Central Green Co. v. U.S.

Decision Date21 February 2001
Docket Number99859
Citation531 U.S. 425,148 L.Ed.2d 919,121 S.Ct. 1005
Parties CENTRAL GREEN CO., PETITIONER v. UNITED STATESSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

The Madera Canal, a federal facility leased to the Madera Irrigation District (MID), flows through petitioner's California orchards. Petitioner brought suit against respondent United States and the MID alleging that their negligence in the canal's design, construction, and maintenance caused subsurface flooding resulting in damage to the orchards and increased operating costs for petitioner. The complaint sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act and other relief. Relying on the immunity granted by the Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. 702c-which states that "[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place"-the United States moved for judgment on the pleadings. The District Court dismissed the complaint because the parties agreed that the canal was a part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, and that flood control was one of that project's purposes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that although the canal serves no flood control purpose, immunity attached solely because it is a branch of the larger project.

Held: In determining whether 702c immunity attaches, courts should consider the character of the waters that cause the relevant damage and the purposes behind their release rather than the relation between that damage and a flood control project. Pp. 3-12.

(a) A passage in United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605-which states that it is "clear from 702c's plain language that the terms 'flood' and 'flood waters' apply to all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood control"-lends support to the Ninth Circuit's holding, but is unquestionably dictum. It is therefore appropriate to resort to the statute's text, as illuminated by the James holding, rather than to that isolated comment, to determine whether the water flowing through the canal that allegedly damaged petitioner's orchards is covered by 702c. The James holding-that the phrase "flood or flood waters" encompasses waters that are released for flood control purposes when reservoired waters are at flood stage-is vastly different from the Ninth Circuit's reading of 702c, under which immunity attaches simply because the Madera Canal is part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, and flood control is one of the project's purposes. Pp. 3-6.

(b) To characterize every drop of water flowing through the immense Central Valley Project as "flood water" simply because flood control is among its purposes unnecessarily dilutes the statute's language. The statute's text does not include the words "flood control project," but, rather, states that immunity attaches to "any damage from or by floods or flood waters." Pp. 7-9.

(c) Neither the statute's language nor the James holding even arguably supports the Government's conclusion that 702c immunity must attach to all the water flowing through the canal, even if the water never approached flood stage and the terminus of the canal was parched at the end of the summer. Accordingly, the Court disavows the "related to" portion of James' dicta. Pp. 9-11.

(d) Because the question of immunity was decided on the pleadings, using an incorrect test and without benefit of an evidentiary hearing or further factual development, the case is remanded for further proceedings. Pp. 11-12. 177 F.3d 834, reversed and remanded.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.

Incident to the authorization of a massive flood control project for the Mississippi River in 1928, Congress enacted an immunity provision which stated that "[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place." 45 Stat. 535, as amended, 33 U.S.C. 702c. At issue in this case is the meaning of the words "floods or flood waters." The narrow question presented is whether those words encompass all the water that flows through a federal facility that was designed and is operated, at least in part, for flood control purposes. The Ninth Circuit, relying upon a broader construction of 702c than some other federal courts have adopted, concluded that they do. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 529 U.S. 1017 (2000), and now reverse.

I

Petitioner owns 1,000 acres of pistachio orchards in California's San Joaquin Valley. The Madera Canal, a federal facility that has been leased to the Madera Irrigation District (MID), flows through petitioner's property. In 1996, petitioner brought this action against respondent United States and the MID alleging that their negligence in the design, construction, and maintenance of the canal had caused subsurface flooding resulting in damage to the orchards and increased operating costs for petitioner. Petitioner did not allege that any physical failure of the dam caused the damage to its property. The complaint sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., as well as injunctive relief. Relying on the immunity granted by the Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. 702c the United States moved for judgment on the pleadings.

Accepting petitioner's submission that the Madera Canal was used for irrigation purposes, the District Court nevertheless dismissed the complaint because the parties agreed that the canal was a part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, and that flood control was one of the purposes of that project. The District Court's decision was dictated by an earlier Ninth Circuit case, which held that if a " 'project has flood control as one of its purposes, and the events giving rise to the action were not wholly unrelated to the project,' " immunity necessarily attached.1

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It agreed with petitioner that the Madera Canal "serves no flood control purpose," but nevertheless held that immunity attached "solely because it is a branch of the Central Valley Project." 177 F.3d 834, 839 (1999). As the Ninth Circuit put it, "[a]lthough the water in the Madera Canal was not held for the purpose of flood control, because it was part of the Central Valley Project, it was 'not wholly unrelated' to flood control." Ibid. (emphasis added). In so holding, however, the court recognized that the Government would probably not have enjoyed immunity in at least three other Circuits where the courts require a nexus between flood control activities and the harm done to the plaintiff.2 Noting the "harsh result of [the] decision," the Ninth Circuit frankly acknowledged that "[t]he 'not wholly unrelated' test applied by this and other circuits reads broadly an already broadly written grant of immunity." Ibid. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, under such a test, there would seem to be no "set of facts where the government is not immune from damage arising from water that at one time passed through part of the Central Valley or other flood control project." Ibid.

II

Not until more than a half century after its enactment did this Court have occasion to interpret 702c. In a consolidated case arising out of two separate accidents, we held that the section "bars recovery where the Federal Government would otherwise be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., for personal injury caused by the Federal Government's negligent failure to warn of the dangers from the release of floodwaters from federal flood control projects." United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 599 (1986).

The principal issue in the James case was whether the statutory word "damage" encompassed not just property damage, but also personal injuries and death. In light of the legislative history, which it reviewed at some length, id., at 606-609, 610-612, the Court concluded that the best reading of the statutory text was one which was both broader and less literal, and which encompassed the claims at issue in the two cases before the Court.

In both instances, the injuries were caused by the turbulent current generated by unwarned releases of waters from a reservoir after the Army Corps of Engineers had determined that the waters were at "flood stage." The fact that the injuries were caused by "flood waters" was undisputed.3 In its opinion, the Court held that the language of the statute covered the two accidents because the "injuries occurred as a result of the release of waters from reservoirs that had reached flood stage." Id., at 604.

Nevertheless, the Court's opinion in James included a passage that lends support to the Ninth Circuit's holding in this case. In that passage, the Court wrote:

"Nor do the terms 'flood' and 'flood waters' create any uncertainty in the context of accidents such as the ones at issue in these cases. The Act concerns flood control projects designed to carry floodwaters. It is thus clear from 702c's plain language that the terms 'flood' and 'flood waters' apply to all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood control, as well as to waters that such projects cannot control." Id., at 605 (emphasis added).4

The sentence that we have italicized and, in particular, the phrase "related to...

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