Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 19 April 1906
• Citation: 40 So. 991,145 Ala. 99
• Parties: CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

40 So. 991

145 Ala. 99

CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 19, 1906

Appeal from City Court of Montgomery; W. H. Thomas, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

The Central of Georgia Railway Company was indicted for obstructing a public road, and it appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Charles P. Jones and W. F. Thetford, Jr., for appellant.

Massey Wilson, Atty. Gen., for the State.

WEAKLEY C.J.

By section 5388 of the Criminal Code (1896) three separate and distinct misdemeanors are declared in three different clauses in respect of obstructions of public roads, and these are (1) To obstruct a public road by a fence, bar, or other impediment, except by gates across the same by leave of the court of county commissioners, obtained as provided by law (2) to cut or place a tree, brush, or other obstacle across a public road so as to impede travel, and not remove the same within six hours; (3) will-fully to obstruct any public road in any way. This statute has been preserved through all our compilations, and has come to us without change from the Code of 1852, and even from Clay's Digest. The indictment charges that the appellant "did obstruct a certain public road, known as 'Pike Road,' by a freight car without leave of the board of revenue first had and obtained against the peace and dignity of the state of Alabama." It does not charge a willful obstruction, and hence was not based upon the third clause above quoted. It does not aver a failure to remove the car within six hours, and hence was not intended to find support in the second clause. It can, therefore, only be referred to, and was no doubt designed to charge an offense, under the first clause. Indeed, the argument here on behalf of the state proceeds upon the contention that the placing of the freight car upon the side track, and allowing it to remain there, as shown by the evidence, obstructed the public road by an "impediment," within the meaning of the first clause above set out.

Upon familiar rules of statutory construction, the three clauses must be construed together, and a field of operation should be found for each; and in construing each clause regard must first be had to its own language, and then to the other clauses, in the same section, adopting that meaning which makes the whole stand consistently together, if it may be done. 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 616; Lehman v Robinson, 59 Ala. 219. Furthermore, where a general term in a statute follows specific words of a like nature, it takes its meaning from the latter, and is presumed to embrace persons or things of the kind designated by the specific words. This is what is usually called the "ejusdem generis rule" of statutory construction. 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 609; Johnson v. State, 32 Ala. 583; Prim v. State, 36 Ala. 244. In Johnson v. State, 32 Ala. 583, it was intimated that an obstruction of a public road by cutting a ditch, so as to cause water to flow upon it was not within the first clause, as we have stated it, the construction not being of like character with a fence or bar, the specific words employed, and in Prim v. State, 36 Ala. 244, it was declared that the intimation was a correct construction, although it was also said that the obstruction of a public road, caused by a mill dam, erected at some distance away, backing water into a stream, so as to impede travel where the stream crosses the road, would be an offense under the third clause if willfully done. In Gude v. State, 76 Ala. 100, the defendant...