Central Lakes Educ. Ass'n v. Independent School Dist. No. 743, Sauk Centre

• Decision Date: 08 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. C6-87-401,C6-87-401
• Citation: Central Lakes Educ. Ass'n v. Independent School Dist. No. 743, Sauk Centre, 411 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. App. 1987)
• Parties: 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2161, 41 Ed. Law Rep. 1072 CENTRAL LAKES EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al., Respondents, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 743, SAUK CENTRE, Minnesota, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 875

411 N.W.2d 875

127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2161, 41 Ed. Law Rep. 1072

CENTRAL LAKES EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al., Respondents, v.INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 743, SAUK CENTRE, MinnesotaAppellant.

No. C6-87-401.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Sept. 8, 1987.

Review Denied Nov. 13, 1987.

Syllabus by the Court

1.The trial court's memorandum decision granting respondent a temporary injunction adequately explains its reasons for purposes of appellate review.

2.The trial court erred in granting respondent a temporary injunction because it failed to show great and irreparable injury.

John M. Roszak, David S. Bartel, Ratwik, Roszak, Maloney & Bartel, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Donald W. Selzer, Jr., Ann M. Curme, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, St. Paul, for respondents.

Heard, considered and decided by LESLIE, P.J., SEDGWICK and LANSING, JJ.

OPINION

SEDGWICK, Judge.

This suit arises out of contract negotiations between respondentCentral Lakes Education Association("CLEA") and appellantIndependent School DistrictNo. 743("District").The CLEA sued the District, alleging its unilateral implementation of its last contract offer constituted unfair labor practices under the Public Employment Labor Relations Act, Minn.Stat. Secs. 179A.01-.25(1986)("PELRA").The District appeals from a temporary injunction restraining it from implementing its proposal and from refusing to continue negotiating.We reverse.

FACTS

The CLEA is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of schoolteachers in Sauk Centre.The CLEA and the District were parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering the 1981-82 and 1982-83 school years.In May 1983, they began negotiating for a new agreement covering 1983-85.Since 1985, the parties have been negotiating for an agreement covering 1985-87 as well.They have been participating in mediation since 1984.

The main areas of dispute are salary and workload.Under the old contract, the secondary teachers' daily workload was five classes per day and one supervisory period (e.g., study hall) per day for half the year.At an October 2, 1986, mediation session, the District offered a $6,400 total average salary increase if the workload was increased to include one supervisory period per day for the full year.The CLEA responded that it would accept the salary increase if it could allocate the raises and the workload remained at one supervisory period for half the year.The District rejected this proposal.The mediator told the parties there would be no more mediation sessions unless one of the parties indicated it was prepared to make a significant new proposal.

On December 8, 1986, the District approved a resolution stating that the parties are at an impasse and that to end the negotiations it was unilaterally implementing its last offer, effective December 10, 1986.In accordance with its resolution, the District issued retroactive paychecks to teachers and made new teaching assignments for the second semester of the 1986-87 school year.On December 11, 1986, the Sauk Centre teachers voted to reject the District's last offer and to seek further mediation.

A final mediation session was held on December 22, 1986.The CLEA proposed a salary increase of $7,064, which the District characterizes as an old proposal it had previously rejected.

The CLEA then brought this suit.It seeks a declaration that the District committed unfair labor practices under PELRA by adopting the December 8 resolution; an injunction restraining the District from implementing its last offer until the teachers file a notice of intent to strike and impasse in negotiations is reached; and damages.

On January 28, 1986, the trial court granted the CLEA a temporary injunction (1) enjoining the District from failing to comply with the 1981-83 bargaining agreement, and specifically its work-load provisions; (2) enjoining the District from failing to negotiate in good faith for agreements covering 1983-85 and 1985-87; and (3) ordering the back-pay paid by the District under its resolution to be placed in escrow.

ISSUES

1.Does the trial court's memorandum decision adequately set forth the basis of its ruling to permit meaningful appellate review?

2.Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting the temporary injunction?

ANALYSIS

I.

The District first argues that we must remand because the trial court failed to make findings on the five factors set forth for reviewing grants or denials of temporary injunctions in Dahlberg Brothers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 274-75, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22(1965).Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01 states:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury * * *, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon * * *; and in granting * * * interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action.

The primary purpose of this requirement is "to aid the appellate court by affording it a clear understanding of the ground * * * of the decision."Asch v. Housing and Redevelopment Authority, 256 Minn. 146, 155, 97 N.W.2d 656, 664-65(1959).

Here, meaningful appellate review is possible because the material facts are not in dispute, the trial court's memorandum contains findings of fact and conclusions of law (although not labeled as such), and it clearly sets forth the basis of its decision.This case is therefore distinguishable from others in which we have reversed for inadequate findings and conclusions.SeeBio-Line, Inc. v. Burman, 404 N.W.2d 318(Minn.Ct.App.1987)(no findings or analysis);Crowley Co. v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 394 N.W.2d 542(Minn.Ct.App.1986)(no findings, conclusion or explanation of basis of decision).While the trial court's memorandum decision should have addressed the Dahlberg factors and labeled its findings of fact and conclusions of law as such, in this context its failure to do so does not justify reversal.

II.

A.

A temporary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that preserves the status quo pending a trial on the merits.Miller v. Foley, 317 N.W.2d 710, 712(Minn.1982).The party seeking a temporary injunction must show it lacks an adequate remedy at law and that interim relief is needed to prevent "great and irreparable injury."Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, 278 N.W.2d 81, 92(Minn.1979).The threatened injury must be real and substantial, not imagined.AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 504, 110 N.W.2d 348, 351(1961).

The granting of a temporary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the sole issue on appeal is whether there was a clear abuse of that discretion by a disregard of either the facts or principles of equity.County of Wright v. Litfin, 386 N.W.2d 757, 758(Minn.Ct.App.1986).

The trial court did not address the issue of great and irreparable injury.(Its decision rested entirely on the CLEA's likelihood of success on the merits.)We believe the CLEA has failed to meet this prerequisite for a temporary injunction.

The CLEA argues that if the District is able to avoid negotiating pending trial, this would irreparably harm the CLEA's ability to function effectively as a collective bargaining representative.The CLEA also cites decisions of the New Jersey Public Employees Relations Commission which hold that unilateral implementation of contract provisions create an irreparable chilling effect on negotiations.See, e.g., County of Morris v. Morris Council # 6, No. C0-87-169 (N.J. PERC Jan. 28, 1987).

We are unable to accept the contention that a temporary (assuming the CLEA wins at trial) end to bargaining and implementation of the District's last offer would substantially and irreparably injure the CLEA's ability to negotiate.This is not a case of a school district attempting to undermine the credibility of a teachers' bargaining representative by refusing to negotiate for a successor agreement--the parties have been negotiating for over three years and have met over 25 times.

The CLEA also argues it would have suffered irreparable injury because some teachers would have been forced to work an additional supervisory period, resulting in less preparation time and lower morale.We do not believe this constitutes an injury sufficiently "real and substantial" to justify the extraordinary remedy of a temporary injunction.

B.

The central dispute between the parties is whether the District has the right to end negotiations and implement unilaterally its last offer under PELRA because collective bargaining has reached an impasse.The trial court's order was based on its conclusions that (1) no impasse had been reached, and (2) even if there was an impasse, PELRA requires that the last contract remain in effect so long as the teachers have not served a notice of intent to strike.Although we hold that the CLEA is not entitled to a temporary injunction because it has failed to show great and irreparable injury, we will address the merits of the legal issues decided by the trial court to ensure this case is not tried on erroneous rules of law.

Impasse

Under the National Labor Relations Act(the "NLRA"), an employer may unilaterally implement its last offer when good-faith negotiations have reached an impasse.See, e.g., American Federation of Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 624(D.C.Cir.1968), aff'gTaft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 64 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1386(1967);cf.Foley Education Association v. Independent School District No. 51, 353 N.W.2d 917, 921(Minn.1984)(stating that unilateral change not unfair labor practice if employer shows there was not a bad faith refusal to bargain).The District argues this principle applies under PELRA.Since the CLEA does not dispute this, we will assume it applies for purposes of this appeal.

The trial court found that ...