Celtic Int'l, LLC v. BNSF Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 22 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:14-cv-02158-TLN-DB,2:14-cv-02158-TLN-DB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | CELTIC INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Plaintiff, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant. |
This is a lawsuit for damages following a train derailment. The matter is before the Court on Defendant BNSF Railway Company's ("BNSF") Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff Celtic International, LLC ("Celtic") opposes the motion. (ECF No. 33.) Also before the Court are Plaintiff Celtic International, LLC's ("Celtic") Motion to Strike (ECF No. 39), Celtic's Motion to Amend (ECF No. 22), and Celtic's Motion to Set a Pretrial Conference (ECF No. 59). For the reasons discussed below, BNSF's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, Celtic's Motion to Strike is DENIED, Celtic's Motion to Amend is DENIED, and Celtic's Motion to Set a Pretrial Conference is DENIED as moot.
Celtic seeks damages for three shipments of wine that were destroyed when the train carrying the shipments derailed. Celtic is a broker that was involved in arranging the wine's ill-fated, transcontinental journey.
Three wholesalers purchased wine from suppliers in California. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 33-1 at No. 1.) Those wholesalers also sent copies of their purchase orders to Cobalt Transport Service, Inc. ("Cobalt"), which in turn arranged for the wine to be consolidated as necessary and loaded into three intermodal shipping containers. (ECF No. 33-1 at Nos. 1-2.) At that point, a sales agent for Celtic named DSB, Inc. ("DSB") became involved with the arrangements. It is not immediately clear how the shipments changed hands between Cobalt and DSB, although they appear to be closely related and roughly interchangeable in this context. (See, e.g., McMurray Decl. Ex. E ("Hertwig Dep."), ECF No. 23-10 at 29:24-25 ().) In any case, the precise arrangement is immaterial.
Acting through DSB, Celtic contracted with J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. ("J.B. Hunt") to have the shipments transported from Napa, California to Little Rock, Arkansas and Memphis, Tennessee, where the wholesalers had requested delivery. (McMurray Decl. Ex. F ("Hyland Dep."), ECF No. 23-10 at 25:9-14.) Celtic expected that J.B. Hunt would in turn "secure arrangements with a rail carrier for the rail transport of the three containers." (Hyland Dep., ECF No. 23-10 at 24:4-7.) Celtic disputes this characterization. (See ECF No. 33 at 2:5-8.)
J.B. Hunt secured arrangements for rail transportation with BNSF. Since 2009, J.B. Hunt has been able to ship with BNSF under a custom rate authority known as JBPREMIUM. (Kessler Decl., ECF No. 23-3 at ¶ 5.)1 JBPREMIUM incorporates by reference a document known as the BNSF Intermodal Rules and Policy Guide (the "IR & PG"). (ECF No. 23-3 at ¶ 5.) The IR & PGspecifies the rules governing BNSF's carriage of intermodal shipments. (ECF No. 23-3 at ¶ 7.) J.B. Hunt submitted to BNSF, via electronic data interchange ("EDI"), bill of lading shipping orders for the three shipments pursuant to the terms of JBPREMIUM. (ECF No. 23-3 at ¶ 4.) Each EDI submission triggered the creation of a computer-generated waybill for its respective shipment. (ECF No. 23-3 at ¶ 4.)
On June 17, 2013, the BNSF train carrying the shipments derailed near Summerfield, Texas. (ECF No. 33-1 at No. 51.) The parties dispute the cause of the derailment. BNSF argues that the derailment was due to an act of God—an extreme gust of wind. (ECF No. 23-1 at 15:25-18:18.) Celtic argues that the train derailed not due to an act of God, but because BNSF negligently allowed a "relatively light-weight and high profile train to proceed into a wind storm." (ECF No. 33 at 19:20-21.)
Celtic sued BNSF after a series of assignments of rights, the sequence of which is disputed but irrelevant. Celtic asserts three claims under a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act known as the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11706.2 (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3:20-5:7.) BNSF moves for summary judgment.
Before turning to BNSF's motion for summary judgment, the Court addresses Celtic's motion to strike, (ECF No. 39). Celtic asks the Court to strike BNSF's reply briefing in support of its motion for summary judgment because the briefing exceeds the allotted page limit. (ECF No. 39 at 3:5-11 (citing Smith v. Frank, 923 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1991).)
The Court will highlight the problem as follows. In Celtic's opposition to BNSF's motion for summary judgment, Celtic argued in part that the Court should deny BNSF's motion pursuantto Rule 56(d) to allow Celtic additional time for discovery. (ECF No. 33 at 4:7-25.) When BNSF filed its reply, BNSF addressed Celtic's substantive legal arguments in a ten-page brief. (ECF No. 35.) But BNSF also filed a ten-page attachment to the reply, which BNSF styled as an opposition to Celtic's Rule 56(d) "motion," bringing the total number of pages to twenty. (ECF No. 35-1.) The Pretrial Scheduling Order limits replies to ten pages. (Order, ECF No. 19 at 5:8-11.)
The Court may impose sanctions for over-length filings "including, in appropriate cases, striking the offending pleading." Smith, 923 F.2d at 142. Here, the Court does not believe that striking BNSF's reply briefing would be an appropriate sanction because the over-length filing appears to result from good-faith confusion about the operation of Rule 56(d). BNSF cites recent in-circuit authority requiring a party seeking relief under Rule 56(d) to make a motion rather than raise the issue in an opposition. (ECF No. 41 at 3:16-23 (citing In re Cardtronics ATM Fee Notice Litig., 874 F. Supp. 2d 916, 927 (S.D. Cal. 2012).) According to BNSF, it believed Celtic was making a Rule 56(d) motion and believed it was entitled to file an opposition. (ECF No. 41 at 2:12-25.) Given the parties' apparent confusion, the Court concludes that striking the offending pleading would not be an appropriate sanction. Accordingly, Celtic's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 39) is DENIED.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The "threshold inquiry" is whether "there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). When the Court looks at the evidence presented by the parties, it must credit the non-moving party's evidence and draw all justifiable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. But inferences are not drawn out of the air. It is the non-moving party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp.2d 1086, 1092-93 (E.D. Cal. 2004); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
When the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could do anything but find in its favor. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). If the moving party carries its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who "must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). The non-moving party cannot merely rely upon the pleadings. Estate of Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, it must produce evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.
In resolving the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the Court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quotations omitted).
The Carmack Amendment is an absolute-liability regime designed to compensate shippers for goods that are damaged or lost during interstate shipping. OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Haas Indus., Inc., 634 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89, 98 (2010)). The Carmack Amendment provides a statutory right of action to "the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading" for a damaged shipment. 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a). When cargo is lost or damaged during shipping, the Carmack Amendment imposes absolute liability on the receiving rail carrier and the delivering rail carrier—regardless of where along the rail route the cargo was actually damaged or which carrier was responsible. See id.; Regal-Beloit, 561 U.S. at 98. To make out a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the goods were delivered to the carrier in good condition; (2) that the goods arrived in damaged condition (or not at all); and (3) an amount of damages. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 138 (1964); Nippon Yusen Kaishav. Burlington & N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 367 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
However, the carrier may assert an affirmative defense. Section 10502(e) of Title 49 authorizes carriers to contract with their shippers for "alternative terms" that would otherwise be inconsistent with the Carmack Amendment. See 49 U.S.C. § 10502(e) (); Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-99. Section 10502(e) thus "frees rail carriers from the strict application of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial