Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Brown
| Decision Date | 22 May 1901 |
| Citation | 38 S.E. 989,113 Ga. 414 |
| Parties | CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. BROWN. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A master is liable for the willful torts of his servant committed in the course of the servant's employment, just as though the master had himself committed them. This rule applies as well where the master is a corporation as where he is a private individual.
2. A railroad company is liable as a trespasser to a passenger for an unjustifiable assault made upon him by the conductor of the train, the conductor being engaged in the company's business, and in the conduct thereof making such assault and, where the same is a joint act of the conductor and a person not a servant of the company, the company and such person are joint trespassers, and the courts of the county of the latter's residence have jurisdiction, under the provisions of paragraph 4 of section 16 of article 6 of the constitution of this state, to try and determine a joint suit against them, although such county is not the county in which the cause of action originated, nor the county of the residence of the railroad company.
3. On the trial of a plea to the jurisdiction filed in such a case it is not error to refuse to submit to the jury a contention that there is no liability on the part of the only defendant who resides in the county, and that the court is, therefore, without jurisdiction over the other defendant. The question of the liability of the resident defendant should be determined on the final trial of the case, at which trial no judgment can be properly taken against either defendant unless the resident defendant be held liable.
Error from city court of Macon; W. D. Nottingham, Judge.
Action by Julius Brown against the Central of Georgia Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
Hall & Wimberly and R. C. Jordan, for plaintiff in error.
M. G. Bayne, for defendant in error.
An action for damages was brought in the city court of Macon (in Bibb county) by Julius Brown against McCowan and the Central of Georgia Railway Company. In the petition it was alleged that the plaintiff was a passenger on an excursion train of the company going from Savannah to Macon, Ga.; that on the trip the conductor, desiring to eject plaintiff from the car set aside for white persons, procured the assistance of McCowan; that a willful and unjustifiable assault and battery was committed upon him by McCowan with the acquiescence and assistance of the conductor; that they caused him to be arrested and imprisoned after the train reached Macon; that his arrest and imprisonment were unlawful and malicious; that McCowan was a resident of Bibb county, in which the suit was brought, and that the defendant company was a corporation of this state; that in the assault and battery of plaintiff, McCowan and the conductor acted jointly, and that the defendants were jointly liable to him in damages. The railroad company filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the ground that the acts complained of were not committed in Bibb county, but in the county of Washington, and that suit could be brought against the company, under the provisions of section 2334 of the Civil Code, in that county only in which the cause of action originated, or, if it had no agent in that county, in the county of its residence. The issues made by the plea to the jurisdiction were tried apart from the main case. Evidence was introduced by both sides. From this evidence it appeared that the acts alleged to constitute an assault and battery were committed in Washington county. Evidence was also introduced upon the merits of the case, the defendant company seeking thereby to justify the acts of the conductor and those of McCowan, while the plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the assault was unwarranted and unjustifiable. After the close of the evidence the trial judge directed a verdict against the plea to the jurisdiction. To this the company excepted.
1, 2. It was argued that under the provisions of section 2334 of the Civil Code, providing for the venue of suits against railroad companies, the courts of Bibb county were without jurisdiction in this case. Had the company alone been sued for acts committed in another county, it was admitted that this Code section would be controlling; but counsel for the plaintiff contended that the court had jurisdiction under paragraph 4 of section 16 of article 6 of the constitution of this state. This constitutional provision (Civ. Code, § 5872) is as follows: "Suits against joint obligors, joint promisors, co-partners, or joint trespassers, residing in different counties, may be tried in either county." Whether this suit was properly brought must, then, depend upon whether McCowan and the railroad company were liable to the plaintiff, under the allegations of his petition, as "joint trespassers." Under those allegations both McCowan and the conductor were clearly liable in an action of trespass, and we must determine whether the company was liable for the acts of the conductor, so as to make it answerable therefor in an action of like kind. One of the first questions which arises is whether a corporation can be sued in trespass. It is curious and interesting to read of the evalution of the doctrine that a corporation can be so sued. At an earlier period it was supposed that a corporation could not commit a tort, and that no action sounding in tort would lie against it; that the corporation was created for lawful purposes, and had no power to do anything unlawful and that, whenever, its servants, agents, or officers exceeded the charter authority by doing an unlawful act, they necessarily committed the act as individuals, and not as representatives of the corporation. Later cases entirely repudiated this doctrine, and it is now universally held that corporations may, in certain cases, be held liable in actions sounding in tort. Among the older decisions will also be found instances in which courts have held that a corporation could in no instance be held guilty of a trespass, because the corporation had no arms with which to commit it, and could not beat or be beaten. Another reason given for holding that a corporation could not be sued in trespass was that capias and exigent would not lie against it, as it had no body to be seized. Modern decisions show that, while a corporation has itself no arms to commit a trespass, it has the right, and exercises it, to employ servants and agents whose acts are the acts of the corporation, and who can and do commit trespass; and that the writs of capias and exigent are unknown to the law of this county. The courts therefore hold that an action of trespass, as well as of trespass on the case, can and will lie against a corporation. 5 Thomp. Corp. § 6305; Railroad Co. v. Dalby, 19 Ill. 353; Whiteman v. Railroad Co., 2 Har. (Del.) 514, 33 Am.Dec. 411; Ramsden v. Railroad Co., 104 Mass. 117, 6 Am.Rep. 200; Railway Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314. The result of these cases is to settle definitely the proposition that a corporation is answerable for the torts of its servants in the same cases and in the same manner and form of action in which other masters are liable for the torts of their servants. Tayl. Priv. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 336. Some of the courts seem at one time to have been inclined to hold that a master could not be held liable for the willful torts of his servant, because, it was said, if the servant, through anger or malice, committed an assault upon a person, he ceased for the time being to occupy the position of servant, and acted independently; that, inasmuch as he was not authorized to commit an assault, he did not represent the master in that act, but acted as an individual, the master, therefore, being not liable either in case...
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