Center for Behav. Health v. Westerly Zoning Bd., 01-179-L.
| Citation | 394 F.Supp.2d 493 |
| Decision Date | 13 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-179-L.,01-179-L. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
| Parties | The CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH — Rhode Island, Inc. Plaintiff v. The WESTERLY ZONING BOARD OF REVIEW by and through its Members, Jane Hence, Harrison Day, Albert B. Ouimet, Giorgio S. Gencarelli, John Gentile, Jr., David Gingerella, Frank T. Verzillo and Robert M. Driscoll; Anthony R. Giordano, in his capacity as Westerly Zoning Official; and Geri Ann Petrangelo, the Finance Director of the Town of Westerly Defendants |
Patricia K. Rocha, Adler Pollock & Sheehan, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.
Stephen P. Harten, Esq., Ratcliffe Burke Harten & Elias LLP, Providence, RI, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. The dispute arises from an alleged violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA"). Plaintiff is The Center for Behavioral Health — Rhode Island, Inc. (hereinafter "CBH"), a methadone clinic in the Town of Westerly, Rhode Island. CBH claims that it was subjected to discrimination, because of the service it provides and its association with methadone users, when it was served with a Cease and Desist Order (hereinafter "the Order") by Anthony Giordano, the Westerly Zoning Official (hereinafter "Giordano"). CBH also claims that the Westerly Zoning Board of Review (hereinafter "ZBR") fostered that discrimination when it upheld the Order. Defendants have responded by denying that they discriminated against CBH, and also have asserted nine affirmative defenses.1 CBH seeks a declaration from this Court that the actions of Defendants violate the ADA, and prays for an award of compensatory and punitive damages, costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
For the reasons set forth below, this Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit. Thus, the Court also denies Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
In June 1999, Plaintiff, in order to open a methadone clinic, entered into a lease agreement with Rory H. and Jacqueline Oefinger (hereinafter "Oefingers"), the owners of the property located at 86 Beach Street, Westerly, Rhode Island (hereinafter "the Property"). The Property is located in a P-15 zone, which is a commercial zone intended for Professional/Office use. The Westerly Zoning Ordinance states that a Professional/Office Zone "is intended to establish areas within which the town encourages a concentration of professional office and related uses." Westerly, R.I., Zoning Ordinance § 3.4(B)(1) (1998). A Professional Office is defined as "a building or portion of a building wherein services are performed involving predominantly administrative, professional or clerical operations." Id. at § 2.1. Additionally, the standard use tables indicate that "General and Professional Offices (including Medical, Legal, Accounting, engineering, architectural, insurance & real estate)" are permitted by right in a P-15 zone. Id. at § 4.2(G)(1.3). Abutters to the Property that were allowed to do business in that zone without a special use permit include a dentist, acupuncturist, radiologists, as well as oral and maxiofacial surgeons.
On November 4, 1999, subsequent to receiving a license from the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals (hereinafter "MHRH") to operate a narcotic treatment facility, CBH opened a methadone clinic on the Property. Section 1.27 of the MHRH Rules and Regulations for the Licensing of Substance Abuse Facilities defines a narcotic treatment facility as "an organization that administers or dispenses a narcotic drug to a narcotic addict for maintenance or detoxification treatment, provides, when appropriate or necessary, a comprehensive range of medical and rehabilitative services."
On Friday, November 12, 1999, Giordano issued the Order addressed to the Oefingers. CBH also received a copy of the Order. The Order stated that a substance abuse facility was not allowed by right in a P-15 zone, but could be allowed upon application for a special use permit. The Order mandated the cessation of the clinic's operations until an application for a special use permit was submitted to and approved by the Westerly Zoning Board.
In response to the Order, CBH filed an action in Rhode Island Superior Court for injunctive and declaratory relief on Monday, November 15, 1999. CBH did not assert a claim under the ADA or seek damages. CBH was represented by Attorney Elizabeth Noonan, of Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, P.C. That same day, CBH was granted a temporary restraining order allowing it to continue operation of the clinic. The temporary restraining order, by its terms, was to remain effective until December 10, 1999. On that date, the Oefingers appealed the issuance of the Order to the ZBR, retaining Attorney Noonan for the appeal. Pursuant to the Westerly Zoning Ordinance, the Order was stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. The Oefingers' appeal was based primarily on the claim that a methadone treatment center is a professional, medical office and therefore permitted by right in a P-15 zone.
Hearings were held by the ZBR on January 5, 2000 and on March 1, 2000. During the hearings, Giordano acknowledged that CBH provided some medical services on its premises. However, Giordano also indicated that he believed those medical services were incidental to what he viewed as being CBH's primary function, the dispensation of methadone. This, he stated, likened CBH to a pharmacy, which is not a permitted use in a P-15 zone. Giordano argued that the general public could not walk into CBH and obtain general medical services as they could at a general medical office.
During the hearings, Giordano also acknowledged that there was no definition of "medical office" in the Westerly Zoning Ordinance or the state enabling legislation. Additionally, Giordano also noted that prior to making his determination that CBH was not a medical office, he never contacted or visited CBH in order to determine the nature of the services that were provided. In fact, Giordano acknowledged that he had no experience dealing with methadone clinics, and that during his thirteen years as a zoning official in Westerly, he never had occasion to review zoning for methadone clinics. Giordano further stated that in his view, "a medical office provides a variety of medical services to a variety of patients." When pressed, however, Giordano also acknowledged that there were dentists, podiatrists, and obstetricians/gynecologists in the P-15 zone and that each of these "medical offices" provided specific types of services to only a portion of the population.
On March 1, 2000, the ZBR voted four-to-one to uphold the Order. Of the four members who voted to uphold the Order, two indicated that they believed that the primary purpose of CBH was to dispense methadone, which made it analogous to a pharmacy, rather than a medical office. The decision took effect on April 6, 2000.
In a separate action that same day, the Oefingers appealed the ZBR'S decision to Rhode Island Superior Court in Washington County. The Oefingers argued that due to the nature of the services provided by CBH, it was indeed a medical office which is permitted by right in a P-15 zone. Additionally, the Oefingers argued that the ZBR's decision violated the ADA. Without delay, the Oefingers received a temporary restraining order, allowing CBH to remain open during the appeal process, and on November 15, 2000 the Superior Court issued a decision reversing the ZBR's decision and vacating the Order. The Court held that CBH is a professional medical office, and as such it was permitted to operate by right in a P-15 zone. The Court did not address the ADA claim.
CBH now requests that this Court declare that Defendants' Order and the subsequent ZBR decision result in a violation of the ADA and award monetary damages.
This case arises under Title II, Part A, of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (2000). Therefore, this Court has original federal question jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, which states that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority," and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which states that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
A court is empowered to grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue is one where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 915 F.Supp. 1267, 1279 (D.R.I.1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
For a moving party to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, it "must point out `an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case.'" Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir.1988) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must do more than merely assert allegations in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact; "it must set...
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