Centerpoint Energy v. Miller Cty Cir. Court

• Decision Date: 14 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-924.,07-924.
• Citation: Centerpoint Energy v. Miller Cty Cir. Court, 276 S.W.3d 231, 372 Ark. 343 (Ark. 2008)
• Parties: CENTERPOINT ENERGY, INC., Centerpoint Energy Resources Corp., Entex Gas Marketing Co., Centerpoint Energy Field Services, Inc., and Centerpoint Energy Pipeline Services, Inc., Petitioners, v. MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, The Honorable James Scott Hudson, Jr., Weldon Johnson, and Angela Sullivan Engledowl, Respondents.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

276 S.W.3d 231

372 Ark. 343

CENTERPOINT ENERGY, INC., Centerpoint Energy Resources Corp., Entex Gas Marketing Co., Centerpoint Energy Field Services, Inc., and Centerpoint Energy Pipeline Services, Inc., Petitioners, v. MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, The Honorable James Scott Hudson, Jr., Weldon Johnson, and Angela Sullivan Engledowl, Respondents.

No. 07-924.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

February 14, 2008.

Baker Botts L.L.P., by: B. Daryl Bristow, Mark R. Robeck, Macey Reasoner Stokes, Jason M. Ryan, Houston, and Thomas R. Phillips, Austin; Jackson Walker L.L.P., by: Richard E. Griffin, Houston; Atchley, Russell, Waldrop & Hlavinka, L.L.P., by: J. Dennis Chambers, Texarkana, TX; and Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Robert S. Shafer, Little Rock, AR, for petitioners.

Patton, Roberts, McWilliams & Capshaw, by: Phillip N. Cockrell, Richard A. Adams, and Shivali Sharma; Keil & Goodson, by: John C. Goodson and Matt Keil; Nix, Patterson & Roach LLP, by: C. Cary Patterson and Michael B. Angelovich, Texarkana, TX; James M. Pratt, Jr. P.A., by: James M. Pratt, Jr., Camden, AR; and Eggleston & Briscoe, by: Wade Vandiver and Bill Eggleston, Houston, TX, for respondents.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

This is the second time that Petitioners Centerpoint Energy, Inc., Centerpoint Energy Resources Corp. (f/k/a Reliant Energy Resources Corp.), Entex Gas Marketing Co., Centerpoint Energy Field Services, Inc., and Centerpoint Energy Pipeline Services, Inc. (collectively Centerpoint), are before this court seeking an extraordinary writ to stop the Miller County Circuit Court from acting on the complaint styled Weldon Johnson, et al. v. Centerpoint Energy, Inc., et al., No. 04-327-2.¹ See Centerpoint Energy, Inc. v. Miller County Circuit Court, 370 Ark. 190, 258 S.W.3d 336 (2007) (Centerpoint I). Now, Centerpoint has requested that we issue a writ of mandamus, a writ of prohibition, and a writ of certiorari directing the circuit court to enforce the mandate issued in Centerpoint I, and to dismiss the second amended complaint filed following the issuance of that mandate.

In support of this petition, Centerpoint argues that: (1) the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in failing to recognize, obey, and execute our mandate and opinion in Centerpoint I such that writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari should be granted; (2) as a result of our issuance of a writ of prohibition in Centerpoint I, venue is no longer proper in the circuit court such that a writ of prohibition is again warranted; and (3) because this court held that Respondents Weldon Johnson and Angela Sullivan Engledowl (collectively Respondents) complain about their gas rates, the Arkansas filed-rate doctrine renders the circuit court wholly without jurisdiction to adjudicate Engledowl's claims such that a writ of prohibition is proper. As this case involves extraordinary writs, jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(a)(3). For the reasons set forth below, we grant the writ of mandamus and the writ of prohibition. The petition for certiorari is moot.

The underlying facts are set out in Centerpoint I. There, Centerpoint argued, in part, that a writ of prohibition should be issued because the state regulatory agencies, including the Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC) and the Texas Railroad Commission (TRRC), have exclusive jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Respondents on behalf of the proposed class, and that the circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction. Prior to addressing Centerpoint's arguments, we held that our jurisdiction was

confined to the issue of the jurisdiction of the APSC over Arkansas customers, who are potential class members. We decline[d] to adjudicate the issue of the jurisdiction of the TRRC under Texas law vis-a-vis Texas ratepayers. Accordingly we den[ied] the writ of prohibition with respect to the potential Texas class members and the TRRC.

Id. at 197, 258 S.W.3d at 340. We then went on to address Centerpoint's contention that the circuit court was wholly without jurisdiction because the APSC has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between customers and utility companies over public rights, such as natural gas rates.

In granting the writ with respect to the Arkansas consumers represented by Johnson, we concluded that there is clear authority given to the APSC by the Arkansas General Assembly for "sole and exclusive jurisdiction" over Respondents' claims as they relate to Arkansas consumers, but not as they relate to Texas consumers under Texas law. Specifically, we summarized the case as follows:

In essence, [Respondents] are complaining that they are being charged too much for natural gas, and their actual damages can only be measured by comparing the rates they have been charged and the rates they should have been charged absent the alleged fraudulent conduct. This squarely falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the APSC under Cullum [v. Seagull Mid-South, Inc.], 322 Ark. 190, 907 S.W.2d 741 (1995)], and Austin [v. Centerpoint Energy Arkla, 365 Ark. 138, 226 S.W.3d 814 (2006)]. The respondents attempt to disguise their claims by labeling them as common law tort claims, but this court must look beneath the labels and inquire into the true nature of the complaint. See Austin, supra. In doing so, it is clear that the complaint is essentially that Centerpoint has overcharged [Respondents] and proposed class members. This is precisely the kind of dispute that should be decided by the APSC.

Id. at 202-203, 258 S.W.3d at 345.

We delivered our Centerpoint I opinion on June 7, 2007, and our mandate was issued on June 26, 2007.² On June 27, 2007, Centerpoint filed two motions in circuit court. First, they filed a joint renewed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and, in the alternative, a motion to abate or stay any further proceedings. Citing Centerpoint I, Centerpoint requested that the circuit court dismiss the case in its entirety because it was without jurisdiction to determine the fundamental threshold question of whether the TRRC has exclusive jurisdiction over Engledowl's claims and because those claims were barred by the filed-rate doctrine as adopted in Arkansas. Alternatively, Centerpoint asked the circuit court to decline to exercise jurisdiction, or to stay further proceedings pending the outcome of a declaratory judgment action they had filed in Texas State District Court to resolve the question of the scope of the TRRC's jurisdiction over Engledowl's asserted claims. Centerpoint also filed a joint motion to dismiss for improper venue in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Specifically, they argued that, following Centerpoint I and the dismissal of Johnson's claims, the circuit court should dismiss this case in its entirety because venue is now improper.³

In response to the renewed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Respondents argued that Centerpoint I did not dismiss any parties or any claims, and that Centerpoint I did not change the fact that this case is about fraud and not filed rates. As to Centerpoint's improper-venue motion, Respondents asserted that Centerpoint had waived any right to venue, as well as that Centerpoint I did not negate proper venue in Miller County. Respondents also filed a motion for leave to file a second amended class-action complaint on July 20, 2007.

On July 25, 2007, a hearing was held on Centerpoint's motions. Following arguments, the circuit court denied both of the motions to dismiss, but stayed all claims by Respondents as they related to Arkansas customers pending further proceedings before the APSC. The court explicitly refused to dismiss Johnson and found that venue was proper based on Johnson's retention in the complaint.

Following the hearing, the circuit court granted Respondents' motion to file a second amended complaint, which they filed on August 2, 2007. Then, on August 7, 2007, the circuit court issued an order denying the motions to dismiss and staying the claims asserted on behalf of Arkansas customers to allow the APSC an opportunity to explore those claims. As to the joint renewed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the circuit court agreed with Respondents and found that

[b]ased upon the Court's interpretation of the Arkansas Supreme Court's opinion issued on June [7],⁴ 2007, and the mandate issued on June 26, 2007, neither Angela Engledowl nor Weldon Johnson have been dismissed as parties plaintiff; and, further, the claims they have asserted have not been dismissed. However, in accordance with the direction provided [in Centerpoint I], the Court ORDERS that the claims asserted on behalf of the Arkansas customers are hereby STAYED to allow the [APSC] an opportunity to explore those claims. The Court appreciates the [APSC] has primary jurisdiction of the claims of Weldon Johnson and the Arkansas customers, as they relate to the regulated entities. The Court further recognizes that the [APSC] may in its discretion: determine and dispose of all those claims; determine that it lacks jurisdiction of some of those claims; or, determine that complete relief could not be afforded to the Arkansas customers by the [APSC]. When and if the [APSC] releases its primary jurisdiction over those claims, in whole or in part, the Court will entertain any appropriate motion to lift this stay as to any claims released back to this Court pursuant to the ruling of the Arkansas Supreme Court.

With regard to the joint motion to dismiss for improper venue, the circuit court again agreed with Respondents and denied the motion

as untimely, and because neither Angela Engledowl, nor Weldon Johnson, nor the claims they have asserted, have been dismissed, and because the claims set forth in [Respondents'] pleadings include allegations of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud and because the fraudulent acts are alleged to have occurred and to have been communicated, in part, in Miller County, Arkansas.

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