Cegalis v. Trauma Inst.
| Decision Date | 30 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-00153 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Vermont |
| Parties | KAREN CEGALIS, Plaintiff v. TRAUMA INSTITUTE AND CHILD TRAUMA INSTITUTE, et. al. Defendants. |
(ECF 5)
Plaintiff Karen Cegalis brings suit against Defendants Trauma Institute and Child Trauma Institute, Ricky Greenwald, and Bambi Rattner for abuse of process, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, prima facie intentional tort, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of professional negligence, defamation, and punitive damages. Defendants now file this motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
This action arises out of a custody dispute between Plaintiff, her minor son, L.C., and his father and stepmother, Raymond and Marilynn Knutsen. During this dispute, the Knutsens accused Plaintiff Cegalis of sexually abusing L.C. and making threats against them and L.C. Plaintiff contends that these allegations are baseless and have caused irreparable damage to her relationship with her son, amounting to personal injury. The Chittenden Unit for Special Investigations, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Rutland Police Department, and the Department for Children and Families have each investigated the sexual abuse allegations made against Plaintiff, and they have each been unable to substantiate them with any evidence. ECF 1-2 at 1. In an Order issued on February 10, 2015 (hereafter "The Family Court Order," the Rutland Family Court concluded that the allegations were not founded in any facts in the record and appeared to be the products of hysteria on the part of the Knutsens. ECF 1-2 at 10. The Rutland Family Court also granted Raymond Knutsen continued sole custody of L.C. and ordered a stop to reunification efforts with Plaintiff Cegalis out of concern for L.C.'s psychological best interest.
As a part of its Order on February 10, 2015, the Rutland Family Court directed Raymond Knutsen to obtain the services of a qualified child trauma therapist for L.C., subject to multiple conditions. ECF 1-2 at 13. The Court ordered that Cegalis have full right of access to L.C.'s therapy records subject to confidentiality provisions unless the therapist determined that such access would contravene L.C.'s best interests. ECF 1-2 at13. The Court also barred the Knutsens from intervening in L.C.'s therapy in any way. ECF 1-2 at 13. Notably, the Family Court issued these instructions in response to its findings that the Knutsens had made multiple attempts to interfere in L.C.'s past therapy experiences by both reinforcing a narrative about Cegalis' alleged abusive behavior and by seeking to undermine the credibility of his past therapist. See ECF 1-2 at 2-11. The Family Court Order sought to prevent these same problems from repeating in L.C.'s next trauma therapy experience by limiting the Knutsens' ability to interfere and by giving Plaintiff Cegalis qualified access to therapy records. The Court also ordered that Raymond Knutsen provide proof of L.C.'s engagement in treatment, and that the therapist be permitted to communicate with the attorneys in this case. ECF 1-2 at 14.
Raymond Knutsen hired Defendants to provide L.C. with EMDR therapy and to testify as experts in litigation concerning Plaintiff's parental alienation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants encouraged L.C. to believe that he was sexually abused by her through EMDR therapy. On June 17, 2017, Defendant Rattner testified in Rutland Superior Court that L.C. should not be reunited with Plaintiff. ECF 1-7. Defendant Greenwald also testified that Plaintiff should not have contact with L.C. on account of past abuse in the parent-child relationship. ECF 1-8.
Defendants Greenwald and Rattner were professionally disciplined for their work on L.C.'s case. On June 26, 2018, the Massachusetts Board of Registration of Psychologists entered into a consent decree with both Rattner and Greenwald for having taken on a child custody evaluation role when their impartiality and effectiveness was compromised. ECF 1-3, ECF 1-4. Both defendants attested that, if the matter went to a hearing, the Board could find that they had conducted inadequate examinations of the minor child and his mother to support a diagnosis and recommendation. ECF 1-3 at 2, ECF 1-4 at 2.
This court has proper diversity jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The parties are residents of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir.1993). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
First, Plaintiff submits that Defendants committed the tort of abuse of process by providing false testimony under oath, failing to produce documents subject to subpoena, and threatening Plaintiff's expert witness with a professional misconduct complaint in a related parental alienation case. See ECF 1-7, 1-8. Taking her factual allegations to be true, Plaintiff's claim regarding Defendants' non-testimonial actions passes muster under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
As a general principle, the tort of abuse of process is reserved for situations in which a defendant uses a legal process against another to accomplish a purpose for which it was not intended. Jacobsen v. Garzo, 149 Vt. 205, 207 (1988). To state an abuse of process claim under Vermont law, a plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) an illegal, improper or unauthorized use of a court process; (2) an ulterior motive or an ulterior purpose; and (3) resulting damage to the plaintiff. Id. at 208. "There is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions." Id. (citation omitted). There mustbe allegations of "irregular steps taken under cover of process after its issuance, and damage resulting therefrom." Italian Star Line v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 52 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1931); see also 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process §§ 2, 13 (). Many courts have also found abuse of process where an individual harasses a litigation opponent by clearly wrongful conduct. See General Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2003).
First, the court must determine whether Plaintiff has a viable abuse of process claim against Defendants as non-party witnesses who provided false testimony at trial. Under Vermont law, the answer is no. In Cunningham v. Brown, 18 Vt. 123, 126 (1846), the Vermont Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may not bring a tort action against a witness who gave false testimony in a prior case. Witnesses enjoy broad "testimonial privilege" which grants them immunity from damages sought in a later civil suit based on allegedly false testimony. See O'Connor v. Donovon, 191 Vt. 412, 427 (2012); Andrews v. Steinberg, 471 N.Y.S.2d 764, 771 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
In the case at bar, Defendants testified against Plaintiff's suitability for parental reunification with L.C. based on conclusions that they reached through possibleprofessional negligence. Despite the evidence that Defendants' testimony lacked professional veracity, contentions under oath in a previous trial are immune from civil suit. While there are limited exceptions to the testimonial privilege (namely, where the case involves a malicious prosecution claim or a criminal conviction of perjury), none apply here. See id. Hence, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that Defendants committed abuse of process by providing alleged false testimony.
Next, Plaintiff makes an abuse of process claim based on Defendants' alleged non-testimonial actions - first, due to their failure to produce documents subject to subpoena. This claim survives Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' delaying tactics sought to undermine her parental reunification efforts, damage her relationship with L.C., and cause her reputational harm in the community. A party's non-compliance at trial could viably qualify as an improper use of a court process with ulterior motive to damage the Plaintiff. Taking all factual allegations in the Complaint to be true, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim of abuse of process.
Additionally, Plaintiff's abuse of process claim concerning alleged threats made by Defendants against Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Mart, also survives this Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Plaintiff proffers that Defendants made these threats todiscourage Dr. Mart from testifying and to retaliate against him professionally if he did so. Taking Plaintiff's factual allegations to be true, and making all inferences in her favor, her claim meets the requirements of abuse of process under Vermont law for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). Indeed, she has stated in her pleadings that Defendants took an irregular action (threatening her expert witness) during the litigation process with ulterior motive to cause a negative collateral effect, thereby harming her position. As such, Defendants' motion to dismiss on the abuse of process claim is denied on this issue.
To continue reading
Request your trial