Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States

• Decision Date: 15 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2012–5002.,2012–5002.
• Citation: 697 F.3d 1360
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
• Parties: CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY, L.L.C., D, S, & T, Inc., Drost & Brame, Inc., Linda Lew Lawton Drost, Evelyn Gay Lawton Duhon, Jack E. Lawton, Jr., Tower Minerals Company, L.L.C., Jack E. Lawton, Sr., and William B. Lawton Company, L.L.C., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant–Appellee.

697 F.3d 1360

CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY, L.L.C., D, S, & T, Inc., Drost & Brame, Inc., Linda Lew Lawton Drost, Evelyn Gay Lawton Duhon, Jack E. Lawton, Jr., Tower Minerals Company, L.L.C., Jack E. Lawton, Sr., and William B. Lawton Company, L.L.C., Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.UNITED STATES, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 2012–5002.

United States Court of Appeals,Federal Circuit.

Oct. 15, 2012.

Andrew Jackson Gray, III, The Gray Law Firm, PLC, of Lake Charles, LA, argued for plaintiffs-appellants.

Katherine J. Barton, Attorney, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. With her on the brief were Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant Attorney General, and Aaron P. Avila, Attorney.

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

PROST, Circuit Judge.

Central Pines Land Company, L.L.C., D, S, & T, INC., Drost & Brame, INC., Linda Lew Lawton Drost, Evelyn Gay Lawton Duhon, Jack E. Lawton, JR., Tower Minerals Company, L.L.C., Jack E. Lawton, SR., and William B. Lawton Company, L.L.C. (collectively, “Central Pines” or “plaintiffs”) appeal the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) to dismiss their takings claims for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1500. Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 99 Fed.Cl. 394 (2011). Because § 1500 barred the Claims Court from having jurisdiction over this action, we affirm.

Background

The progression of Central Pines's two suits informs the § 1500 issue before us. On August 22, 1996, Central Pines and others, some of whom are not party to the current action, filed suit against the United States, et al., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Louisiana. Central Pines alleged it was the owner of all oil, gas, and other minerals underlying property in Vernon Parish, Louisiana, which it subdivided into Group A, Group B, and Group C mineral servitudes. It claimed that between 1943 and 1978, the United States imposed a drilling and operations moratorium on the three groups and that the surface has continually been used for bombing and artillery practice. It further alleged that starting in 1992, the United States, claiming ownership over the mineral rights, has granted a series of oil and gas leases covering the property in interest. Based on these factual allegations, Central Pines filed for declaratory judgment quieting title to the property. In the alternative, it alleged an unconstitutional taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

In a pair of decisions issued on April 7, 1999 and July 28, 2008, the district court granted summary judgment to the United States with regards to Group A and Group B mineral servitudes because the Louisiana prescription period was not suspended by the government's moratoriums. With regards to Group C, the district court granted summary judgment to Central Pines, finding that the Group C servitude was imprescriptible. On November 28, 2001, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881 (5th Cir.2001). On October 7, 2002, Central Pines's petition for writ of certiorari was denied. Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 822, 123 S.Ct. 101, 154 L.Ed.2d 30 (2002).

On April 3, 1998, while summary judgment motions were pending in district court, Central Pines filed a complaint in the Claims Court, alleging a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. As in its district court complaint, Central Pines alleged it was the owner of all oil, gas, and other minerals underlying property in Vernon Parish, Louisiana, which it subdivided into Group A, Group B, and Group C mineral servitudes. It claimed that between 1943 and 1978, the United States imposed a drilling and operations moratorium on the three groups and that the surface has continually been used for bombing and artillery practice. It further alleged that starting in 1992, the United States, claiming ownership over the mineral rights, has granted a series of oil and gas leases covering the property in interest. Central Pines acknowledged that it had filed suit against the United States, et al., in district court for quiet title and, alternatively, for an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Central Pines explained that its Claims Court suit was brought in the alternative of its district court action, and requested that its Claims Court suit be stayed pending resolution in the district court.

The Claims Court granted the stay, which remained in place until November 12, 2002. Upon lifting the stay, the Claims Court ordered plaintiffs to amend their complaint, and on January 6, 2003, plaintiffs filed a First Amended and Restated Complaint. They alleged a temporary taking of the Group C mineral servitude and permanent taking of Group A and Group B mineral servitudes. The complaint reiterated the same factual allegations to title and the same government conduct made in the original complaint, and added allegations based on the resolution of the district court action. Litigation with regard to these three mineral servitudes proceeded. In 2004, the Claims Court dismissed the Group A and Group B claims and limited the Group C claim to post–1992 action. Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 527, 530 (2004). After denial of summary judgment in 2008, Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, No. 98–314 (Fed.Cl. Sept. 30, 2008), the case proceeded to trial. At trial, the Claims Court found that the government's issuance of protective leases commencing after May 1, 1997, constituted a temporary taking for which Central Pines was entitled to compensation. Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 95 Fed.Cl. 633, 651–53 (2010).

On May 26, 2011, while the parties were briefing the question of attorneys fees and costs and prior to the entry of final judgment, the United States filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1500, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1723, 179 L.Ed.2d 723 (2011). On September 7, 2011, the Claims Court granted the United States' motion to dismiss. Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 99 Fed.Cl. 394 (2011). The Claims Court compared the district court complaint and the original Claims Court complaint line-by-line, finding that the operative facts alleged in the two complaints were nearly identical. Id. at 400–02. Because these two complaints shared the same operative facts and thus were “for or in respect to” the same claim, § 1500 precluded the Claims Court from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' original Claims Court complaint, which was filed while the district court action was pending. Id. The Claims Court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that their First Amended and Restated Complaint was a supplemental complaint that vested the Claims Court with jurisdiction previously lacking over the original complaint. Id. at 402–03.

Central Pines appeals the dismissal of its Claims Court action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

Decision

We review the Claims Court's decision to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed.Cir.2011). Section 1500 limits the Claims Court's jurisdiction when a related action is pending in another court. Specifically, the statute provides:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States or any person who, at the time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to act, directly or indirectly under the authority of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1500. Because subject matter jurisdiction depends on the state of things at the time of the Claims Court action that was brought, we look to the facts as they exist when a plaintiff filed his Claims Court complaint to determine if § 1500 applies. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207–08, 113 S.Ct. 2035, 124 L.Ed.2d 118 (1993). If a plaintiff, upon filing, has a suit pending in any other court “for or in respect to” the same claim, § 1500 bars jurisdiction over the Claims Court suit. Id. at 209, 113 S.Ct. 2035. “Two suits are for or in respect to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in the [Claims Court], if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit,” Tohono O'Odham, 131 S.Ct. at 1731, or the legal theories asserted, Keene, 508 U.S. at 210, 113 S.Ct. 2035.

On appeal, plaintiffs do not dispute that the district court action was pending when they filed their Claims Court action in 1998. Rather, plaintiffs argue that § 1500 does not bar their Claims Court action because the Claims Court action and district court action were decided on different facts—specifically, different time periods.¹ In essence, plaintiffs are advocating a comparison of the state of the two suits at the time the motion to dismiss was filed by the government or considered by the Claims Court. The problem for plaintiffs, though, is that this argument has been soundly rejected time and again. Keene, 508 U.S. at 208, 113 S.Ct. 2035;Dico, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1199, 1203–04 (Fed.Cir.1995) (explaining that “the § 1500 bar rises, if at all, at the time the complaint is filed in the Court of Federal Claims, ... and is based on well-plead allegations”); UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1022 (Fed.Cir.1992) (en banc) aff'd sub nom. Keene, 508 U.S. 200, 113 S.Ct. 2035 (“There is nothing in section 1500 to suggest a free floating jurisdictional bar that attaches only when the government files a motion to dismiss, or...