Cent. Austin Neighborhood Ass'n & Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. City of Chi.

Decision Date13 November 2013
Docket NumberDocket No. 1–12–3041.
Citation377 Ill.Dec. 89,2013 IL App (1st) 123041,1 N.E.3d 976
PartiesCENTRAL AUSTIN NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION and American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Sidley Austin LLP, of Chicago (Richard J. O'Brien, Eric S. Mattson, and Alexis Rollins Dunton, of counsel), for appellant Central Austin Neighborhood Association.

Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., of Chicago (Harvey Grossman and Karen Sheley, of counsel), for appellant American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois.

Stephen R. Patton, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Andrew W. Worsek, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Two organizations whose members include African–Americans and Hispanics sued the City of Chicago (City), alleging a violation of the Illinois Civil Rights Act (Act) (740 ILCS 23/5 (West 2012)), and seeking a change in the way the City responds to emergency calls to 911. The organizations alleged that, on average, persons in neighborhoods populated mostly by African–Americans and Hispanics wait longer than persons in neighborhoods populated mostly by whites for police to arrive in response to a 911 call. The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that regardless of the extent of the systematic disparity in response times, because the complaint raised only a nonjusticiable political question, the complaint did not state a claim for which the court could grant the complainants relief. On this appeal, we hold that the political question doctrine does not divest a court of jurisdiction to address plaintiffs' claim that the City's allocation of resources to respond to 911 calls results in a disparate impact on residents of police districts populated largely by African–Americans and Hispanics, and, therefore, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint for failure to state a justiciable claim. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings on the complaint.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The Central Austin Neighborhood Association and the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois sued the City, alleging that the City's administration of responses to 911 calls violates the Act. The City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2012)). The trial court granted the motion on grounds that the complaint raised only a nonjusticiable political question. The plaintiffs now appeal.

¶ 4 Due to the procedural posture of this case, we must accept as true all facts well-pleaded in the complaint. See Brogan v. Mitchell International, Inc., 181 Ill.2d 178, 183, 229 Ill.Dec. 503, 692 N.E.2d 276 (1998). According to the complaint, the office of emergency management and communications (OEMC) answers 911 calls and dispatches emergency personnel, including Chicago police officers, to respond to the calls. The City authorizes OEMC to dispatch beat officers only from the police district where the call originated. When a police district no longer has any beat officers available for dispatch in response to a call, the district has radio assignments pending, which the parties refer to as a “RAP” situation. During a RAP situation, OEMC still answers 911 calls, but no officer responds to those calls until an officer becomes available. Districts that have more frequent RAP situations have greater delays in responding to 911 calls. Districts populated mostly by white residents report fewer violent crimes and fewer 911 calls per beat officer, and correspondingly lower response times to 911 calls. Districts populated mostly by African–American and Hispanic residents reported more violent crimes and more 911 calls per beat officer, more RAP situations, and higher response times to 911 calls. Citing an article from the Chicago Sun Times, dated November 22, 2010, plaintiffs alleged that Town Hall, a majority white district, had 17 RAP situations between January 2009 and October 2010, while Chicago Lawn, a district mostly populated by African–Americans and Hispanics, had 885 RAP situations in the same time period. Chicago Lawn had 3.61 violent crimes per beat officer, while Town Hall had 1.63 violent crimes per beat officer.

¶ 5 The complaint included further allegations that the disparate response times for responses to 911 calls, depending on the predominant racial makeup of the police districts, had prevailed in Chicago for 20 years. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the administration of the 911 system violated the Act and an order requiring the City to submit to the court a plan detailing how the City will “provide equal services in response to 911 calls to minority neighborhoods.”

¶ 6 Plaintiffs served discovery requests on the City. The court granted the City's motion to stay discovery pending a decision on the City's motion to dismiss the complaint. In the motion to dismiss, the City argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of the Act, that they failed to allege that they suffered harm from the alleged practices, and that they raised only a nonjusticiable political question. The trial court held that (1) the Illinois Constitution delegates to the City, and not to the court, the power to organize, fund and control the police force; (2) no judicially discoverable and manageable standards could guide a judicial resolution of the alleged problem; and (3) any court order in favor of the plaintiffs would inextricably involve the court in a policy determination of a kind clearly meant for nonjudicial discretion. Applying the political question standards enunciated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), the trial court found that the complaint raised only a political question, so the court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs now appeal.

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under section 2–615 of the Code. Simpkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 13, 358 Ill.Dec. 613, 965 N.E.2d 1092. The trial court should not dismiss the complaint unless the complaint clearly shows that the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts under the complaint that would entitle them to relief. Simpkins, 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 13, 358 Ill.Dec. 613, 965 N.E.2d 1092.

¶ 9 Plaintiffs seek relief under the Act, which provides:

(a) No unit of State, county, or local government in Illinois shall:

(1) exclude a person from participation in, deny a person the benefits of, or subject a person to discrimination under any program or activity on the grounds of that person's race, color, national origin, or gender; or

(2) utilize criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or gender.

(b) Any party aggrieved by conduct that violates subsection (a) may bring a civil lawsuit, in a federal district court or State circuit court, against the offending unit of government. Any State claim brought in federal district court shall be a supplemental claim to a federal claim. This lawsuit must be brought not later than 2 years after the violation of subsection (a). If the court finds that a violation of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) has occurred the court may award to the plaintiff actual damages. The court, as it deems appropriate, may grant as relief any permanent or preliminary negative or mandatory injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order.” 740 ILCS 23/5 (West 2012).

¶ 10 Plaintiffs have alleged that the City, a unit of local government, uses a method of administering responses to 911 calls that has the effect of subjecting the residents of police districts populated mostly by African–Americans and Hispanics to longer waiting periods, on average, for responses to 911 calls. The complaint alleges a violation of the Act. 740 ILCS 23/5 (West 2012). We look to cases concerning alleged violations of federal civil rights statutes to guide our interpretation of the Act. Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 131 Ill.2d 172, 178–79, 137 Ill.Dec. 31, 545 N.E.2d 684 (1989); Trayling v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 273 Ill.App.3d 1, 11, 209 Ill.Dec. 846, 652 N.E.2d 386 (1995). If the court allows the suit to proceed, and plaintiffs can prove their allegations,

“the burden shifts to the City to demonstrate that its policy or practice had “manifest relationship” to a legitimate, non-discriminatory policy objective and was necessary to the attainment of that objective. [Citation.] If the City shows that its actions were justified, then the burden shifts back to Appellants to show ‘a viable alternative means' was available to achieve the legitimate policy objective without discriminatory effects.” Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 834 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting Darst–Webbe Tenant Ass'n Board v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 417 F.3d 898, 902–03 (8th Cir.2005)).

¶ 11 Judicial Notice

¶ 12 The City asks us to take judicial notice of several documents, including academic studies and reports by a variety of governmental bodies, that no party presented to the trial court. See, e.g., Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: the Evidence (Wesley Skagen & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004), available at http:// www. nap. edu/ catalog/ 10419. html; Dennis P. Rosenbaum & Cody Stephens, Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago: Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department (Center for Research in Law and Justice, 2005) (http:// www. icjia. state. il. us/ public/ pdf/ Research Reports/ Reducing Public Violenceand Homicidein Chicago. pdf). The City cites the reports as evidence that it has a sound basis for its methods for deploying police...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Weiler v. Vill. of Oak Lawn
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • March 31, 2015
  • Jacobs v. Yellow Cab Affiliation, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 16, 2017
    ...take judicial notice of the City ordinances. Central Austin Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Chicago , 2013 IL App (1st) 123041, ¶ 13, 377 Ill.Dec. 89, 1 N.E.3d 976 ("Courts may take judicial notice of facts proven by 'immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources......
  • John Z. Huang, Individually, & John Z. Huang, P.C. v. Brenson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 5, 2014
    ...a set of facts that would entitle it to relief. Central Austin Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 123041, ¶ 8, 377 Ill.Dec. 89, 1 N.E.3d 976. Opposition to a section 2–615 motion cannot rely on mere conclusions of law unsupported by specific factual allegations. Karimi......
  • Powell v. Illinois
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • September 30, 2019
    ...impact claim brought by residents of underserved Chicago neighborhoods to go forward in Central Austin Neighborhood Association v. City of Chicago, 1 N.E.3d 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013). The plaintiffs there alleged that the City of Chicago "use[d] a method of administering responses ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT