Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 02 February 1911
• Citation: 170 Ala. 611,54 So. 509
• Parties: CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. JONES.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

54 So. 509

170 Ala. 611

CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 2, 1911

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; A. O. Lane, Judge.

Action by Mrs. R. A. Jones against the Central of Georgia Railway Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

London & Fitts, for appellant.

Gaston & Pettus, for appellee.

MAYFIELD J.

This was an action by a lady passenger, against a common carrier to recover damages sustained by her on account of the carrier's delay in delivering her baggage, in violation of its duty to promptly deliver same in accordance with its contract of carriage. The only damages sought were those in consequence of the delay in delivery. The period of delay was about 10 days in length.

Plaintiff by her contract, was a passenger from Birmingham, Ala., to the city of New York. Her route as per her contract with appellant was from Birmingham, Ala., to Savannah, Ga., over the appellant's line of railroad, and from Savannah to New York by a steamer. The appellant's agent sold her a through ticket, which included, as incident thereto, the carriage of her baggage, which consisted of her wearing apparel for her trip and her visit to New York. In consequence of the delay in delivering her baggage, she was without change of necessary dress for 10 days, except such as she of necessity had to purchase or obtain elsewhere. The evidence tended to show that she suffered some damages, such as physical pain, inconvenience, and mental worry, on account of the failure to deliver her baggage promptly.

During the examination of plaintiff as a witness in her own behalf her counsel propounded to her the following question: "What would these goods in your baggage have been worth to you the time you were out of the use of your baggage?" To this question the defendant objected, on the ground that it was a question for the jury and not for the witness' opinion. The court overruled the objection and allowed the witness to answer. The correctness of this ruling is the only assignment of error insisted on in argument. The witness answered that in her judgment it was about $500.

It was at an early date ruled in this state that a witness should not be allowed to state his opinion as to the amount of damages the plaintiff or the witness sustained, or was entitled to recover, in consequence of a given act or omission, the basis of the suit. Montgomery & West Point R. R. Co. v. Varner, 19 Ala. 185. In that case the witness was allowed to testify as to the amount of damages done to land by the construction of a railroad thereon. This was held error. This rule had been applied to a great number of subsequent cases, some of which were actions for personal injuries, some for injuries to live stock, and some actions ex contractu as for breaches of contracts. In the case of Young v. Cureton, 87 Ala. 727, 6 So. 352, it was ruled that a party could not testify as to the amount of damages he sustained by the breach of the contract on which he had sued. The reason assigned for the rule is that to allow such statements would be to substitute the witness' opinion or conclusion for that of the jury, whose exclusive province it is to draw the inferences and conclusions from the facts and circumstances in evidence.

The general rule, of course, is that witnesses must depose to facts, and cannot be allowed to give their opinions founded on these facts, or the inferences or deductions which they draw from them. To this general rule, however, there are many exceptions, as where the subject involves expert evidence, questions as to value, etc. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 440 et seq.; 1 Whart. Ev.§ 509 et seq.

Mr. Greenleaf says that the "opinion rule" of evidence is based on the thought that the opinion is superfluous and unnecessary and should not be brought into the case, because, if the opinion of that witness is allowed, then all persons having the same knowledge as the witness could be brought in to state their opinion, and the trial would thus be incumbered, without adding any essential data not already before the jury.

Mr Wharton says: "When we enter on the discussion of the admissibility of opinion, we strike a topic which is embarrassed by much ambiguity of terms." Any one who will attempt to examine the texts and adjudicated cases on this subject will be overwhelmed not only as to "ambiguity of terms," but also as to the direct conflict of opinions and decisions upon the subject. The condition of the authorities on the subject is little better than a state of anarchy. There are, however, some abstract...