consistently upheld as valid exercises of the police power. The rationale of those decisions is that 'it would be destructive of the plan if, during the period of its incubation, parties seeking to evade the operation thereof should be permitted to enter upon a course of construction which might progress so far as to defeat in whole or in part the ultimate execution of the plan.' (Miller v. Board of Public Works, Supra, 195 Cal. 477, 496, 234 P. 381, 388.)
Such interim ordinances, sometimes referred to as 'stopgap' or 'incubation period' ordinances, may be validly enacted without prior notice and hearing. (Silvera v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 3 Cal.App.3d 554, 557--558, 83 Cal.Rptr. 698; Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, Supra, 222 Cal.App.2d 508, 518, 35 Cal.Rptr. 480; Fletcher v. Porter, Supra, 203 Cal.App.2d 313, 324, 21 Cal.Rptr. 452; Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, Supra, 182 Cal.App.2d 93, 100, 5 Cal.Rptr. 724.) In urging that the State Zoning Law prescribes minimum due process procedural...
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