Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 31 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. S021168,S021168
• Citation: 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208,3 Cal.4th 181
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 832 P.2d 924 CENTRAL PATHOLOGY SERVICE MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent. Constance HULL, et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 208

10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208

3 Cal.4th 181, 832 P.2d 924

CENTRAL PATHOLOGY SERVICE MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent.

Constance HULL, et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. S021168.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 31, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1992.

Bonne, Jones, Bridges, Mueller, O'Keefe, Kenneth N. Mueller, John Aitelli, Los Angeles, John D. McCurdy, D. Scott Elliot, Redlands, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Kent L. Richland and Roxanne Huddleston, Beverly Hills, for petitioners.

Horvitz & Levy, S. Thomas Todd and David S. Ettinger, Encino, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

David M. Harney, Carl McMahan, Los Angeles, Thomas Kallay, Esner & Marylander, Stuart B. Esner and Grant Marylander, Santa Monica, for Real Parties in Interest.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

Real parties in interest (plaintiffs) brought suit against petitioners (defendants) alleging claims based on negligent medical practices. Subsequently, plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint to add two causes of action based on intentional tort theories and to claim punitive damages for those intentional torts. The trial court (respondent) concluded Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, ¹ restricting prayers for punitive damages in actions "arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider," did not apply to plaintiffs' punitive damages claims and granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. Defendants sought review after the Court of Appeal summarily denied their petition for a writ of mandate to compel respondent court to vacate its order. We granted defendants' petition for review and issued an alternative writ of mandate. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude the trial court erred; we therefore remand this case to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order granting plaintiffs' leave to amend their complaint and directing the trial court to conduct further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein.

I. FACTS

In March 1990, plaintiffs Constance and Michael Hull filed a complaint for damages against multiple defendants including petitioners Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc., and Central Pathology Services Medical Group, Inc. (collectively Central Pathology), Elizabeth Irwin, M.D., and Elizabeth Irwin, M.D., Inc. (collectively Irwin). The complaint asserted causes of action for medical negligence and loss of consortium based on the failure of defendants to care for and treat Constance Hull.

In February 1991, approximately two months before the case was scheduled to be tried, plaintiffs moved for leave to file an amended complaint, seeking to add causes of action for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The new causes of action alleged that Irwin performed a pap smear on Constance, which was sent to Central Pathology for analysis. It was further alleged that despite the presence of abnormal cells, defendants failed to notify Constance that she was developing cancer; that Central Pathology, after being ordered to retest all persons tested in the past five years, intentionally failed to notify Constance that she should be retested; and that Irwin denied using Central Pathology in an effort to cover up her medical negligence. The cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleged that defendants acted in an outrageous manner with the intent to cause severe emotional distress. Plaintiffs sought punitive damages under the new causes of action.

Central Pathology opposed the motion to amend the complaint, asserting the proffered amendment failed to meet the requirements of section 425.13, subdivision (a) (section 425.13(a)), because the amendment was untimely and because plaintiffs would be unable to show there was a substantial probability they would prevail on their claims for punitive damages. Irwin likewise argued the motion was untimely. In response, plaintiffs contended that section 425.13(a) did not apply to the proposed amendments. ²

The trial court agreed with plaintiffs and granted the motion to amend, stating section 425.13(a) was not "a bar to the fraud or intentional infliction [of emotional distress] cause[s] of action, and the punitive [damage] allegation against the health care provider." The court concluded that although section 425.13(a) applies to professional negligence causes of action, the causes of action alleged in the amended complaint did not relate to such negligence.

After the Court of Appeal summarily denied defendants' petition for a writ of mandate, we granted review and issued an alternative writ of mandate.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Background

Section 425.13(a) establishes a procedure for claiming punitive damages in certain cases. It provides, "In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider, no claim for punitive damages shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court may allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive damages on a motion by the party seeking the amended pleading and on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code...." (Italics added.)

The trial court relied on Bommareddy v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1017, 272 Cal.Rptr. 246, to support its conclusion that section 425.13(a) is inapplicable when a plaintiff seeks punitive damages for intentional torts allegedly committed by health care providers. In Bommareddy, the defendant doctor sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to strike a claim for punitive damages that was based on a cause of action for medical battery, claiming the provisions of section 425.13 were applicable. (Bommareddy, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1018, 272 Cal.Rptr. 246.) In rejecting the doctor's claim, the court concluded, " '[p]rofessional negligence' as used in ... section 425.13[ (a) ] is a term of art that does not include intentional torts ... even when occurring during the provision of medical services." (Id. at p. 1024, 272 Cal.Rptr. 246.) The court based this conclusion on its view of the legislative history of section 425.13(a) and its determination that limiting the application of section 425.13(a) to professional negligence of a health care provider would not render the statute meaningless. (Bommareddy, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1021, 272 Cal.Rptr. 246.) Defendants argue that the reasoning of Bommareddy is flawed and should be disapproved. We agree.

B. Statutory Language

In determining the meaning of a statute, we are guided by the following principles: " '[O]ur first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute Sthemselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import.... The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. [Citations.] Where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation. [Citation.] Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent. ... [Citations.]' " (Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 268, 284 Cal.Rptr. 718, 814 P.2d 704.)

We must construe the first sentence of section 425.13(a). It provides that the statute applies to "any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider...." We will consider the meaning of the critical words "professional negligence" and "arising out of" as used in section 425.13(a).

"Professional negligence" is no stranger to statutory definition. In 1975, the Legislature passed the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) containing no fewer than six sections defining "professional negligence" as "a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital." (§§ 364, subd. (f)(2), 667.7, subd. (e)(4), 1295, subd. (g)(2); Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6146, subd. (c)(3); Civ.Code, §§ 3333.1, subd. (c)(2), 3333.2, subd. (c)(2).) Although the Legislature did not repeat that definition in section 425.13, we must presume that the Legislature was familiar with existing statutory definitions. (Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977, fn. 10, 140 Cal.Rptr. 669, 568 P.2d 394.) Therefore, we find that the existing definition was intended to apply to section 425.13.

Next we turn to the meaning of "arising out of" as used in section 425.13(a). Although "arising out of" is not defined in section 425.13 or the MICRA statutes, ³ other cases have defined the term. " 'The phrase "arising out of" is equated with origination, growth or flow from the event.' [Citations.]" (Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Civil Service Employees Ins. Co. 1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 26, 32, 108 Cal.Rptr. 737; see also Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 377, 386, 150 Cal.Rptr. 841 ["arise" means to originate from specified source or to come...