Centinela Hospital Assn. v. City of Inglewood

Decision Date10 December 1990
Docket NumberNo. B047219,B047219
Citation225 Cal.App.3d 1586,275 Cal.Rptr. 901
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesCENTINELA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF INGLEWOOD and City Council of the City of Inglewood, Defendants and Respondents. DIDI HIRSCH PSYCHIATRIC SERVICE, etc., Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Phillips, Alan I. Rothenberg, Sherwin L. Memel, Philip R. Recht, Diane L. Faber, Cox, Castle & Nicholson, Kenneth B. Bley, Los Angeles, and Eric Tuckman, Lynwood, for plaintiff and appellant.

Howard Rosten, City Atty., and Jack Ballas, Chief Asst. City Atty., for defendants and respondents.

Richards, Watson & Gershon, Mitchell E. Abbott, Scott Weible, Alschuler, Grossman & Pines, Frank Kaplan, Joan A. Wolff, Los Angeles, Baker & Burton, and Kent Burton, Hermosa Beach, for real party in interest and respondent.

Mental Health Advocacy Services, Inc., as amicus curiae on behalf of real party in interest and respondent.

LILLIE, Presiding Justice.

Centinela Hospital Association, doing business as Centinela Hospital Medical Center (Centinela or Centinela Hospital) appeals from "summary judgment" 1 entered in favor of defendants City of Inglewood and City Council of the City of Inglewood (hereinafter referred to collectively as City) and real party in interest Didi Hirsch Psychiatric Service on Centinela's first amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, in which Centinela challenged City's grant to Didi Hirsch of a special use permit for construction of a 15-bed crisis psychiatric facility. The principal issues on this appeal are whether City properly determined the facility was categorically exempt from the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and whether Centinela's amended petition for writ of mandate states viable claims challenging City's decision to grant real party's special use permit.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Proceedings

Didi Hirsch Psychiatric Service (Didi Hirsch) is the owner of a 13,338 square-foot parcel of property located at 1007 Myrtle Avenue in the City of Inglewood, and zoned R-M (Residential and Medical). The property is bounded on three sides by other residential uses; across the street to the east is Centinela Hospital. In October 1988, Didi Hirsch filed application for special use permit to demolish three deteriorated buildings on the property (a single-room occupancy building with ten rooms rented on a weekly basis, an efficiency apartment, and a one-bedroom apartment) and to construct on the site a two-story 15-bed crisis residential convalescent facility for those experiencing psychiatric distress.

The City's Planning Division staff report on Didi Hirsch's application noted that the proposed facility was to have seven bedrooms each with two beds on the second floor, a handicap-equipped bedroom for one person on the first floor, counseling offices, two lounges, a kitchen, dining room, laundry room, four bathrooms, and eight on-site parking stalls; residents at the facility would consist of the chronically mentally ill who can function in the community with a support system of assistance in times of crisis; no residents with a history of "acting out" or violence would be accepted, nor would persons with a primary diagnosis of alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental retardation; residents would stay at the facility up to 14 days and then would be referred to long-term independent living arrangements, transitional or board-and-care facilities.

The staff report also stated that the facility would have 24-hour monitoring, with an average staff of six during the day, four in the evening, and three at night; intercom and alarm systems would be used to enhance monitoring.

Subject to special use permit approval, hospitals and convalescent facilities are permitted in Inglewood's R-M residential and medical zone. The staff report indicated that four findings related to the proposed use and its surroundings were required to grant the special use permit, and that the proposed facility met the four criteria. The staff report recommended that the Planning Commission grant the special use permit subject to five conditions, not at issue herein.

On November 10, 1988, City issued a Notice of Exemption, declaring that the proposed facility was "categorically exempt" from CEQA pursuant to Section 15303 (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15303; hereinafter referred to as Guidelines section 15303).

After an advertised public hearing on December 7, 1988, the City of Inglewood Planning Commission (Commission) adopted a resolution approving the special use permit for the psychiatric facility. The Commission's resolution contained the findings that (1) the site is adequate in size and shape to accommodate the proposed use with adequate facilities and improvements conforming to the requirements of the zoning code; (2) the facility is served by streets of appropriate width and function to carry project-generated traffic, and there is adequate on-site parking; (3) the use of the property conforms with the purpose and intent of the General Plan; (4) the proposed use will not adversely affect neighboring properties, occupants thereof, or the permitted uses thereon, or the general public in terms of noise, litter, traffic, parking availability, health, safety or any other factor causing potential detriment to neighboring properties or property values. 2 The resolution further concluded that the facility will have a beneficial impact on public health, safety, and welfare by providing the social advantage of increased community care and service; and granting of the special use permit for the proposed project is categorically exempt from the requirements of CEQA and a Categorical Exemption has been prepared.

Centinela appealed the decision of the Commission to the City Council of the City of Inglewood. After a noticed public hearing on the appeal on February 7, 1989, the City Council closed the public hearing, but kept the record open for the purpose of receiving written briefs on legal issues from attorneys representing Didi Hirsch, Centinela, and from the City Attorney; at the continued hearing on February 28, 1989, the Mayor of Inglewood stated that the Council had ordered that the City Attorney "receive testimony by the attorneys by February 17, and we wanted that testimony by February 23 and that hasn't been done.... I want to advise you, this [new information] cannot be considered at this time."

At the hearing, Centinela's attorney pointed out that after the closing of the public hearing on February 7, Centinela discovered information which he believed the City "must consider in making its determination," and Centinela conveyed this information to the City in a February 24, 1989 letter. 3 A representative of Didi Hirsch objected to the City Council consideration of the new information offered by Centinela. In response to a question by a member of the City Council, the representative of Didi Hirsch stated that the two stabbings involved different situations and facilities than its proposed facility; the stabbing of the social worker in Santa Monica occurred in an open clinic where people walk in off the streets and get help; Jump Street is a shelter for the homeless mentally ill that are not in crisis; the proposed facility has a double layer of screening like its existing Excelsior House program, which has not had any problems. Thereafter, the City Council voted unanimously to deny the appeal and affirm the decision granting the special use permit.

B. Trial Court Proceedings

Centinela's first amended petition for writ of mandate challenges the granting of the permit for Didi Hirsch's facility on three grounds, each ground set out in a separate cause of action. In the first cause of action, captioned writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, Centinela alleges that City's findings were unsupported by substantial evidence and City failed to receive evidence and make findings on certain "public safety" issues; in a second cause of action captioned writ of mandate under CEQA, Centinela alleges that City improperly determined Didi Hirsch's psychiatric facility is categorically exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub.Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.); in the third cause of action for writ of mandate under the Brown Act, Centinela alleges that private meetings between the Inglewood City Attorney and each of several members of the City Council, occurring earlier on the day of the February 28, 1989 hearing of Centinela's appeal to the City Council from the decision of the City Planning Commission, violated government Code section 54953, thus rendering the City Council's decision null and void under the Brown Act. 4

After answering the amended petition, Didi Hirsch filed motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication that certain issues were without substantial controversy. The ground of real party's motion for summary judgment was that Welfare and Institutions Code section 5120 (§ 5120) preempted CEQA and the Brown Act, and that section 5120 removed any discretion of City to deny its special use permit. 5 Although City filed a memorandum in support of real party's motion for summary judgment, City disagreed with Didi Hirsch's interpretation of section 5120; City argued that while section 5120 limits the ability of municipalities to discriminate, through their zoning restrictions, against mental health facilities in areas where a hospital or other health facility would be permitted, section 5120 does not eliminate the discretion of a city to apply other generally applicable nondiscriminatory criteria in granting or denying a special use permit.

While Centinela's opposition to the motion for summary...

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