Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Brown

• Decision Date: 03 February 1910
• Citation: 165 Ala. 493,51 So. 565
• Parties: CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. BROWN.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

51 So. 565

165 Ala. 493

CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. BROWN.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 3, 1910

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; H. A. Sharpe, Judge.

Action by Miles Brown against the Central of Georgia Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

London & London, for appellant.

Stallings & Drennen, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

Plaintiff sued as a passenger. The case was tried on the general issue there being no plea of contributory negligence. Plaintiff was standing upon the platform of the moving train, and according to his version of what happened, he had just released his hold upon the railing, and turned to go into the door, when a lurch of the car as it moved around a curve caused him to fall to the ground, with the result that he received the injuries complained of. It does not appear that there was anything out of the ordinary in the operation of the train, or that it was operated in a way which could have caused injury to a passenger not exposed to danger by being on the platform as was the plaintiff.

Not in every case of injury to a passenger does a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier arise from the happening of the injury. In Georgia Pacific v. Love, 91 Ala. 432, 8 So. 714, 24 Am. St. Rep. 927, this court limiting the application of certain expressions used in Louisville & Nashville v. Jones, 83 Ala. 376, 3 So. 902, said, quoting the language of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Dougherty v. Missouri Railroad, 81 Mo. 325, 51 Am. Rep. 239, "that where the vehicle or conveyance is shown to be under the control or management of the carrier or his servants, 'and the accident is such as, under an ordinary course of things, does not happen if those who have the management use proper care,' it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." It is sometimes stated that the fact that a passenger is injured on a carrier's train raises the presumption of negligence and casts upon it the burden of showing that it was not guilty of negligence. But it is evident that there are cases in which that broad statement cannot be made, for example, a case in which the plaintiff's evidence shows his injury to have resulted probably from some unavoidable cause--some cause outside the ordinary supervision and control of the carrier. In such case it would be too broad a statement of the rule to say that a presumption of negligence arises from the happening of accident and injury to a passenger, and in such case the burden must rest upon the plaintiff, in consonance with the universal rule of judicial procedure, to reasonably satisfy the jury that his injury is justly attributable to negligence on the part of the carrier. Elliott on Railroads, § 1644. This limitation upon the broad doctrine occasionally stated was recognized by this court in Montgomery & Eufaula Ry. Co. v. Mallette, 92 Ala. 209, 9 So. 363, also.

Assuming for the argument, that plaintiff received his injuries by being thrown from the platform of the train by a lurch or jerk no more violent than the lurching or jerking of trains commonly known to be a necessary incident to their rapid movement when operated with due care, as was the case which his evidence tended to show, and as was the case according to appellant's contention, an application of the principle stated above to the issue made by the pleadings and the evidence leads to the conclusion that the burden rested upon the plaintiff to reasonably satisfy the jury that his presence upon the platform while the train was in motion was due to negligence on the part of the defendant. From the evidence touching this point of the case the jury was authorized to find that the plaintiff got upon the train at Birmingham for the purpose of being carried to Columbus, Ga. The plaintiff was a negro, and the car into which he might lawfully go was a partitioned car, one-half of which was set apart for people of his race. All the seats were occupied, and the aisle was filled to its capacity with passengers standing. Plaintiff, with others, was standing near the door. At one stop--possibly at another, also--before reaching Henry Ellen, near which station plaintiff received his injuries, the conductor said to the men standing near the door that they were to give passengers room to get on and off at stations. At Henry Ellen plaintiff went out upon the platform. Passengers got on and off. Very soon after the train had moved away from the station, and just as plaintiff released his hold upon the railing and started to re-enter the door of the car, impeded somewhat by another, who had also got upon the platform, and who preceded plaintiff in passing through the door, the train struck a curve in the track, which had the effect to throw plaintiff from the platform. ...