Cent. Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike

• Decision Date: 06 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-375,94-375
• Citation: 73 Ohio St.3d 581,653 N.E.2d 639
• Parties: CENTRAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee, v. CITY OF PEPPER PIKE et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 581

73 Ohio St.3d 581

653 N.E.2d 639

CENTRAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee, v.CITY OF PEPPER PIKE et al., Appellants.

No. 94-375.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 23, 1995.

Decided Sept. 6, 1995.

The twenty-one-year-old case before us concerns the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance as applied to appellee's property.

The Property

Central Motors Corporation("CMC"), appellee, is an Ohio corporation owned by members of the Porter family.CMC owns approximately one hundred fourteen undeveloped acres located in the southwest corner of the city of Pepper Pike("Pepper Pike"), appellant.

In 1959, CMC purchased approximately two hundred acres of land within the cities of Beachwood and Pepper Pike for approximately $2,500 per acre.In 1962, the state of Ohio acquired 33.68 acres of the parcel by eminent domain for the construction of I-271.Ohio paid CMC $212,987 for the acquisition.The six-lane highway bisected CMC's property leaving approximately one hundred seventeen acres in Pepper Pike.The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, in 1977, appropriated two and one-half acres of the property's southwest corner to install an electrical substation.The remaining one hundred fourteen acres, however, have not undergone any development or improvement since 1959 and the property does not have on-site storm sewers or sanitary sewers.

Rectangularly shaped, CMC's property is bordered on the east by Brainard Road, a two-lane residential street in Pepper Pike.Across from the property on the east side of Brainard Road are eighteen single-family homes on one acre or greater lots.On the property's west border is I-271 and high voltage transmission lines and poles associated with the electrical substation.To the property's north is a narrow strip of undeveloped land abutting South Woodland Road.Across South Woodland Road to the north is a new subdivision developed for single-family residential homes on one-acre lots.

On the south, the property abuts Woodmere Village and on that border starting from the west is the I-271/Chagrin Boulevard interchange, a bank office building, the Village Square Shopping Center and other commercial uses.The parcel has no frontage on Chagrin Boulevard.

Zoning History

In 1959, when CMC purchased it, the property was zoned for single-family residential dwellings with a one-acre minimum lot requirement.

In the early 1970's, CMC proposed a planned unit development which included high-rise office buildings, mid- and high-rise condominium/apartment buildings and clustered townhouses.Pepper Pike refused to rezone.CMC then amended its planned-unit-development proposal and requested that the property be zoned for three different uses.CMC wanted its property rezoned to allow a campus office park consisting of seven buildings on one third of the parcel at the southwestern edge of the property.On another third of the parcel, north of the proposed office park and abutting the interstate, CMC proposed zoning to allow thirteen five-story condominium buildings consisting of three hundred ninety condominium units total, or thirty units per building.The remaining area was to be restricted to development of one hundred twenty townhouse units, arranged in clusters.

In 1981, several years after this case began, Pepper Pike's city council passed ordinance No. 1981-21, which rezoned the property from the detached single-family zoning to townhouse cluster zoning with a maximum density of 2.5 units per acre.The electorate ratified the new zoning ordinance.The new zoning ordinance restricted the use of the property to no more than four units per structure, with a maximum height of thirty-five feet or two and one-half stories and a minimum of thirty feet between each townhouse.That ordinance also mandated a set back of one hundred fifty feet from South Woodland Road, Brainard Road and I-271.

Case History

In 1974, when Pepper Pike refused to rezone CMC's property, CMC sued for a declaration that Pepper Pike's single-family residential zoning of CMC's property was unconstitutional.From 1974 to the present, the case has been back and forth between the trial court and the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals on numerous occasions.

The case was originally tried in 1976, prior to Pepper Pike's rezoning CMC's property to townhouse use.After CMC presented its evidence and rested, Pepper Pike moved for dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2), which the trial court granted.The court of appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the trial court erred because CMC demonstrated its right to relief by clearly removing the validity of the single-family zoning classification beyond fair debate.Cent. Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike(1979), 63 Ohio App.2d 34, 13 O.O.3d 347, 409 N.E.2d 258.¹

The present appeal concerns the constitutionality of zoning ordinance No. 1981-21 which permitted townhouse units at a maximum density of 2.5 units per acre.After a full trial concerning the 1981 zoning ordinance, the trial court held that the low-density townhouse zoning as applied to CMC's property was unconstitutional.Having determined that Pepper Pike had rezoned the property under the opportunity provided by Union Oil Co. of California v. Worthington(1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 263, 16 O.O.3d 315, 405 N.E.2d 277, the trial court found CMC's proposed use, with some exceptions, to be reasonable and ordered Pepper Pike to submit proposed zoning regulations permitting the court-approved uses.²After receiving the proposed zoning regulations, the trial court appointed its own expert and entered judgment based on the court-appointed expert's recommendations.The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Thompson, Hine & Flory, David L. Parham and Karen E. Rubin, Cleveland, for appellee.

Walter & Haverfield, Christopher L. Gibbon and R. Todd Hunt, Cleveland, for appellants.

John E. Gotherman and Malcolm C. Douglas, Cleveland, urging reversal for amici curiae, Ohio Mun. League and Ohio Mun. Attys.Ass'n.

Clarence D. Rogers; Zashin, Rich & Sutula and Robert I. Zashin, Cleveland, urging reversal for amicus curiae, residents of the city of Pepper Pike.

COOK, Justice.

In this casewe are asked to determine whether Pepper Pike's zoning of CMC's property is unconstitutional and whether Pepper Pike had used its one opportunity to rezone to cure the constitutional defect, thereby allowing the judicial rezoning of the property.We hold that the zoning ordinance is constitutional and, thus, do not reach the issue of whether judicial rezoning was proper.

Neither party contests the legal principles governing this case.Rather, the dispute concerns the application of those principles to the specific facts of this case.In analyzing the constitutionality of zoning ordinances, we necessarily begin with the strong presumption that the ordinance is valid.Valley Auto Lease of Chagrin Falls, Inc. v. Auburn Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 184, 185, 527 N.E.2d 825, 827;Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati(1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 28, 32, 30 OBR 33, 36, 505 N.E.2d 966, 970;Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc.(1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 69, 71, 9 OBR 273, 275, 458 N.E.2d 852, 855;Brown v. Cleveland(1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 93, 95, 20 O.O.3d 88, 89, 420 N.E.2d 103, 105.We note that the party challenging the validity of a zoning classification bears, at all stages of the proceedings, the burden of demonstrating that the provision is unconstitutional.Ketchel v. Bainbridge Twp.(1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 239, 557 N.E.2d 779;Valley Auto, supra;Mayfield-Dorsh, Inc. v. S. Euclid(1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 156, 157, 22 O.O.3d 388, 388-389, 429 N.E.2d 159, 160.

In reviewing the trial court's decision to invalidate Pepper Pike's zoning ordinance, we are guided by the principle that judgments supported by competent, credible evidence going to all the material elements of the case must not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co.(1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus.If the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we must give it the interpretation consistent with the trial court's judgment.SeeSeasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland(1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 10 OBR 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273.

Recently, this court reaffirmed the well-established standard of review that in order to invalidate a zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds, the party attacking the regulation must establish, beyond fair debate, that the zoning classification denies the owner an economically viable use of the zoned property and that the zoning classification fails to advance a legitimate governmental interest.Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 638 N.E.2d 533, syllabus.This court has stated that there is little difference between the "beyond fair debate" standard and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.Karches v. Cincinnati(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 19, 526 N.E.2d 1350, 1357, fn. 7."A court may substitute its judgment for that of the local governing body only when a municipality exercises its zoning power in an arbitrary, confiscatory or unreasonable manner which violates constitutional guaranties."Gerijo, 70 Ohio St.3d at 226, 638 N.E.2d at 536." * * * [T]he court can not usurp the legislative function by substituting its judgment for that of the council.Municipal governing bodies are better qualified, because of their knowledge of the situation, to act upon these matters than are the courts.* * * The legislative, not the judicial, authority is charged with the duty of determining the wisdom of zoning regulations, and the judicial judgment is not to be substituted for the legislative judgment in any case in which the issue or matter is fairly debatable."Willott v. Beachwood(1964), 175 Ohio St. 557, 560, 26 O.O.2d 249, 251, 197 N.E.2d 201, 203-204.

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