Cent. Bank & Trust Corp. v. State

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HILL
• Citation: 76 S.E. 587,139 Ga. 54
• Decision Date: 20 November 1912
• Parties: CENTRAL BANK & TRUST CORPORATION. v. STATE.

76 S.E. 587
139 Ga. 54

CENTRAL BANK & TRUST CORPORATION.
v.
STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 20, 1912.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Judgment (§§ 593, 702^*)—Merger and Bar—Splitting Causes of Action.

Estoppel by judgment applies alike to the state as to individuals.

(a) A former judgment of the superior court in a case arising upon the same issues and matters as are included in a subsequent suit, between the state and the receiver of an insolvent bank, decreeing the exact sum that the state should recover of the receiver, without specifying whether the sum adjudicated to be due included interest (this sum having been accepted by the state and no exception having been taken to the judgment on the ground that it did not include interest), is res adjudicata as to a subsequent suit brought by the state to recover interest of the receiver on the same sum so decreed to be due the suite by the former judgment.

(b) A single cause of action cannot be split up and tried by piecemeal, so as to recover the principal sum in one suit and interest in another.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1108, 1227; Dec. Dig. §§ 593, 702.*]

2. Depositaries (§ 10*)—States (§ 110*)— Interest on Deposits — Insolvency of Bank—Priority of Claims.

Where a bank has made a contract with the state, whereby it agrees to pay her a certain rate of interest on daily balances on deposit in the bank belonging to the state, and the bank subsequently becomes insolvent and a receiver is appointed to take charge of its assets, the state can recover of the receiver the principal sum due her and interest at the contract rate to the date of the appointment of a receiver for the assets of the bank, and also 7 per cent. per annum as legal interest from the date of the receivership to the date of payment.

(a) The state has the right of priority of payment out of the assets of an insolvent state bank which prior to insolvency was a state depository as against individual depositors and creditors.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Depositaries, Cent Dig. §§ 23-26; Dec. Dig. § 10;* States, Cent Dig. § 108; Dec. Dig. § 110.*]

(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)

3. Damages (§ 67*)—"Interest"—Right to Recover—Incident to "Debt."

The term "debt" embraces interest as well as principal, and "interest, " in the absence of an express agreement, is a mere incident of the debt, and may be recovered as damages for its detention.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 135, 136; Dec. Dig. § 67.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1864-1886; vol. 8, p. 7628; vol 4, pp. 3706-3709.]

Fish, C. J., and Atkinson, J., dissenting in part.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; W. D. Ellis, Judge.

Action by the State against the Central Bank & Trust Corporation, receiver. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Candler, Thomson & Hirsch, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

T. S. Felder, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

HILL, J. In the year 1907, on the application of the Attorney General of Georgia, the assets of the Neal Bank were placed in the custody of a receiver, pursuant to section 2306 of the Civil Code. Prior to and at the date of the receivership the bank was a designated depository of the state, and at the time of its failure the bank was indebted to the state in a large sum of money deposited by various state officials, which deposits appeared upon the books of the bank. By appropriate interventions the state set up the fact that at the time of the bank failure she had on deposit in the bank certain sums of money deposited by and standing in the name of the State Treasurer and

[76 S.E. 588]

other state officials, and claimed a first and prior lien over all other depositors on the assets of the bank, and prayed that her lien be established and the receiver be directed to pay her the several amounts of money so deposited. The trial court decreed that the money deposited in the name of the state officials was the money of the state, and that the state had a prior lien on the assets of the bank; and the receiver was directed to pay to the state the sums so standing in the name of the officials, according to the terms of the decree. This court, on review, affirmed that decree. Booth v. State of Georgia, 131 Ga. 750, 63 S. E. 502; Booth v. State of Georgia, 134 Ga. 163, 67 S. E. 803. The receiver of the bank subsequently paid to the Treasurer of the state the principal sums of the several deposits, except a balance of $859.46 principal due the state on account of a deposit made in the name of the Gordon Monument Commission. No interest was paid by the receiver on any of these sums under the decree, nor does it appear that the decree in terms called for the payment of interest. After the payment of the principal sum by the receiver, the state filed another intervention, in which it was alleged that the receiver of the bank had paid only the principal sums of the several amounts which were due the state, and prayed that the receiver be directed to pay the state 2 per cent. on the daily balances of the respective deposits (under and by virtue of the contract of the bank with the state) to the date of the failure of the bank, and also 7 per cent. on the amounts due upon the several deposits from the date of the failure of the bank to the date when the principal sums were paid. It was alleged in the intervention that the receiver had sufficient funds in his custody to pay the state's claim for interest, and that the state claimed the amount due on the deposit appearing in the name of the Gordon Monument Commission, viz., the principal sum, interest at the contract rate of 2 per cent. on daily balances to the date of the receivership, and interest at the rate of 7 per cent, to date of payment. The receiver filed its answer to the intervention, admitting the statement of facts contained therein; but also filed its demurrer to the intervention. There was no issue of fact. The court overruled the demurrer, and decreed that the state was entitled to receive 2 per cent. per annum on the daily balances of all deposits of money in said bank belonging to the state to the date of its failure; and that the state was entitled in addition to 7 per cent. per annum as interest on all balances on all the deposits from the date of the failure of the bank to the date of the payment of the principal sums on deposit. The court also found that no interest had been paid by the receiver to the state, and that the receiver had sufficient money in custody to pay all the claims of the state for interest, and the re, ceiver was directed to pay the claims of the state for interest accordingly. To this decree the receiver excepted.

1. It is insisted by the plaintiff in error that the original decree of the court, adjudging that the principal sums claimed by the state, should be paid, and the acceptance by the state of the principal sum under said decree estopped it from setting up a claim for interest alleged to be due, and that the question is now res adjudicata. This leads us to consider, first, was there a final judgment or decree of the court, as insisted. We hold that there was a decree, and that it was a final judgment. Booth v. State, 131 Ga. 750, 63 S. E. 502; Id., 134 Ga. 163, 67 S. E. 803. There was no prayer to reopen the judgment. Second. Does the doctrine of estoppel apply to the state as well as to the individual? In 1 Herman on the Law...