Centeno v. Facilities Consulting Grp., Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-3696-G
| Decision Date | 20 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-3696-G |
| Parties | GERMAN A. CENTENO, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. FACILITIES CONSULTING GROUP, INC., ET AL., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court are the defendants' motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) ("Motions to Dismiss") (docket entry 10). For the reasons stated below, the court denies the defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion but grants the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion with respect to all of the plaintiffs' claims. However, the court grants the plaintiffs' leave to replead claims that accrued on and after October 15, 2011.
The plaintiffs, German Centeno and Rubilio Centeno, accuse the defendants, Facilities Consulting Group, Inc. ("FCG"), and Edwin Mendenhall, of failing to payovertime and travel compensation as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Complaint Under 29 U.S.C. 201-216 Overtime Wage Violations ("Complaint") ¶¶ 15-18 (docket entry 1). According to the complaint, FCG served as the plaintiffs' employer -- as that term is defined in the FLSA -- during the relevant period. Id. ¶ 3. Mendenhall worked as a "corporate officer and/or owner and/or manager . . . who runs the day-to-day operations of the Defendant Company for the relevant time period" and was responsible for controlling the plaintiffs' work schedules and paying their wages. Id. ¶ 4. The plaintiffs contend their employment falls within the FLSA's coverage because "the materials and goods that [they] used on a constant and/or continual basis and/or that were supplied to them by the Defendants to use on the job moved through interstate commerce prior to and/or subsequent to Plaintiffs' use of the same." Id. ¶ 11. Moreover, the plaintiffs aver that FCG qualifies as a covered enterprise, thus bringing all of its employees within the FLSA's coverage. See id. ¶¶ 12-14; see also discussion of enterprise coverage infra pp. 8-10.
Rubilio Centeno began working for the defendants in 2000 as a painter and foreman in construction, while German Centeno began similar work the following year. Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. From their respective start dates through approximately October 15, 2012, both plaintiffs allege they worked "an average of 60 hours per week" but failed to receive the statutorily mandated rate of time-and-a-half for hoursworked in excess of forty. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. In a roughly two-year period between October 2012 and October 2014, both defendants assert they "performed 7 overtime hours per week that went completely unpaid: 6 overtime hours of weekly travel time and one overtime hour for daily loading and unloading which Defendants refused to pay any wages for." Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. The plaintiffs claim the defendants "knew of the overtime requirements of the" FLSA but nevertheless "willfully and intentionally refused to pay Plaintiffs' overtime wages." Id. ¶ 19.
In 2012, the Department of Labor ("DOL") investigated claims that FCG violated the FLSA. See Receipt for Payment of Back Wages, Employment Benefits or Other Compensation for German Centeno, Exhibit A-1 to Defendants' Appendix (docket entry 12); Receipt for Payment of Back Wages, Employment Benefits or Other Compensation for Rubilio Centeno, Exhibit A-2 to Defendants' Appendix (collectively "Receipts for Payments"). As a result of this investigation, on August 10, 2012 both Rubilio and German Centeno signed receipts for payment of back wages, employment benefits, and other compensation for services provided between April 3, 2010 and February 11, 2012. Receipts for Payments. To secure the necessary signatures, FCG issued checks to both plaintiffs for an amount that the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL found appropriate to remedy the FLSA violations. Facilities Consulting Group, Inc.'s Checks to German A. Centeno, Exhibit A-3 to Defendants' Appendix; Facilities Consulting Group, Inc.'s Checks to Rubilio De JesusCenteno, Exhibit A-4 to Defendants' Appendix (collectively, "Checks for Plaintiffs"); see also Receipts for Payments. Both receipts specifically stated that an employee's "acceptance of this payment of wages and other compensation due under the FLSA based on the findings of the Wage and Hour Division" waives the employee's right to "bring suit . . . for the payment of such unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for the period of time indicated [on the receipt] and an equal amount of liquidated damages, plus attorney's fees and court costs under Section 16(b) of the FLSA." Receipts for Payments.
According to the plaintiffs, after settling the above dispute, the defendants promised the plaintiffs that "they would repay all the overtime hours owed to Plaintiffs" from periods not covered under the settlement "as a way to convince Plaintiffs not to bring their own FLSA lawsuit." Complaint ¶ 19. However, the plaintiffs claim, the defendants refused to fulfill their promises and "instead implemented a system where they failed to pay [the plaintiffs] for work time related to travel...." Id. Thus, the plaintiffs initiated the present action "on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. [§] 216(b)" to remedy the defendants' "willful[ ] and intentional[ ]" actions. Id. at 1, ¶ 19.
The plaintiffs filed their complaint with this court on October 15, 2014. See Complaint. In response to the complaint, the defendants filed these motions todismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on November 24, 2014. See Motions to Dismiss. The plaintiffs then filed a timely response which was followed by the defendants' timely reply. See Plaintiffs' Response (docket entry 13); Defendants' Reply (docket entry 14). The motions are now ripe for decision.
"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)). However, a court only considers a defendant's attachment if it is "referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and [is] central to her claim." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182 (2008). Documents meeting these requirements "assist[ ] the plaintiff in establishing the basis of the suit, and the court in making the elementary determination of whether a claim has been stated." Collins, 224 F.3d at 499. "To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" In re Katrina Canal, 495 F.3d at205 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." In re Katrina Canal, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Martin K. Eby Construction Company, Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has prescribed a "two-pronged approach" to determine whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The court must "begin by identifying the pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. The court should then assume the veracity of any well-pleaded allegations and "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. The plausibility principle does not convert the Rule 8(a)(2) noticepleading to a "probability requirement," but "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" will not defeat a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. The plaintiff must "plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not 'show[n]' -- 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). The court, drawing on its judicial experience and common sense, must undertake the "context-specific task" of determining whether the plaintiffs' allegations "nudge" their claims against the defendant "across the line from conceivable to plausible." See id. at 680, 683.
The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, applies broadly to employers, defined as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . .." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). "[A]ny individual employed by an employer" qualifies as an employee, id. § 203(e)(1), and the term employ "includes to suffer or permit to work." Id. § 203(g). With the circularity of these definitions producing greater confusion than clarity, the Supreme Court has provided guidance.
The Court...
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