Celis v. State

Decision Date01 February 2012
Docket NumberNos. 13–09–00477–CR,13–09–00478–CR.,s. 13–09–00477–CR
Citation354 S.W.3d 7
PartiesMauricio Rodriguez CELIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

354 S.W.3d 7

Mauricio Rodriguez CELIS, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Nos. 13–09–00477–CR

13–09–00478–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi–Edinburg.

Aug. 31, 2011.Rehearing Overruled Oct. 13, 2011.Discretionary Review Granted Feb. 1, 2012.


[354 S.W.3d 15]

David L. Botsford, Law Office of David L. Botsford, Austin, J.A. ‘Tony’ Canales, Jo Ellen Hewins, Canales & Simonson, P.C., Corpus Christi, for Appellant.

Mark Skurka, Dist. Atty., Corpus Christi, Ellen Stewart–Klein, Eric Nichols, Asst. Atty's Gen., Michael Shane Attaway, Deputy Atty. Gen. for Crim. Justice, Austin, for State.

Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices GARZA and PERKES.
OPINION
Opinion by Chief Justice VALDEZ.

Appellant, Mauricio Rodriguez Celis, was convicted of fourteen counts of falsely holding himself out as a lawyer. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.122(a) (West 2003). By eighteen issues, appellant seeks to reverse his conviction based on challenges to: (1) the legal sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the denial of his motion for new trial based on judicial bias; (3) the constitutionality of section 38.122 of the Texas Penal Code; (4) the jury charge; and (5) the admission and exclusion of evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we overrule appellant's issues and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I. Background

By two indictments,1 appellant was charged with 23 counts of falsely holding himself out as a lawyer in violation of section 38.122(a) of the Texas Penal Code. See id. A jury trial was held in the 148th Judicial District Court of Nueces County with Judge Mark Luitjen presiding by appointment. At trial, the State offered the testimony of 20 witnesses and over 100 exhibits, including appellant's sworn testimony in a civil case. In presenting his defense, appellant relied upon many of the same witnesses and exhibits and, in addition, offered the testimony of three other witnesses.

The evidence established that appellant held himself out as a lawyer with CGT Law Group International, LLP, a law firm located in Nueces County, Texas founded by appellant and others. Appellant has not been admitted to the practice of law in Texas. Although appellant described himself as a lawyer from Mexico, he is not certified as a foreign legal consultant. According to the testimony of Josh Hensley, the Director of Eligibility and Examination of the Texas Board of Law Examiners, a person who has a certificate as a foreign legal consultant is considered to be affiliated with the State Bar of Texas, and is allowed to have a law practice limited to advising clients about the laws of Mexico

[354 S.W.3d 16]

while maintaining an office in Texas. The Texas Board of Law Examiners requires attorneys from Mexico to produce a “cedula” as evidence of the person's ability to practice law in Mexico, as well as a certificate from Mexico's Ministry of Education stating that the person is currently meeting the requirement to be a lawyer in Mexico.

The evidence, including appellant's sworn testimony, established that appellant does not have a cedula. Nevertheless, when asked, “[A]re you a nonlawyer or are you a lawyer?” appellant testified, “I am a lawyer in Mexico.... I'm considered a lawyer in Mexico.” According to appellant, “The Constitution does not require that you be a licensed attorney or have a diploma in law to practice law in Mexico.” Appellant testified that although he has a diploma in judicial sciences, it has never been registered with the Ministry of Education, which is required to obtain a cedula.

Appellant called two witnesses to testify about the requirements to practice law in Mexico. The first witness, Jose Martin de Valenzuela Hernandez, an attorney with appellant's law firm (who has a cedula), testified that it is not necessary to go to law school and obtain a law license to practice law in Mexico. Hernandez testified that “[t]he cedula is not a license.” According to Hernandez, “that's what the law in Mexico is.... Anybody who goes and wants to practice in the four areas of amparo, employment law, agrarian law, and criminal law can do that. Anybody here can do that. And they can go to Mexico and try it.” On cross-examination, the State asked Hernandez, “So, every single Mexican citizen is licensed to practice law?” to which Hernandez replied, “As long as they're not liars and they're not mentally incompetent.... The law establishes it as such for everyone.” The State also asked Hernandez, “Under this particular statute, everybody in Mexico is authorized to practice law, is that right?” and Hernandez answered, “That's correct.” Later, Hernandez testified that appellant is a “licenciado,” a term which he described as a synonym for attorney, based on a law that applies “to every single Mexican citizen.” The State asked Hernandez, “So every Mexican citizen is a licenciado?” to which Hernandez replied, “If you want to look at it that way, you have a license under the constitution and laws, yes.”

The second witness called by appellant, Hector Rene Valdez Diaz (who also has a cedula), gave testimony consistent with Hernandez's testimony. Diaz is a personal secretary for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Justice of the State of Chihuahua. On cross-examination, the State asked Diaz, “So what you're telling this jury is that all Mexican citizens who are of legal age and of sound mind are licensed to practice law in Mexico?” to which Diaz replied, “In these areas [referring to amparo, employment law, agrarian law, and criminal law], yes.”

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on 14 counts: (1) stating on a business card that he was licensed in Mexico (count 2 in Cause No. 07–CR–4046–E, submitted to the jury as count 1); (2) being described on a business webpage as an attorney at law and a licensed attorney in Mexico (count 5 in Cause No. 07–CR–4046–E, submitted to the jury as count 4); (3) signing a legal document in a place designated for an attorney's signature (count 6 in Cause No. 07–CR–4046–E, submitted to jury as count 5); (4) stating that he was a lawyer, that he had been admitted to the bar in the year 2000, that he had been in the full time practice of law for 6 years and that he was a member in good standing of the state bar of Mexico, in an insured supplement

[354 S.W.3d 17]

application for lawyer's professional liability insurance (count 2 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); (5) stating that he was a lawyer, that he had been admitted to the bar in the year 2000, that he had been in the full time practice of law for 7 years and that he was a member in good standing of the state bar of Mexico, in an insured supplement application for lawyer's professional liability insurance (count 3 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); (6) accepting a check in the amount of $84,286.15 as attorney's fees (count 6 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); (7) accepting a check in the amount of $100,020.83 as attorney's fees (count 7 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); (8) accepting a check in the amount of $80,000.00 as attorney's fees (count 8 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); (9) accepting a check in the amount of $286,000.00 as attorney's fees (count 9 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); (10) accepting a check in the amount of $27,000.00 as attorney's fees (count 10 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); (11) accepting a check in the amount of $122,500.00 as attorney's fees (count 11 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); (12) accepting a check in the amount of $157,500.00 as attorney's fees (count 12 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); (13) accepting a check in the amount of $440,000.00 as attorney's fees (count 13 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E); and (14) accepting a check in the amount of $37,789.53 as attorney's fees (count 14 in Cause No. 08–CR–1365–E).

The jury assessed a ten-year prison sentence and $10,000 fine as punishment for each offense. The jury recommended that the prison sentence be suspended and that appellant be placed on community supervision. Judge Luitjen did not sentence appellant at that time, but instead ordered the preparation of a presentence report.

Subsequently, on March 26, 2009, Judge Luitjen reconvened the proceedings to consider, among other things, the State's request for restitution. Although appellant had not yet been sentenced, the court certified appellant's right of appeal and set bond at $700,000.

On April 24, 2009, before sentencing had taken place, appellant filed a motion to recuse Judge Luitjen based on allegations of judicial bias involving the judge's courtroom behavior. In support of the motion, appellant attached affidavits from seven of the jurors who served on the case. In their affidavits, each of the jurors expressed an opinion that based on what he or she had observed during the trial, Judge Luitjen was biased against appellant and his counsel. The same affidavits were also attached in support of appellant's motion for new trial, which was filed at the same time as the motion to recuse. Appellant's motion for new trial requested relief based on structural error involving the same allegations of judicial bias made in the motion to recuse.

On May 15, 2009, Judge Manuel Banales, then the presiding judge of the Fifth Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, held a hearing on appellant's motion to recuse. Six of the seven jurors whose affidavits had been relied upon by appellant were called as witnesses at the hearing and gave testimony verifying the statements made in the affidavits. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Banales granted the motion to recuse and assigned himself to the case. Subsequently, Judge Banales accepted the jury's assessment of punishment on all fourteen counts, suspended the prison term, imposed community supervision for a term of ten years, and assessed a single fine in the amount of $10,000. 2

[354 S.W.3d 18]

On June 24, 2009, the State filed a motion to recuse Judge Banales. Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson of the Texas Supreme Court appointed the Honorable Louis Sterns to preside over the motion to recuse. After holding an evidentiary...

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27 cases
  • Celis v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 15 Mayo 2013
    ...and does not plainly dispense with one, and that the trial court, therefore, was required to instruct as to one. Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 27 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2011) (citing Tex. Penal Code §§ 6.02, 38.122). The court of appeals was “not persuaded that the [statute] is silent on ......
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 18 Noviembre 2015
    ...out as a lawyer is not material and, therefore, would not be included in a hypothetically correct charge.” Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 20 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2011), aff'd416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (citing Rodriguez v. State, 336 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2010, pet......
  • Nelson v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 11 Diciembre 2018
    ...before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case." Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 21 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2011), aff'd, 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A trial judge is constitutionally unacceptable when: (1) the judge has......
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 28 Mayo 2015
    ...out as a lawyer is not material and, therefore, would not be included in a hypothetically correct charge." Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 20 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2011), aff'd 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Rodriguez v. State, 336 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 201......
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