Central Trust Co. v. Cameron Iron & Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1891
• Citation: 47 F. 136
• Parties: CENTRAL TRUST CO. v. CAMERON IRON & COAL CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

47 F. 136

CENTRAL TRUST CO. v. CAMERON IRON & COAL CO.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

July 9, 1891

Francis Rawle, for petitioner.

A. H Joline and William P. Schell, Jr., for Central Trust Co.

Before ACHESON and REED, JJ.

ACHESON J.

The petitioner's claim purports to be against a building which it describes thus: 'The said building is built of stone, and constitutes a series of coke-ovens, for coking coal. ' These ovens, it would seem, are of the ordinary size and form. Now, we know, from common observation, that coke-ovens are about six feet in height, and are arched over at the top, a hold being left in the crown for the exit of gases, and for the introduction of coal, with a door in front for the discharge of the coke, which during the burning process is walled up. Is, then, a coke-oven a 'building,' within the meaning of the mechanic's lien act of 1836? The word as there used cannot be held to include every species of erection on land. Truesdell v Gay, 13 Gray, 311. 'Taken in its broadest sense,' says the court in that case, 'it can mean only an erection intended for use and occupation as a habitation, or for some purpose of trade, manufacture ornament, or use, constituting a fabric or edifice, such as a house, a store, a church, a shed. ' That a coke-oven is not intended as a habitation or for shelter is certain. Neither is it capable of occupation and use for the purpose of trade, etc., in the sense of the above definition. It is no more a building than is any other oven erected on land for the purpose of baking bread, or drying any substance. In the recent case of Cowdrick v. Morris, 9 Pa.Co.Ct.R. 312, it was decided by the court of common pleas of Center county, Pa., that a lime-kiln is not a building within the scope of the mechanic's lien law. But if a lime-kiln is not such a building, neither is a coke-oven. In the case of Truesdell v. Gay, supra, it was held that a wall built around three sides of the stack of an iron furnace at a distance of a few feet from it, in order to protect it from earth slides, was not a building within the meaning of such a law. It is worthy here of note that since the act of June 16, 1836, giving a mechanic's lien against buildings, there has been supplemental legislation expressly extending the act to steam-engines, coal-breakers, pump-gearing, etc., (Act April 21, 1856; P.L. 496,) and, in certain counties, to 'improvements, pumps, engines, tanks,' etc., (Act Feb. 27, 1868; P.L. 212,) connected with oil refineries, and to 'oil-tanks,' whether connected with a refinery or not. Thus have we in subsequent statutes in pari materia a legislative indication of the meaning of the word 'building' which should govern in the construction of the original act. U.S. v. Freeman, 3 How. 556. We do not think that the cases of Short v. Miller, 120 Pa.St. 470, 14 Atl.Rep. 374; Short v. Ames, 121 Pa.St. 530, 15 Atl.Rep. 607; and Titusville Iron-Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 130 Pa.St. 24, 18 Atl.Rep. 739,--sustain the position taken by the petitioner. In our judgment, in no reasonable sense can a coke-oven be said to be a building.

But, if the contrary conclusion were admissible, still another obstacle confronts the petitioner. The mortgage of the Cameron Iron & Coal Company to the Central Trust Company was recorded August 8, 1888, whereas the contract between the Cameron Iron...