Central Alabama Fair Housing Ctr. v Lowder Realty
| Decision Date | 05 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | 996133,11 |
| Parties | CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR HOUSING CENTER, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LOWDER REALTY CO., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. (No. 97-00474-CV-A-N), N. Harold Albritton, III, Chief Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Cynthia Foster, Denise Frazier, Barbara Gill-Smith, Brenda Smith, Ezell Smith, and the Central Alabama Fair Housing Center appeal a final jury verdict in favor of defendants on their housing discrimination claims. Plaintiffs present two distinct issues on appeal. First, the individual plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by finding a prima facie case of racial discrimination in their use of a peremptory challenge at trial, and subsequently denying their request to strike the juror in question. Second, the Central Alabama Fair Housing Center argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury that the Center's right to recover was contingent upon a finding that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against the individual plaintiffs. We conclude that the district court committed reversible error as to both issues, vacate the jury verdict, and remand for a new trial.
The individual plaintiffs are six African-Americans who sought to purchase homes in Montgomery, Alabama. They allege that the defendant real estate companies, Lowder Realty Co., Inc., Lowder New Homes, Inc., and Lowder New Homes Sales, Inc., intentionally steered them away from predominantly white neighborhoods and toward predominantly African-American neighborhoods. Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601, et seq., and two provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982).
On December 7, 1998, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama called a venire panel for service in a term of civil jury court. This action was the only case to be tried during the term. Three days preceding the calling of the venire, the Jury Commissioner had distributed to the parties copies of the list of jurors on the venire and questionnaires completed by the venire members.
After the venire was sworn by the clerk, the district court conducted voir dire and allowed attorneys for the parties to ask questions that further explored answers given by the individual venire members. After voir dire was completed, the district court excused four jurors who asserted that for personal reasons it would be impossible or an extreme hardship to serve on the jury. The court then heard the parties' challenges for cause. Plaintiffs made challenges for cause against five jurors, all white, one of which was granted. Defendants challenged two jurors for cause, both of whom were struck by the court.
The court then stated that it would empanel eight jurors and permitted each party three peremptory challenges. Of the prospective jurors-the first fourteen remaining on the venire-eleven were white and three were black. The parties exercised their peremptory strikes by concurrently writing down all of their requested strikes and returning them to the clerk. Plaintiffs and defendants each utilized two of their three allotted peremptory strikes.
Plaintiffs then asserted that the defendants, who used their two strikes to challenge African-American jurors (# 7 and # 8), exercised their strikes on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The district court found that a prima facie case was established because "defendants' only strikes were black jurors and ... no black jurors remained on the panel as constituted." Although defense counsel pointed out that one African-American juror had not been struck and would serve even if the parties' peremptory strikes were upheld, the district court nevertheless required the defendants to give race-neutral reasons for their strikes. Defense counsel stated that Juror # 7 was struck because (1) she was grimacing, frowning, and staring straight ahead; (2) defendants' jury consultant observed that she was sleeping; and (3) one of the defense lawyers always struck people from Lowndes County. Defense counsel said that Juror # 8 was struck on the grounds that (1) she was grimacing and frowning; (2) her arms were crossed; (3) the jury consultant observed that she was sleeping; (4) she was a "social worker type"; and (5) one of the defense lawyers always struck people from Bullock County. The district court found that these explanations could be a cover for race-based reasons, and upheld plaintiffs' Batson challenge as to both jurors. The jurors were then placed on the jury empaneled to hear the case.
Defendants then asserted that plaintiffs had engaged in intentional discrimination when exercising their two strikes against Jurors # 5 and # 9. Defendant counsel objected on the ground that both jurors were white males and neither had made statements during voir dire that would justify striking them but for their race. The district court found a prima facie case of racial striking, stating only "[b]oth challenges having been used against white jurors, I find there is a prima facie case of racial striking and I will require the plaintiffs to show race neutral reasons." When plaintiffs exercised their peremptory challenges, eleven of the fourteen prospective jurors were white.
Plaintiffs then provided race neutral reasons for striking the two jurors. As to Juror # 5, they stated that they struck him because he belonged to the NRA. The district court found this reason to be race neutral, and denied defendants' challenge to plaintiffs' strike of Juror # 5.
Plaintiffs then presented five separate reasons for striking Juror # 9: (1) he held a bank account with Colonial Bank, a company within the same corporate family as several of the defendant corporations; (2) he owned commercial rental property; (3) his immediate family members belonged to various clubs and organizations about which the district court had questioned the venire; (4) his status as an alcoholic, as revealed on the court's juror questionnaire form, rendered him more susceptible to any stress associated with jury service in a two-week civil rights trial; and (5) the stress of serving on a jury could have been further exacerbated by the fact that he lived 80 or 90 miles from the courthouse. Each of the reasons offered by the plaintiffs was based on information contained in the record, including the jury questionnaires completed by the venire members.
After plaintiffs finished explaining why they struck Juror # 9, the district court failed to state whether it considered plaintiffs' reasons to be race-neutral but instead immediately presented defendants with the opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of those reasons. In response, defense counsel stated that they believed Juror # 9 had not had a drink since 1991, that he rented commercial and not residential property, and that they did not believe in striking a juror because he was an alcoholic. The district court then concluded that ownership of a warehouse had nothing to do with the case and that being a recovering alcoholic and living 90 miles from the courthouse were not legitimate reasons for striking a juror and could be a cover for race-based reasons. With no further discussion of these three reasons proffered by plaintiffs and no discussion whatsoever of plaintiffs' other two proffered reasons, the district court sustained defendants' challenge to plaintiffs' attempted peremptory strike. The district court placed Juror # 9 on the jury of eight that was empaneled to hear the case and the remaining venire members were excused. Juror # 9 ultimately served on the jury that rendered a verdict and became the jury foreperson.
The Central Alabama Fair Housing Center is a nonprofit corporation whose mission is eliminating racial discrimination in housing. It receives and investigates complaints of discrimination in the Montgomery area, provides counseling to persons who believe they have been discriminated against, and educates realtors and the public about federal fair housing law. In connection with its investigatory role, the Center goes to court seeking redress for violations of housing laws.
At trial, the Center presented the following evidence in support of its claim. In response to complaints of racial steering it had received, the Center conducted a series of tests, sending two teams of white and black employees to two different Lowder realtors, Juliette Stuckey and Debra Whitehouse. White tester Jennifer Woods recounted her testing experience for the jury. Woods testified that when the team of white testers contacted Stuckey, they asked to see four houses in racially mixed or black neighborhoods. Rather than initially showing them the older houses they had asked to see, however, Stuckey showed them a new house in a predominantly white area. When she did show them the first of the houses they asked to view, she made a number of comments about the neighborhood, offering her opinion that it was "not a good area" and that the white testers would not want to live there because there were "too many of the other kind."
Woods further testified that after the couple had viewed the first house they had requested to see, Stuckey reiterated, Then, pointing to an apartment complex nearby, Stuckey said, "That's nothing but blacks over there in all those apartments." As they returned to the Lowder office, driving through predominantly white neighborhoods, Stuckey...
To continue reading
Request your trial