Cent. Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n

Decision Date21 April 1920
Docket NumberNo. 13093.,13093.
Citation293 Ill. 62,127 N.E. 80
PartiesCENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to Circuit Court, Champaign County; Franklin H. Boggs, Judge.

The Industrial Commission having rendered an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act in favor of B. L. Kirk, administrator of Jesse Huddleston, against the Central Illinois Public Service Company, employer, the employer brought certiorari to the circuit court and, the writ being quashed, brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

Carter and Farmer, JJ., dissenting.

Vanse & Kiger, of Mattoon, for plaintiff in error.

Dobbins & Dobbins, of Champaign, and F. B. Leonard, Jr., of Metropolis, for defendants in error.

STONE, J.

On August 10, 1918, the Industrial Commission of Illinois, at a hearing to review an award, entered its order affirming the award in favor of B. L. Kirk, administrator of the estate of Jesse Huddleston, deceased, whose death was the result of an injury arising in the course of his employment with the plaintiff in error. At the time of the injury both parties were working under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Illinois. On August 26, 1918, the plaintiff in error filed with the clerk of the circuit court of Coles county a praecipe for a writ of certiorari directed to the Industrial Commission, returnable to the October term, 1918, of said court, and filed its bond in the sum fixed by the Industrial Commission, and the same was approved by the clerk as required by law. On the same day a writ of certiorari was mailed to the Industrial Commission and notice of the commencement of the certiorari proceedings and the return day of the writ was mailed to Kirk the administrator, in care of Dobbins & Dobbins, his attorneys, at their post office address at Champaign, in Champaign county, Ill. Kirk was appointed administrator by the county court of Coles county. He resides in champaign county and filed with the Industrial Commission his request that all notice of proceedings in this cause be served personally or by registered mail upon B. L. Kirk, administrator of the estate of Jesse Huddleston, deceased, Champaign, Ill., and gave the names and address of his agents or attorneys as Dobbins & Dobbins, of Champaign. Dobbins & Dobbins, acting as attorneys for the defendant in error, wrote counsel for plaintiff in error that Kirk did not reside in or ‘may be found’ in Coles county, and that they would take advantage of such want of jurisdiction of the circuit court of Coles county if an effort were made to have the case reviewed in that court. On October 15, 1918, Kirk, in person limiting his appearance, moved the circuit court of Coles county to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that under the statute the court had no jurisdiction for the reason that he was not a resident and could not be found in Coles county within the meaning of the statute. Thereupon, on October 28, 1918, the writ of certiorari thus issued was quashed. On November 4, 1918, plaintiff in error filed a motion to set aside the order quashing the writ of certiorari, which motion was granted on April 23, 1919. On May 3, 1919, plaintiff in error filed a cross-motion for change of venue to the circuit court of Champaign county, which was allowed. The court thereupon ordered that the cause be transferred to the circuit court of Champaign county, and that the clerk forthwith transmit a transcript of the proceedings had in Coles county, together with all orders made and entered therein and all papers filed in the cause, to the clerk of the circuit court of Champaign county, and that the plaintiff in error pay all costs accrued. On June 18, 1919, after the order thus transferring the cause to the circuit court of Champaign county had been filed, the defendant in error, limiting his appearance, entered his motion to quash the writ of certiorari, for the reason that no writ of certiorari was sued out of the circuit court of Champaign county within 20 days from the receipt of notice by plaintiff in error of the decision of the Industrial Commission, and for the further reason that the circuit court of Coles county never acquired jurisdiction, and that the circuit court of Champaign county was likewise without jurisdiction.

The question presented by the assignments of error in this case is whether or not the circuit court of Champaign county acquired jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter.

Plaintiff in error contends that the order of the circuit court of Coles county transferring the cause to the circuit court of Champaign county was a valid order, and that the latter court thereby had jurisdiction of the cause and should have decided it on its merits. The question involved here is not one arising on the merits, however, but is whether plaintiff in error is entitled to a hearing on the merits in the circuit court of Champaign county. Circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction. A court of general jurisdiction may have conferred upon it by statute a special statutory jurisdiction not arising out of the common law, from which such court draws its general jurisdiction, nor exercised according to the course of the common law but which is outside the general jurisdiction of such court. In such a case its jurisdiction is special, and its proceedings and judgments are treated as the judgments and proceedings of courts of special jurisdiction. Calkins v. Calkins, 229 Ill. 68, 82 N. E. 242. When a court is in the exercise of special jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is limited to the language of the act conferring it. That court has no powers from any other source.

Plaintiff in error contends that, since the circuit courts of the state have jurisdiction of common-law writs of certiorari and of bills in chancery, the circuit court of Coles county for that reason had jurisdiction of the subject-matter in the case at bar and had jurisdiction to transfer the cause to Champaign county. Actions and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Act were unknown at common law. The entire subject of compensation for injuries to employès is of statutory origin. All proceedings thereunder are purely statutory. The writ of certiorari in this class of cases is not to be confused with the common-law writ of certiorari. The powers of the court under such a writ as provided by this act are different from those under the common-law writ of certiorari and are limited to the powers and jurisdiction conferred by the act. The proceedings under this act, where the writ of certiorari has issued or suit in chancery been commenced, are not the same as in other similar suits, but are governed wholly by the statute in question. People v. McGoorty, 270 Ill. 610, 110 N. E. 791. The theory of the Workmen's Compensation Act is that the question of compensation for injuries of an employé shall be adjusted speedily through the Industrial Commission in so far as that is possible. Courts are called upon to assist only as to questions of law arising. The method of invoking the aid of the circuit court is prescribed by statute, as are the questions that can be raised and the orders the court may enter. The jurisdiction of the circuit court and the method of review being statutory, only such jurisdiction for review is granted and only such method of proceeding can be employed as are pointed out by the statute. Where, in a special statutory proceeding, one from of review is especially given, all other forms of review are excluded. Smith-Lohr Coal Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 88, 116 N. E. 656; People v. McGoorty, supra.

Clause 1 of paragraph (f) of section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 48, § 144) reads as follows:

‘The circuit court of the county where any of the parties defendant may be found shall by writ of certiorari to the Industrial Board have power to review all questions of law presented by such record. Such writ shall be issued by the clerk of such court upon praecipe. Service upon any member of the Industrial Board or the secretary thereof shall be service on the board, and service upon other parties in...

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