Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Paslick

• Decision Date: 23 January 1917
• Docket Number: 65.
• Parties: CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. PASLICK.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

239 F. 713

CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. PASLICK.

No. 65.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 23, 1917

Henry L. de Forest, of New York City, for plaintiff in error.

Frank J. Felbel, of New York City, for defendant in error.

Before COXE, ROGERS, and HOUGH, Circuit Judges.

HOUGH Circuit Judge.

Paslick sued in reliance on the federal Employers' Liability Act and the only question here presented is whether he received the injuries for which action is brought at a time when he was engaged in the defendant in error's share of interstate commerce. Pedersen v. Railway, 229 U.S 146, 33 Sup.Ct. 648, 57 L.Ed. 1125, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153; North Carolina R.R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248, 58 L.Ed. 591, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 159. ^[1] That he was a servant of the railroad company is admitted. Plaintiff below was a helper in the blacksmith shop appurtenant to and part of the repair establishment of the railroad company, a carrier admittedly engaged in interstate commerce. It is, in effect the finding of the jury that Paslick was hurt by the negligent descent of a steam hammer which at the time was working on the repair of a Baltimore & Ohio car. From this fact it is urged that the repair of a car-- an instrumentality of commerce belonging to another interstate carrier, which must have come from another state, would naturally there return, and is only used and usable in that movement which is commerce-- brought Paslick within the Pedersen Case, supra, and enabled him (as may be inferred from the pleadings) to evade the operation of the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Law (P.L. 1911, p. 134)

It is not profitable to discuss the cases following the Pedersen decision, further than to point out that in Chicago etc., R.R. v. Harrington, 241 U.S.at page 180, 36 Sup.Ct. 517, 60 L.Ed. 941, it was held that the true test of employment in interstate commerce in the sense intended by the statute is, 'Was the employe at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it? ' This decision was filed after trial in the court below, and was here relied on as leaving to the jury the duty of answering under the evidence herein the question above stated. On the day this writ was argued, however, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in Minneapolis, etc., Co. v. Winters, 242 U.S. 353, 37 Sup.Ct. 170, 61 L.Ed. . . . (No. 420 Oct. Term, 1...