Center Tp. School Dist. v. Oakland Independent School Dist., No. 50124

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: GARFIELD; LARSON; PETERSON; OLIVER
• Citation: 104 N.W.2d 454,251 Iowa 1113
• Parties: CENTER TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, by Frank Rollins, President, Appellee, v. OAKLAND INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT of Oakland, Iowa, by Victor Allen, President, and County Board of Education of Pottawattamie County, by Clifford Heyne, President, Henry Rossman, Frank Bell, Dudley Stupefell and Henry Petersen, Board Members, Appellants.
• Docket Number: No. 50124
• Decision Date: 02 August 1960

Page 454

104 N.W.2d 454 251 Iowa 1113 CENTER TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, by Frank Rollins, President, Appellee,
v.
OAKLAND INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT of Oakland, Iowa, by Victor Allen, President, and County Board of Education of Pottawattamie County, by Clifford Heyne, President, Henry Rossman, Frank Bell, Dudley Stupefell and Henry Petersen, Board Members, Appellants. No. 50124. Supreme Court of Iowa. Aug. 2, 1960.

[251 Iowa 1114]

Page 455

Hogzett & Burgett, Oakland, for appellant Oakland Independent School District of Oakland.

[251 Iowa 1115] Kenneth Sacks, Council Bluffs, for appellant County Board of Education of Pottawattamie County.

Joe W. Turner, Avoca, for appellee Center Township School District.

GARFIELD, Justice.

The question presented by this appeal, granted by us under rule 332, Rules of Civil Procedure, is whether the case involves such a disagreement between plaintiff Center Township School District and defendants Oakland Independent School District and the Pottawattamie County board of education as must be appealed to the state superintendent of public instruction before resort may be had to the courts. The district court evidently answered this question in the negative and we affirm the decision.

Center Township district filed in the district court its petition for declaratory judgment alleging that about 100 pupils residing in plaintiff district attend school in defendant Oakland district; a dispute has arisen between the two districts over the inclusion by Oakland, in the expenditures from which tuition fees to be paid by plaintiff are computed, of an item of $5000 paid by Oakland on the principal of its bonded indebtedness. The petition quotes the pertinent parts of sections 279.18 and 282.20, Code, 1958, I.C.A., which state the items of expenditure a receiving school district shall include in computing tuition rates to be paid by the district in which the pupils reside. The petition then alleges that payment of principal on bonded indebtedness is not an item which may be included in the computation and the Code does not make it so. A declaratory judgment so holding is asked.

Defendants Oakland District and county board of education filed special appearances asserting the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action because plaintiff had not appealed the disagreement to the state superintendant of public instruction under Code section 285.13, I.C.A. The district court overruled the special appearances and defendants have appealed to us from the ruling.

Section 285.13, upon which defendants rely, states: 'In the event of a disagreement between the board of a school district [251 Iowa 1116] and the county board of education, the board of the school district may appeal to the state superintendent of public instruction * * *. The decision of the state superintendent of public instruction shall be subject to appeal to the courts as provided for in section 285.12.'

The county board of education became involved in the disagreement between the two districts because Code, §§ 279.18 and 282.20, I.C.A., provide that the receiving district shall file with such board the computation of tuition rates 'for its review and approval.' Plaintiff's petition alleges Oakland's computation was so filed and approved.

Page 456

Although the merits of the controversy are not before us it seems desirable to set out the pertinent parts of Code §§ 279.18 and 282.20, I.C.A. For present purposes they are virtually identical except that 279.18 refers to elementary schools and 282.20 to high schools. Each section provides the district in which the student resides shall pay the one where he attends school a tuition fee sufficient to cover the average cost per child in average daily attendance in the receiving district.

Each section then contains this language over which the controversy has arisen and which plaintiff asks the court to construe: 'Such tuition rates shall include expenditures from the general fund for general control, instruction, auxiliary agencies except transportation costs, co-ordinate activities, operation of plant, maintenance of plant, fixed charges including insurance on buildings and contents, capital, interest paid for debt service from the general fund, interest paid for debt service and retirement of bonds from the schoolhouse fund.'

Plaintiff concedes the above language authorizes the inclusion of interest on bonded indebtedness but, as before indicated, alleges it does not permit inclusion of principal of such indebtedness. The statute does not seem as clear as it might be upon this point and it is not surprising the present controversy has arisen.

We are satisfied plaintiff has alleged a proper case for a declaratory judgment unless the disagreement is one which must first be taken to the state superintendent. Rule 261, Rules of Civil Procedure, in part states: 'Courts of record * * * shall [251 Iowa 1117] declare rights * * * whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. * * * The existence of another remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.'

And rule 262 provides, 'Any person * * * whose rights * * * are affected by a statute * * * may have determined any question of the construction * * * thereof or arising thereunder, and obtain a declaration of rights * * * thereunder.' According to rule 269 'person' includes any 'entity capable of suing or being sued under the laws of Iowa.' This of course includes a school district.

We have repeatedly held the above rules are remedial and should be given a reasonably liberal construction. In re Estate of Turner, 250 Iowa 795, 798-799, 96 N.W.2d 481, 483, and citations; Herbst v. Treinen, 249 Iowa 695, 698, 88 N.W.2d 820, 822.

We assume, as the parties have done, that the question whether plaintiff was compelled to first submit this controversy to the state superintendent may be properly raised by special appearance. We merely note that in most of our many decisions involving a like question it was raised by demurrer or motion to dismiss.

Code section 285.13, I.C.A., quoted above, was enacted in 1945 by...