Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Sims

• Decision Date: 24 November 1910
• Citation: Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Sims, 169 Ala. 295, 53 So. 826 (Ala. 1910)
• Parties: CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. SIMS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

53 So. 826

169 Ala. 295

CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. SIMS.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 24, 1910

Appeal from Circuit Court, Russell County; A. A. Evans, Judge.

Action by J. E. Sims against the Central of Georgia Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The pleadings and the issues sufficiently appear in the opinion. The general charge of the court, to which exception is reserved, is as follows: "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if you believe from the evidence in this case that there was an unreasonable delay in the transportation in the said car load of peaches from Seale, Ala., to the city of New York, and that by reason of said unreasonable delay said peaches were damaged, then the defendant in this case would be liable to the plaintiff for whatever damages he sustained by reason of said unreasonable delay in the transportation of said peaches,regardless of where, or on what part of the route, or on what line of connecting carriers the damage may have occurred."

G. L Comer, for appellant.

Glenn &amp de Graffenried, for appellee.

ANDERSON J.

This was an action for the breach of a contract of shipment whereby the defendant undertook to transport a number of crates of peaches from Seale, Ala., to New York City, and the breach assigned, in varying forms, was the failure to transport them in such a way as to prevent loss, decrease, or destruction of the value of same, and that the injury or damage to the peaches occurred on defendant's line or the connecting lines over which it undertook to transport them to New York. The special pleas from 2 to 6, inclusive, do not deny that the damage or injury occurred, after the issuance of the bill of lading and before a delivery of the peaches or before they were ready for delivery, but each of them attempts to set up certain clauses of the contract of shipment limiting the defendant's liability. The principal point insisted on being that the contract limited the defendant's liability for loss, damage, or destruction on its own line, and that said loss, damage, or destruction occurred after the peaches had been safely delivered to another carrier. These provisions, or some of them, might be effective and binding on the parties, under our decisions as to interstate shipments prior to the enactment of what is known as the Carmack amendment to section 20 of the interstate commerce law of the United States (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 386 [U. S. Comp St. 1901, p. 3169]), passed June 29, 1906 (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 906, Supp. 1909, p. 1163]), and might be now binding as to intrastate shipments, but for section 5546 of the Code of 1907. McNeill v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 161 Ala. 319, 49 So. 797; Jones' Case, 89 Ala. 376, 8 So. 61; Landers' Case, 135 Ala. 510, 33 So. 482.

The subject-matter of the present contract, the transportation of goods from one state to another, was an act of interstate commerce, and was subject to federal cognizance and regulation. Southern R. Co. v. Harrison, 119 Ala. 539, 24 So. 552, 43 L. R. A. 385, 72 Am. St. Rep. 936. And when federal statutes have been enacted governing and regulating interstate commerce, they will be recognized and enforced by the courts of this and other states. Harrison's Case, supra; M. & O. R. R. Co. v. Dismukes, 94 Ala. 131, 10 So. 289, 17 L. R. A. 113; Southern Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw, 5 Ga.App. 675, 63 S.E. 865.

So much of the interstate commerce act as amended, and as is necessary to be set out, reads as follows: "That any common carrier, railroad or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: provided, that nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under the existing law. That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof." While this act is enforceable generally by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the above-quoted part has been recognized and enforced by the courts, state and federal. Smeltzer v. St. Louis R. Co. (C. C.) 158 F. 649; Riverside Mills v. A. C. L. R. R. Co. (C. C.) 168 F. 987; So. Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw, 5 Ga.App. 675, 63 S.E. 865; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Scott, 133 Ky. 724, 118 S.W. 990; Galveston, H. & S. R. R. Co. v. Piper Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 115 S.W. 107. So, too, has it been held that this enactment was within the power of Congress and not unconstitutional. Appellant contends that the last part of the above quotation, that is so much thereof as permits the initial carrier to recover from the connecting carrier,...