Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims Sims v. Central Intelligence Agency
Decision Date | 16 April 1985 |
Docket Number | 83-1249,Nos. 83-1075,s. 83-1075 |
Citation | 471 U.S. 159,85 L.Ed.2d 173,105 S.Ct. 1881 |
Parties | CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, et al., Petitioners v. John Cary SIMS and Sidney M. Wolfe. John Cary SIMS and Sidney M. Wolfe, Petitioners v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and William J. Casey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Between 1953 and 1966, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) financed a research project, code-named MKULTRA, that was established to counter Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing and interrogation techniques. Subprojects were contracted out to various universities, research foundations, and similar institutions. In 1977, respondents in No. 83-1075 (hereafter respondents) filed a request with the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking, inter alia, the names of the institutions and individuals who had performed the research under MKULTRA. Citing Exemption 3 of the FOIA—which provides that an agency need not disclose "matters that are . . . specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute . . . refers to particular types of matters to be withheld"—the CIA declined to disclose the requested information. The CIA invoked, as the exempting statute referred to in Exemption 3, § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, which states that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Respondents then filed suit under the FOIA in Federal District Court. Applying, as directed by the Court of Appeals on an earlier appeal, a definition of "intelligence sources" as meaning only those sources to which the CIA had to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the information, the District Court held that the identities of researchers who had received express guarantees of confidentiality need not be disclosed, and also exempted from disclosure other researchers on the ground that their work for the CIA, apart from MKULTRA, required that their identities remain secret. The court further held that there was no need to disclose the institutional affiliations of the individual researchers whose identities were exempt from disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed this latter holding, but reversed the District Court's ruling with respect to which individual researchers satisfied "the need-for-confidentiality" aspect of its formula- tion of exempt "intelligence sources." The Court of Appeals held that it was error automatically to exempt from disclosure those researchers to whom confidentiality had been promised, and that an individual qualifies as an "intelligence source" exempt from disclosure under the FOIA only when the CIA offers sufficient proof that it needs to protect its efforts in confidentiality in order to obtain the type of information provided by the researcher.
Held:
1. Section 102(d)(3) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. Section 102(d)(3) clearly refers to "particular types of matters" within the meaning of Exemption 3. Moreover, the FOIA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended § 102(d)(3) to be a withholding statute under that Exemption. And the plain meaning of § 102(d)(3)'s language, as well as the National Security Act's legislative history, indicates that Congress vested in the Director of Central Intelligence broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information from disclosure. To narrow this authority by limiting the definition of "intelligence sources" to sources to which the CIA had to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the information, not only contravenes Congress' express intention but also overlooks the practical necessities of modern intelligence gathering. Pp. 166-173.
2. MKULTRA researchers are protected "intelligence sources" within § 102(d)(3)'s broad meaning, because they provided, or were engaged to provide, information that the CIA needed to fulfill its statutory obligations with respect to foreign intelligence. To force the CIA to disclose a source whenever a court determines, after the fact, that the CIA could have obtained the kind of information supplied without promising confidentiality, could have a devastating impact on the CIA's ability to carry out its statutory mission. The record establishes that the MKULTRA researchers did in fact provide the CIA with information related to its intelligence function, and therefore the Director was authorized to withhold these researchers' identities from disclosure under the FOIA. Pp. 173-177.
3. The FOIA does not require the Director to disclose the institutional affiliations of the exempt researchers. This conclusion is supported by the record. The Director reasonably concluded that an observer who is knowledgeable about a particular intelligence research project, such as MKULTRA, could, upon learning that the research was performed at a certain institution, deduce the identities of the protected individual researchers. Pp. 177-181.
228 U.S.App.D.C. 269, 709 F.2d 95 (1983), affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Richard K Willard, Washington, D.C., for petitioners in No. 83-1075 and respondents in No. 83-1249.
Paul Alan Levy, Washington, D.C., for respondents in No. 83-1075 and the petitioners in No. 83-1249.
In No. 83-1075, we granted certiorari to decide whether § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as incorporated in Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act, exempts from disclosure only those sources of intelligence information to which the Central Intelligence Agency had to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the information. In No. 83-1249, the cross-petition, we granted certiorari to decide whether the Freedom of Information Act requires the Agency to disclose the institutional affiliations of persons whose identities are exempt from disclosure as "intelligence sources."
Between 1953 and 1966, the Central Intelligence Agency financed a wide-ranging project, code-named MKULTRA, concerned with "the research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior." 1 The program consisted of some 149 subprojects which the Agency contracted out to various universities, research foundations, and similar institutions. At least 80 institutions and 185 private researchers participated. Because the Agency funded MKULTRA indirectly, many of the participating individuals were unaware that they were dealing with the Agency.
Dissatisfied with the Agency's limited disclosure, respondents filed suit under the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That court ordered disclosure of the withheld names, holding that the MKULTRA researchers and affiliated institutions were not "intelligence sources" within the meaning of § 102(d)(3). 479 F.Supp. 84 (1979).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals concluded, as had the District Court, that § 102(d)(3) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 of the FOIA. The court held, however, that the District Court's analysis of that statute under the FOIA lacked a coherent definition of "intelligence sources." Accordingly, it remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the following definition:
"[A]n 'intelligence source' is a person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the Agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of those who provide it." 206 U.S.App.D.C. 157, 166, 642 F.2d 562, 571 (1980).
On remand, the District Court applied this definition and ordered the Agency to disclose the names of 47 researchers and the institutions with which they had been affiliated. The court rejected respondents' contention that the MKULTRA research was not needed to perform the Agency's intelligence function, explaining that
"[i]n view of the agency's concern that potential foreign enemies could be engaged in similar research and the desire to take effective counter-measures, . . . [the Agency] could reasonably determine that this...
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