Central Trust Co. v. Texas & St. L. Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 02 April 1886 |
Citation | 27 F. 178 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Parties | CENTRAL TRUST CO. v. TEXAS & ST. L. RY. CO. (BORDEN and another, Intervenor.) [1] |
Charles G. B. Drummond, for intervenor.
Phillips & Stewart, for receiver.
In the Texas & St. Louis Railway Case, intervening petition by Borden, Sellick & Co., the claim was referred to the master, by him reported, and exceptions to his report were presented. The claim amounted to $2,205.75. It was for scales, trucks, letter-presses, and things of that kind which were sold and delivered to the road during the period between August 1, 1882, and January 4, 1884. The master reported in favor of the entire amount as a general claim against the road, and gave a lien prior to the lien of the mortgagees for $1,541.60, the price of the goods delivered after September 1, 1883; but declined to award a lien for the balance, $654.15, which was sold and delivered between August 1, 1882, and September 1, 1883, holding that it did not come within the orders of the court respecting claims for materials furnished; and the question now presented is whether the master erred in rejecting the claim for a prior lien for that balance.
Two questions are presented.
First. It is claimed that the goods thus delivered were lienable goods, and that under the railroad lien law of your state although the goods, the trucks, scales, and letter-presses did not pass into the structure, yet, as they became a part of the permanent equipment, they were within the scope of that act. The only difference of moment between the railroad lien law and the general mechanic's lien law is that in the former the word 'fuel' is used, giving to those who sell fuel, as well as to those who do labor and furnish materials, a lien. Of course, fuel does not pass into the structure of the road, and, by reason of the use of that word 'fuel,' it is claimed that the intent of the legislature was to enlarge the scope of the word 'material,' and make it include anything and everything which passed, not merely into the structure, but into the permanent equipment.
In the intervention of the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, in this same case of Central Trust Co. v. Texas & St. L.R. Co., reported in 23 F. 703, we examined that statute, and were of the opinion that such was not a fair construction; that although 'fuel' was named in the statute as a matter in respect to which a lien might be claimed, yet it was not the intent of the legislature, by the use of that word, to enlarge the scope of the word 'material,' as used in ordinary lien laws. It is true that oil does not pass into the permanent equipment, but is a matter for daily consumption; and counsel seek to distinguish this case from that, in that these matters pass into the permanent equipment. I do not think there is any reason to depart from the construction we then placed upon the...
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