Cellucci v. General Motors Corp.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: James L. Griffith, Virginia Lynn Hogban, and Brett L. Messinger Philadelphia, for Volvo N.A.; Before FLAHERTY; CASTILLE
• Citation: 706 A.2d 806,550 Pa. 407
• Decision Date: 02 January 1998
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,141 Daniel CELLUCCI, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee. Susan C. MUNTZ and Frederick F. Muntz, Appellees, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, William H. Williams, Paul D. Williams, Volvo AB SWE, Volvo North American Corp., Jim Wynn Volkswagen-Volvo, Andrew Kositsky, Michael Earl Eidle, and Laura Ann Semmelroth, Appellants. Appeal of VOLVO NORTH AMERICA CORP., AB Volvo and Jim Wynn Volkswagen-Volvo.

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706 A.2d 806 550 Pa. 407, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,141 Daniel CELLUCCI, Appellant,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee.
Susan C. MUNTZ and Frederick F. Muntz, Appellees,
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
William H. Williams, Paul D. Williams, Volvo AB SWE, Volvo
North American Corp., Jim Wynn Volkswagen-Volvo, Andrew
Kositsky, Michael Earl Eidle, and Laura Ann Semmelroth, Appellants.
Appeal of VOLVO NORTH AMERICA CORP., AB Volvo and Jim Wynn
Volkswagen-Volvo. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 28, 1997.
Decided Jan. 2, 1998.

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[550 Pa. 409] Larry E. Coben, Donald E. Matusow, Philadelphia, for Daniel Celucci.

Arthur H. Bryant, Philadelphia, for Amici Trial Laws.-Auto Safety.

Terry S. Hyman, Harrisburg, for Amicus Pa. Trial Lawyers Assoc.

Susan E. Satkowski, Philadelphia, for General Motors Corporation and David Heilbron.

Kenneth S. Geller, William J. Conroy, Philadelphia, Lily F. Swenson, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.

Dawn Riley Courtney, Philadelphia, for Joseph DeFalco.

James L. Griffith, Virginia Lynn Hogban, and Brett L. Messinger Philadelphia, for Volvo N.A., J. Wynn, and AB Volvo.

David L. Grove, Peter Breslauer, Philadelphia, for Susan and Frederick Muntz.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CASTILLE, Justice.

The sole issue on appeal in these two matters is whether the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. (recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-33118) ("the Safety Act"), preempts state causes of action sounding in tort based upon a manufacturer's failure to equip a vehicle with air bags for occupant crash protection. Because we find that the Safety Act impliedly preempts such state actions sounding in [550 Pa. 410] tort, we affirm the order of the Superior Court in Cellucci and reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court in Muntz.

The relevant facts pertaining to the Cellucci matter are that Daniel Cellucci suffered serious brain injuries when the 1986 Chevrolet Cavalier in which he was a passenger went off the road and collided with a tree. The Cavalier was equipped with three-point lap and shoulder harness safety belts, and a dashboard warning light and buzzer which were designed to promote occupant use of manufacture installed seat belts.

Cellucci brought an action against the manufacturer of the vehicle, General Motors Corporation ("GM"), claiming that he was wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident but that the Cavalier was defectively designed because air bags were not installed in it. In response, GM filed a motion for partial summary judgment contending that federal law preempts Cellucci's claim that the vehicle was defective because it did not have air bags. On August 19, 1995, the trial court denied GM's motion. GM appealed to the Superior Court. On April 30, 1996, the en banc Superior Court, ¹ in a published opinion, reversed the trial court and held that the Safety Act impliedly preempted Cellucci's air bag claim. We granted Cellucci's petition for allowance of appeal.

The relevant facts surrounding the Muntz matter are that on December 17, 1988, Susan Muntz was driving a 1985 Volvo 240 station wagon when a truck struck her vehicle head-on and caused her to suffer serious and permanent injuries. The Volvo was equipped with a three-point manual lap and shoulder harness safety belt and a dash board warning light designed to encourage occupant use of seat belts. On October [550 Pa. 411] 1, 1991, Susan and Frederick Muntz brought an action under theories of negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranties and loss of consortium claiming that Volvo failed to design, manufacture and sell a vehicle

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which contained an effective and safe passive restraint system, such as a driver's side air bag, a knee bolster, a safety belt pretension system and a safety belt tensioner. Volvo North America Corporation, AB Volvo, and Jim Wynn Volkswagen-Volvo (collectively "Volvo") filed answers to the complaint and new matter in which they asserted that the regulations promulgated under the Safety Act preempt the Muntzes' claims.

On April 28, 1993, Volvo filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the Muntzes' claims were preempted by the Safety Act on the basis that the safety system that Volvo used in their vehicles met the applicable federal regulations promulgated under the Safety Act. On April 15, 1994, the trial court granted Volvo's motion for summary judgment, finding that the federal standards set by the Safety Act preempted the Muntzes' causes of action. The Muntzes appealed to the Commonwealth Court which quashed the appeal as interlocutory. ² On August 19, 1994, the Muntzes applied to the trial court for certification of the April 15, 1994 order as a final order. On December 5, 1994, the trial court granted the Muntzes' application for certification. The Muntzes once again appealed to the Commonwealth Court. On March 1, 1996, the Commonwealth Court, in a published opinion, reversed the trial court and held that the Safety Act did not preempt the Muntzes' state common law tort claims. We granted Volvo's petition for allowance of appeal and consolidated it with Cellucci in order to resolve the split between the two intermediate appellate courts of the Commonwealth over whether the Safety Act preempted the common law tort claims raised in these cases.

[550 Pa. 412] The United States Congress enacted the Safety Act in order "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (previously codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988)). The preemption clause of the Safety Act provides that:

Preemption.--(1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under this chapter.

(2) A State may enforce a standard that is identical to a standard prescribed under this chapter.

49 U.S.C.A. § 30103(b). However, the Safety Act also provides that "[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law." 49 U.S.C.A. § 30103(e).

Pursuant to the powers which are authorized under the Safety Act, the Secretary of Transportation promulgated three safety options for occupant crash protection of passenger vehicles at Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 ("FMVSS 208"). For cars manufactured in 1985 and 1986, such as the vehicles at issue, Standard 208 provided that a manufacturer had the option for occupant restraint systems to equip the vehicle with (1) a complete passive restraint system for front and lateral crashes, (2) passive restraints for frontal crashes plus lap belts, shoulder harnesses and a warning system, or (3) a three-point manual seat belt with a warning system. 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.208 § 4.1.2.1, § 4.1.2.2, and § 4.1.2.3. Both of the vehicles at issue in this appeal had three-point manual seatbelts and a warning system installed.

[550 Pa. 413] GM and Volvo argue that since they complied with one of the three safety options promulgated pursuant to the Safety Act, the common law tort claims raised by Cellucci and the Muntzes related to the failure of their cars to have air bags or other type of

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passive restraint systems (collectively, "no air bag" claims) are preempted by the Safety Act. Conversely, Cellucci and the Muntzes argue that Congress never intended for the Safety Act to preempt such claims. This Court's resolution of this dispute depends on an analysis of federal preemption law.

The United States Supreme Court, discussing federal preemption, has stated that:

Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Thus, since our decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is "without effect." Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause "start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Accordingly, " '[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' " [sic] of preemption analysis.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (citations omitted). Furthermore, Congress' intent may be found in federal regulations that are duly enacted pursuant to delegation of congressional authority. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The United States Supreme Court has held that federal preemption of state law can occur (1) where Congress explicitly preempts a state law, (2) where a state law actually conflicts with federal law, and (3) where Congress has implicitly indicated an intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state law. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-300, 108 S.Ct. 1145, 1150, 99 L.Ed.2d 316 (1988). [550 Pa. 414] Since Section 30103(e) of the Safety Act, which states that it does not exempt a party from liability at common law, shows that Congress did not implicitly intend to occupy the entire field of automobile safety to...